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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that the limited application of postcolonial perspectives in European Union 
(EU) enlargement studies, and especially in studying power relations, has led to a failure to 
properly identify and examine the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. 
Current studies of enlargement are largely based on mainstream positivist theories and thus 
overlook the importance of a post-positivist, critical and interpretivist research framework in 
understanding the EU and power relations. In contrast, by adopting postcolonialist 
perspectives and applying them to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents 
a critical discourse analysis of the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with 
officials of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams in order to demonstrate the extent to 
which the EU produces unequal power relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism 
and mimicry that have so far been identified and discussed by postcolonial scholars. Each of 
these three perspectives has so far been obscured to a large extent from the enlargement 
literature, as a result of the limited application of postcolonial approaches in EU studies. This 
thesis aims therefore to address this gap and advance the postcolonial research on the EU and 
unequal power relations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The foundation of this thesis has its origins two decades ago, in an obscure question that I 
asked myself when observing a poster in 1994, when the referendum vote for joining the 
European Union (EU) was prepared in Sweden. The poster in question (see National Library 
of Sweden, 2008) captured the slogan Ja till Europa (Swedish for “Yes to Europe”), 
suggesting that Sweden’s EU accession1 was a way of entering Europe. However, this slogan 
made me question when did Sweden ever leave Europe and when did the EU become the 
embodiment of Europe? My understanding had always been that Sweden was a European 
country regardless of any EU accession, while the EU was a union of states and unrelated to 
any entry to Europe.  
 
The opacity that this slogan created was rooted in my own personal background. Born in a 
family with origins in most (of what one may call) European countries and raised in both the 
so called Eastern and Western Europe, I had personally never been exposed to an 
understanding that Europe was anything else apart from a continent formed by a number of 
countries. Yet, the process of EU enlargement introduced this discourse, which implicitly 
indicated a process of exclusion from and inclusion in Europe based on EU membership. 
During the years that followed and especially through my academic studies, I came across 
this kind of analogy several times, for instance when Italy captured a similar motto, Entrare 
                                                          
1 The act of joining the EU upon satisfactorily completing accession negotiations and thus becoming a member 
state (European Union, 2015c). 
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l’Europa (Italian for “Entering Europe”), prior to joining the Euro zone in 1999 (cited in 
Risse, 2009, p.154).  
 
However, it was not until the fifth enlargement2 when I noticed an extensive use of slogans 
and especially statements, which made references to EU accession as an entry ticket to 
Europe. For instance, the Hungarian pro-EU accession campaign encouraged a “return to 
Europe” (Andor, 2000:2), while Romanian President Traian Băsescu declared on the day of 
Romania’s EU accession (1 January 2007) that “We arrived in Europe. Welcome to Europe” 
(BBC, 2007). And during the most recent EU enlargement round, Croatia’s pro-EU slogan 
captured "Europe or the Balkans”, with President Ivo Josipovic declaring after the Croatian 
positive EU referendum that “Today’s decision determined Croatia as a European nation” 
(NineMsn, 2012). Furthermore, European Commission President Romano Prodi also 
rendered Europe to the ideals and visions of the EU in his publication Europe as I see it 
(2004), while the more recent State of the Union 2012 Address3 (European Commission, 
2012) by European Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso captured the close 
congruence between Europe and the EU, when concluding that “a better, stronger and a more 
united Europe” can only be built upon “the values that are at the heart of the European 
Union”.  
 
In response to the above and in contrast to the Swedish and Italian campaigns mentioned 
previously, slogans and statements produced during the fifth enlargement seemed to attach a 
stigma of difference between applicants4 and the EU to a larger extent, especially slogans and 
statements produced by the EU and its member states. For instance, in 2003 French President 
                                                          
2 Refers to the fifth round of EU enlargement, which started in March 1998 when the accession process was 
launched (European Union, 2007).  
3 Annual speech on the state of the EU by the European Commission President.  
4 A state, which has submitted an application for membership to the EU and its application is under examination 
(European Commission, 2013m). 
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Jacques Chirac called some of the then acceding5 and candidate states6 as "badly brought up" 
(The Irish Times, 2003) and some of their actions as "infantile" and "dangerous". Chirac’s 
purposive statement suggested that as non-members of the EU, these countries did not know 
how to behave. The stigma of difference was clearly implied when Chirac concluded that 
"when you are in the family ... you have more rights than when you are asking to join and 
knocking on the door" (CNN, 2003). Prodi endorsed Chirac’s statement, stating that the 
candidate and acceding states did not seem to understand the meaning of the EU: "I have 
been very, very sad, but I am also patient by nature, so I hope they will understand that 
sharing the future means sharing the future" (The Irish Times, 2003). As indicated by Maria 
Mälksoo, such statements provide clear evidence that the EU rendered the fifth enlargement 
applicants as children in no position to take decisions, but who needed the guidance of the 
EU (2009:66). In the same vein, Boris Buden indicates that the applicants were regarded as 
being “in diapers” (2010a:4) and as “a landscape of historical ruins that is inhabited only by 
children, immature people unable to organize their lives democratically without guidance” 
(2010a:5), in contrast to the EU, who represented “’the better world’”, which applicants 
should emulate (2010a:4).  
 
The above discussion deserves closer attention because it suggests that during the fifth 
enlargement the EU may have produced discourses based on alterity between the EU as 
Europe and applicants as the Other. What is distinctive about this is the fact that the EU 
seemed to have revived the Enlightenment discourse about the existence of the superior 
Europe and the inferior Other. Such a discourse has been covered by numerous scholars 
                                                          
5 Also known as accession country (a legalistic and unclear concept), a candidate country, which has completed 
negotiations and has signed an accession treaty or is waiting ratification by the member states (European 
Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m).  
6 Also referred to as prospective, aspiring or would-be members, EU contenders, possible/likely/potential future 
member, refers to a country which is negotiating or waiting to start negotiations with the EU after the European 
Council has confirmed to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences (European Commission 2013b, 
2013j, 2013m). 
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(Delanty, 1995; Wolff, 1995; Neumann, 1996, 1999:207; Wilson and van der Dussen, 1996; 
Malmborg and Stråth, 2002; Kuus, 2004:475; Best, 2006:186; Kármán, 2010). In particular, 
Larry Wolff’s Inventing Eastern Europe presents how Western European Enlightenment 
thinkers created images of an immature, backward and Eastern Other (1994:356), which was 
regarded as “standing somewhere between barbarism and civilization, evaluated with respect 
to a standard set in Western Europe”, which was identified as mature, developed and superior 
(1994:95). In the same vein, Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans provides an insightful 
examination of how Western Enlightenment thinkers shaped the image of the Balkans as “a 
repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image 
of the “European” and the “West”” was produced (1997:188; see also Bakic-Hayden, 
1995:917-918; Stenning, 2005:378). Real or imaginary, the Enlightenment discourse aimed 
to identify the existence of a superior and distinctive Europe, who distributed her knowledge 
to what was considered a backward non-European Eastern Other. This inevitably created 
power asymmetry, by establishing a sense of European superiority over the inferior Other 
(Pagden, 2004b:41 and 50-51).  
 
In the same way, it seems to that the EU also created discourses in which the Union and the 
candidates existed in opposition to the other, which inevitably constructed “an unequal 
dichotomy” (McLeod, 2010:49). Thus, based on my original question that I asked at the 
beginning of this chapter and the above reflections, these raised questions of why and how 
are such discourses created, to whose benefits and what impact do they have? Most 
importantly, it made me question the extent to which these EU discourses frame relations of 
power and in particular produce unequal power relations. And if such unequal relations are 
produced, could these relations be changed and how? An interest in both the production and 
change/emancipation of power relations has been in particular raised by Stephen Bates 
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(2010). Bates engages with the argument that power is not only about understanding for 
instance production of domination, but also understanding how emancipation of the 
dominated can occur (2010:373). In other words, studies of power can therefore sustain an 
understanding of how structures are power phenomena that constrain, but also of structures as 
power phenomena that can lead to change and emancipation (2010:374). 
 
Literature review and research questions 
The vast literature on the EU provides a useful framework in which different aspects of the 
Union have been examined (Dinan, 1999, 2004, 2014; McCormick, 1999, 2011; Featherstone 
and Radaelli, 2003; Nugent, 2006, 2010; Hix, 2008; Bomberg et al., 2012a; Kenealy et al., 
2015). In particular EU enlargement has attracted a great deal of interest (Baun, 2000; Kaiser 
and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schneider, 2012; 
Gateva 2015). Especially when discussing enlargement policy, which has often been 
discussed in terms of asymmetrical relations (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002; Papadimitriou 
and Phinnemore, 2008; Avery, 2012; Gateva, 2014), the bulk of enlargement studies are 
largely dominated by positivist approaches (Moravscik, 1993, 1995, 1998; Heinemann-
Grȕder, 2002; Ortino et al., 2004; Schmitter, 2005; Burgess, 2009, 2010; MacMillan, 2009; 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Niemann with Schmitter, 2009; Hill and Smith, 2011; 
Tatham, 2011; Franchino, 2012; Bochsler and Szöcsik, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, in recent years, post-positivist research on the EU has expanded, especially 
through the publication of the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, which has in particular 
examined EU enlargement and power relations (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Engel-Di Mauro, 
2001, 2006a; Böröcz, 2005; 2006a, 2009; Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Zielonka, 2006, 2008; 
Behr, 2007; Bhambra, 2007; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007; Mälksoo, 2009; Fisher Onar and 
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Nicolaïdis, 2013; Hansen and Jonsson, 2014). However, although these studies have added 
value to EU literature, there is still a dearth of postcolonial research into understanding the 
extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Such unexplored avenues include 
broader application of postcolonial perspectives and of adequate research methods, as well as 
engagement with the postcolonial examination of the 2007 enlargement7. Thus, this thesis 
argues therefore that the literature is missing adequate applications of post-positivist theories 
(Geyer, 2003; Rosamond, 2007; Manners and Whitman, 2016), in particular postcolonial 
perspectives, in studying power relations, which has led to a failure to properly identify how 
the EU produces unequal power relations.  
 
Thus, while EU focused postcolonial scholarship constructs a partial picture of EU 
enlargement and power relations, I propose that the literature has been silent about the 
following research questions, which this thesis will aim to answer:  
 
 To what extent can a postcolonial examination demonstrate how the EU produces 
unequal power relations in the enlargement context?  
 How can we reveal such unequal power relations?  
 In which way does a postcolonial examination contribute to our understanding of EU 
enlargement and the production of unequal power relations?  
 
Here, my understanding of unequal power relations as used in this current thesis is based on 
Norman Fairclough’s definition of power relations, as the interaction between two or more 
actors, but which can become unequal when actors (known as dominant bloc or powerful 
                                                          
7 Also known as the second wave of the fifth enlargement, it refers to the process of enlargement of Bulgaria 
and Romania and which culminated in the accession of both countries in 2007 (European Union, 2007).  
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participant) exercise control and constraint of contributions and discourses of other actors 
(known as non-powerful actor) (Fairclough, 2001:27 and 38-39). 
 
Thus, by building upon the current postcolonial literature, and in particular EU focused 
postcolonial scholarship, and asking the above research questions, this thesis aims to 
introduces the application of three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and 
mimicry, in order to critically explore and rethink the way we understand the EU as a 
postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced and thus contribute to the 
expansion of postcolonial research on EU enlargement.  
 
Case-study: the Romanian enlargement  
In order to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, this 
research will focus on one case-study, the Romanian enlargement. In this current thesis, the 
Romanian enlargement refers to the enlargement process, which took place between March 
1998 when the accession process was launched 8  with Romania and January 2007 when 
Romania accessed the EU and became a member state (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 
2008:40 and 72). The reason for choosing this case-study is two–fold. First, although the fifth 
enlargement is regarded as a major source of academic scrutiny and interest (Hall and Danta, 
2000; Ingham and Ingham, 2002; Poole, 2003; Dimitrova, 2004a; Kuus; 2004; Verdun and 
Croci, 2005; Önkol, 2009; Daborwski and Rostowski, 2012; Yoji, 2015), its second wave9 of 
enlargement has been less researched (Phinnemore, 2006b; Noutcheva and Bechev, 
2008:123). In other words, studies of the Romanian enlargement are curtailed (Henderson, 
                                                          
8 The actual accession negotiations began first in February 2000.  
9 Due to the complexity of the fifth enlargement, it was decided early in the process that this enlargement would 
take place in waves, meaning that applicants would access at different periods based on their ability to fulfil the 
accession criteria. The first wave culminated in the accession of ten countries in May 2004. The second wave 
culminated with the accession of two countries in January 2007 (Phinnemore, 1999:73; European Union, 2007; 
O’Brennan, 2007:34). 
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1999; Farrell et.al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005, 2009; Pridham, 2007a). Such a scholarly gap has 
been explained as an effect of the big-bang excitement that the first wave of enlargement 
brought and which drew more academic attention (Phinnemore, 2006a:43, 2011:92). 
However, the fact that the Romanian enlargement is under-studied is in itself highly 
indicative of an exclusion of this particular enlargement from the literature. This thesis argues 
therefore that a postcolonial examination of the Romanian enlargement is instrumental in 
demonstrating that this enlargement is not “a minor area of curiosity”, but merits “serious 
attention on the same terms” as other enlargements (McLeod, 2010:18).  
 
Moreover, as EU enlargements are “individualised and personalised” processes, the focus on 
the Romanian enlargement can be enlightening of any distinctive dynamics between the EU 
and the production of power relations (see Vromen, 2010:255). This relates to the argument 
that although the steps in an enlargement process are applied in similar ways to all applicants, 
every enlargement is also subjected to individual and personalised processes (Bojkov, 2004; 
Sadurski, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2009). For 
instance, scholars have drawn attention to the fact that Romania’s lengthier and stricter 
enlargement process has been infused with unprecedented requirements and thus was 
different than for example the 2004 enlargement. Such a different pattern of enlargement has 
led to questions of the extent to which this process impacted upon EU-Romania relations 
(Blokker, 2008:266; see also O’Brennan, 2006; Pridham, 2007a:353 and 351; 2007c:534; 
Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009; Ashbrook, 2010; Lawrence, 2010). In light of 
the above, the Romanian enlargement can therefore be particularly indicative of what 
postcolonial assumptions can be identified in the production of unequal power relations (see 
McLeod, 2010:179).   
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Second, another aspect that makes the Romanian enlargement a pertinent case-study is 
Romania’s constitution as an Other and a subaltern during the enlargement process, which 
has been identified by a range of scholars (see for instance Burgess, 1997:107; Deltcheva, 
2000; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Pagden, 2004a; Kamińska, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Engel-
Di Mauro, 2006a; Sellar et.al., 2009:255; Kovačević, 2012). Such an understanding 
originates primarily in the EU’s representations of Romania as a laggard in comparison to 
other applicants (Baun, 2000:126; Phinnemore, 2006b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004, 
2008; Verdun, 2005:12-13; Pridham, 2007a:350, 2007c:527; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a). 
This aspect has not gone unchallenged by a number of scholars, who have observed that these 
representations produced processes of othering and subalternity (Kuus, 2007; Buden, 2010a). 
For instance, Merje Kuus indicates that Romania’s othering was enabled through its 
demarcation “as not-yet-fully European” (2004:474 and 477, 2006:227; see also Kürti, 1996; 
Burgess, 1997:22 and 62; Agnew, 2001; Sjursen, 2002:506; Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004:574-575; Stenning, 2005:378; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:13; Lazarus, 
2012:122), while Lucian Boia maintains that Romania’s othering could be observed in the 
EU’s representation of the country as an “exotic land: somewhere ‘out there’, on the margins 
of Europe” (2001:8). Similar interpretations are also to be found in the results of Amprenta 
României (Footprint Romania), a study, which presents perceptions of Romania in Brussels 
six months prior to Romania’s accession to the EU. The study identifies that Romania was 
perceived as old-fashioned and as something of an exotic appearance on the European scene, 
despite its proximity to EU accession (Euractiv, 2006; Pridham, 2007c:533). Moreover, Judit 
Timár raises concerns about subalternity, arguing that during the fifth enlargement EU 
experts emerged as the voice/s of the candidates, but which Timár regards as “ignorant of the 
region and the country which they are supposed to study” (2004:535; see also Csepeli et. al., 
1996:497; Velickovic, 2012:164). According to John Thieme, the effect of such a practice 
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could be regarded as an “equivalent of the culturally underrepresented colonies of the late 
nineteenth- century European empires” and thus in “danger” of airbrushing “off the map” the 
candidates’ voices (2005:3). On these grounds, EU representations can be identified as 
important referents in shaping Romania as an Other and a subaltern.  
 
Research methods 
In order to gain in-depth understanding (Vromen, 2010:255; see also Kvale, 2007:x-xi) of the 
ways in which the EU produces unequal power relations and extract observations of aspects 
of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry and thus demonstrate how different postcolonial 
perspectives inform the analysis, this thesis relies on the qualitative research methods of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) and interviews. The quantitative method of content analysis 
has been briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection and 
thus support the findings of CDA and interviews.  
 
Critical discourse analysis was employed because it engages specifically with examining 
production of unequal power relations (Fairclough, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2011; Wodak, 1995, 
2007; Van Dijk, 2003; Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2007). This thesis proposes that the 
most relevant CDA model for the purpose of this current research is Norman Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional CDA (Fairclough, 2001, 2010). This model draws particular attention to 
the production of unequal power relations “through focusing upon language" (Fairclough, 
1989:4, 2001:34; Krźyzanowski and Wodak, 2009:27; Fairclough et. al., 2011:358) and aims 
to change unequal power relations and emancipate subordinated groups (Jones, 2007:356; see 
also Sidaway, 2000:594; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2001:89-90; Fairclough, 2001:2; Weiss 
and Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357; Gee, 2011:9). It should be noted that 
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Fairclough distinctly refers to language as discourse (2001:17 and 18-19) and thus language 
and discourse will be used interchangeably throughout the current thesis. 
 
The correlation between power relations and language is explained through Fairclough’s 
argument that one way of producing unequal power relations is by controlling discourses and 
contributions and constraining what is said and done, what relations are enacted and what 
positions are determined in and behind discourse 10  (2001:36 and 38-39). Furthermore, 
Fairclough’s CDA model, which is based on three dimensions of discourse analysis, viz. 
description, interpretation and explanation, is applied upon three dimensions of discourse, 
viz. text, discourse practices and sociocultural practices. The contribution of the three-
dimensional CDA is that it engages with a comprehensive analysis of the production of 
unequal power relations in and behind discourse, by examining text (micro level), how text is 
produced and interpreted (meso level) and how context affects and is affected by discourse 
(macro level) 11 (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:181).  
 
The research method of conducting interviews was employed to answer the research 
questions due to the fact that using interviews in conjunction with the three-dimensional 
CDA model ensures “a more balanced approach” (Grix, 2010:126-127; see also Pierce, 
2008:46), especially as CDA is a method that is influenced by the interpretation/s of the 
researcher, such as what the researcher “’sees’ in a text, what one regards as worth 
describing, and what one chooses to emphasize” (Fairclough, 2001:22). Furthermore, as the 
interview method will introduce the experiences, understandings, interpretations, etc. of 
individuals, who had been involved in the Romanian enlargement, the interview material will 
familiarize us further with the dynamics between the EU and the production of power 
                                                          
10 The aspects of in and behind discourse will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
11 Each of these elements will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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relations, seen through the interviewees’ eyes (see Vromen, 2010:258; see also Kvale, 
2007:8; Pierce, 2008:45; Grix, 2010:121; Bryman, 2012:213 and 471).  
 
In order to examine how the EU produces unequal power relations with a focus on the 
Romanian enlargement, the method of CDA will be applied to the language of two sets of EU 
monitoring documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report12 (see 
Vromen, 2010:262), which include the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement 
progress (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274). The interview material will be examined as 
an observation of how the interviewees’ perspectives support or differ from the CDA 
findings.  
 
Contributions 
The contributions of this current research are three-fold. While the first two aim for an 
ontological and epistemological contribution through the expansion of post-positivist theories 
to the study of EU enlargement and unequal power relations, the third is a methodological 
one (see Manners and Whitman, 2016:14). First, the thesis contributes to the advancement of 
postcolonial research on EU enlargement, by introducing a critical exploration and rethinking 
of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power relations 
are produced. The thesis argues that although the bulk of enlargement studies is vast, 
enlargement has largely been discussed from the perspectives of rationalist-objectivist 
mainstream theories. However, by providing a postcolonial springboard for the investigation 
of the EU and power relations, this research aims to make an important theoretical 
contribution, which will consolidate the application of post-positivist perspectives and reduce 
the postcolonial void that exists in EU studies (Tlostanova, 2012:130; see also Huggan, 2008; 
                                                          
12  When referring to the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, I will spell 
Report/Reports with capital letter in order to distinguish these from other reports. 
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Chari and Verdery, 2009; Cornis Pope, 2012:146; Manners and Whitman, 2016; Parker, 
2016). 
 
Second, another contribution is specifically related to EU focused postcolonial scholarship. 
Although this scholarship provides substantial research on the EU and in particular the fifth 
enlargement and power relations, the literature has been largely discussed from the viewpoint 
of one specific postcolonial perspective, orientalism. Even though orientalism offers a solid 
rationale within which the EU and power relations can be understood (see Bryman, 2012:20), 
by including two additional postcolonial perspectives, subalternity and mimicry (alongside 
orientalism) this thesis will capture a broader postcolonial analysis, by expanding our 
understanding of the extent to which postcolonial perspectives can provide a framework 
within which the EU’s production of unequal power relations can be examined.   
 
Third, although the work of for instance Thomas Diez (e.g. 2001, 2014) and Ben Rosamond 
(e.g. 2013, 2014) are ground-breaking when it comes to the study of enlargement through the 
application of discourse analysis, this thesis argues that we can further expand EU research 
by applying the method of critical discourse analysis, which aims to “’critique, expose, 
deconstruct, counter and … transcend’” unequal power relations (see Sidaway, 2000:594). As 
previously mentioned, CDA not only examines the extent to which unequal power relations 
are produced in and behind discourse through the application of a micro, meso and macro 
level of analysis, but it also aims to attain change and emancipation.  
 
Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 argues that although the study of EU 
enlargement has attracted vast scholarly interest, the mainstream literature has so far 
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neglected engaging with postcolonial approaches, thus offering a limited post-positivist 
understanding of EU enlargement and unequal power relations (see Rosamond, 2010:106). 
The chapter maintains therefore that postcolonialism can be a fruitful avenue to employ when 
examining enlargement and the production of power relations. In recent years however, an 
EU focused postcolonial literature has emerged, which has offered an abundant bulk of 
studies engaging with the EU and unequal power relations, although there are some apparent 
gaps, which Chapter 1 will discuss. In sum, the chapter argues that ultimately, the application 
of postcolonial perspectives is crucial in introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of 
the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space and how unequal power relations are 
produced in EU enlargement. 
 
Chapter 2 argues that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the gaps 
identified in the previous chapter, engaging with three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry, is pivotal in adequately demonstrating the extent to which the EU 
produces unequal power relations. The chapter is therefore setting out a preliminary 
discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to the examination of EU enlargement 
and unequal power relations. In sum, the chapter argues that by drawing upon a postcolonial 
framework, this current research has the potential to make three significant contributions by 
offering new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of 
the way we understand EU enlargement. 
 
Chapter 3 argues that employing Fairclough’s three-dimensional critical discourse analysis 
model and the interviewing technique will help examining the extent to which the EU 
produces unequal power relations. The method of content analysis was briefly employed in 
order to provide an additional element of data-collection. The chapter also addresses the 
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reasons why these research methods will be applied to the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Report. Potentialities and limitations encountered during field 
work will be discussed, as well as how these may have impacted upon the research results 
and how they have been dealt with (see Grix, 2010:32). The chapter concludes that by 
engaging with the above research framework, this current research will aim to make 
important methodological contributions to our understanding of the extent to which the EU 
produces unequal power relations.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement and accession 
negotiations. The chapter is divided into two main sections, a first one, which provides a 
general history of the enlargement process and a second, more detailed history of the 
accession negotiations. The overall aim of the chapter is to reveal the extent to which the 
enlargement process and in particular the accession negotiations set out a context in which an 
“unequal encounter” (Fairclough, 2001:36) took place between the EU and Romania. More 
importantly, the chapter argues that the monitoring Reports played a determinative role in the 
Romanian enlargement. Additionally, the chapter considers the fact that although we may 
speak of the EU as a unitary actor in its interaction with candidate states or when producing 
unequal relations, a variety of EU institutions are involved, which play a significant role in 
the enlargement process. The section will also address the fight against corruption, which was 
regarded as one of Romania’s main problems in fulfilling the accession criteria and which 
impacted upon the Reports, negotiations and Romania’s accession. Overall, the chapter will 
present key positions of the EU and Romania during the enlargement process, how these are 
reflected in the Reports and flag up some of the key analytical points that will be made in the 
empirical chapters.  
 
 Page | 16  
 
Chapters 5 to 8 argue that by engaging with the three-dimensional CDA, interviews and 
content analysis, the current research will aim to demonstrate the extent to which the EU 
produces unequal power relations, with a focus on the language of the Romanian monitoring 
Reports. The application of the CDA dimensions is different for each chapter: Chapter 5 
analyses the vocabulary and Chapter 6 examines the grammar through the application of the 
description dimension; Chapter 7 analyses the discourse practices through the interpretation 
dimension; Chapter 8 examines the sociocultural practices through the explanation 
dimension. All four chapters follow a similar structure, which includes a brief outline of what 
each respective CDA stage entails and how the dimension has specifically been applied to the 
Reports13. Furthermore, each chapter includes the CDA findings of the Reports and which are 
discussed in order to reveal the extent of the production of unequal power relations by 
establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and 
mimicry. The in-depth (semi-structured) interviews will enable the voices of EU and 
Romanian officials, who have been involved in the Romanian enlargement, to be heard and to 
introduce their own perspectives on enlargement, power relations and inequality. 
Additionality, the interview material will be discussed in relation to the three postcolonial 
elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. As a concluding remark, each chapter 
summarizes in which ways the corresponding CDA dimension and interview material extract 
observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and sets out how subalternity, orientalism 
and mimicry are operating in the Reports. 
 
The Conclusions summarize the findings of this research, its contributions and limitations, as 
well as recommendations for further research. More importantly, the conclusions will address 
the extent to which future research can be based on the contributions of this current thesis.  
                                                          
13 As grammar is analysed in a similar way to vocabulary, the outline of the description dimension is not 
included in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ENLARGMENT 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Although the study of EU enlargement has attracted vast scholarly interest (McCormick, 
1999; Dinan, 2004, 2014; Nugent, 2010; Kenealy et al., 2015), this chapter argues that there 
is a dearth of postcolonial applications in the literature and in particular in examining the 
extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. As a response to this, this chapter 
aims to develop a critical assessment of EU enlargement literature, with a focus on studies of 
the fifth enlargement, by presenting key arguments, considering contributions and identifying 
gaps (see Dunleavy, 2003; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012:101). In sum, the chapter argues that by 
building upon postcolonial literature and in particular the EU focused postcolonial 
scholarship, this thesis will advance the application of postcolonialism to the study of how 
the EU produces unequal power relations, by bringing to the fore an engagement with 
postcolonial perspectives. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section maintains that the fifth enlargement 
literature is a substantial scholarship, which has focused to a larger extent on the first wave of 
enlargement, while overlooking the second wave. When it comes to the study of power 
relations and enlargement, two strands can be identified, one which has been dominated by 
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studies of asymmetry and a second, contrasting one, which demonstrates the candidates’ 
agency capacity in the fifth enlargement 
 
The second section argues that although the enlargement literature offers a considerable 
theoretical richness, the bulk of studies tend to be studied from the perspectives of positivist 
theories and thus the literature has been less responsive to the application of post-positivist 
approaches. In particular, postcolonialism has been overlooked in assessing the extent to 
which the EU produces unequal power relations, which are similar to the legacies of colonial 
and imperial unequal power relations that have so far been discussed by postcolonial scholars 
(Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1967; Cabral, 1972; Rushdie, 1982; Spivak, 1988; Bhabha, 1997; 
Loomba, 1998; Said, 2003). The section argues therefore that an inclusion of post-
positivism 14  perspectives into the literature would introduce “an ever more faceted and 
nuanced picture of the European Union” (Diez and Wiener, 2009:21) and in particular in 
understanding the EU and unequal power relations (see Rosamond, 2010:106). In line with 
the focus of this current thesis, the section also discusses how critical theories are highly 
involved with using discourse in their analysis of unequal relations, domination and 
asymmetry. 
 
The third section argues that postcolonial scholars have established a solid body of literature. 
One of the most distinctive postcolonial scholarships is the EU focused postcolonial 
literature, which has proven to be a fruitful research avenue, by taking postcolonialism to new 
levels in the study of the EU. Nevertheless, there still remains a dearth of postcolonial 
research in this particular literature, due to limited application of postcolonial perspectives, 
                                                          
14 In this thesis, post-positivist theories will also be called reflectivist and critical theories. 
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overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement and using a limited research 
method.  
 
1.1. The fifth enlargement scholarship 
The European Union has undergone continuous widening and deepening following its 
establishment as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by six founding member 
states15 in 1951 (Dinan, 2004, 2014; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004). One of its most successful 
integration policies has been initiated through the enlargement policy, which refers to the act 
through which applicants, who have applied to EU membership, eventually become member 
states (European Commission, 2014b). From 1951 onwards, the EU has enlarged seven 
times 16 , although the latest three enlargement rounds (2004, 2007 and 2013) are often 
referred to as belonging to one round, the so called Central and Eastern European 
enlargement or the fifth enlargement (European Union, 2007).  
 
Studies of the enlargement policy and the evolution of individual enlargements have 
produced a large scholarship (Baun, 2000; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schneider, 2012; Gateva 2015). In particular, the 
fifth enlargement has attracted a significant amount of scholarly interest (see 
Schimmelfennig, 2001; Mattli and Plümper, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2002; Kassim and Menon, 
2003; Raik 2004; Piedrafita, 2007). Research of the first wave of enlargement has been 
prominent (Dinan, 1999, 2004; Baun, 2000; Curzon Price et.al., 2001; Kaiser and Elsevert, 
2004; Nugent, 2004; Verdun and Croci, 2005; O’Brennan, 2006; Heidbreder, 2011; 
Michalski, 2014), perhaps due to the more challenging nature of enlargement in comparison 
                                                          
15 Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Netherlands. 
16 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Portugal and Spain; 1995: Austria, 
Finland and Sweden; 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia; 2007: Bulgaria and Romania (Verdun, 2005:10-11). In 2013 Croatia joined as part of the 
latest round of the fifth enlargement (European Commission, 2013e). 
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to previous rounds (Verdun, 2005:12-13; Zielonka, 2013:43). In contrast, studies of the 
second wave are curtailed, although in recent years we have seen a growing number of 
research (Bojkov, 2004; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009; Chiva and 
Phinnemore, 2011; Gateva, 2015). 
 
One of the most substantial researches of the fifth enlargement is John O’Brennan’s The 
Eastern enlargement of the European Union (2006), which brings attention to an analysis of 
concepts and institutions and highlights the impact of this round of enlargement upon EU 
institutions involved in the process and discusses reasons why the enlargement took place. 
The volume significantly contributes to the field of enlargement studies in numerous ways, 
by introducing how “normative and ideational factors” were the driving factors behind 
enlargement (2006:5) and how the EU’s internal institutional politics “shaped the eastern 
enlargement process” (2006:7). Published in 2006, just before the second wave of 
enlargement, the volume focuses to a larger extent on the candidates of the first wave, 
missing out on a more detailed research of the 2007 candidates (although Romania and 
Bulgaria are discussed accordingly).  
 
On the other hand, Cristina Chiva and David Phinnemore’s The European Union’s 2007 
Enlargement (2011a) pays particular attention to the second wave of the fifth enlargement. 
Chiva and Phinnemore offer a significant understanding of what has happened to the 
candidates of the second wave, by for instance discussing the process of enlargement and 
outcomes of accession negotiations and in particular placing Romania and Bulgaria within 
the wider context of past and future EU enlargements (Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011b:2). 
Their volume substantially contributes to the curtailed research of the second wave, by 
bringing attention to its significance, the implications for both the EU and the candidates and 
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as Chiva and Phinnemore maintain, “provide partial correctives to established scholarly 
perspectives on enlargement” (2011:3) 
 
A considerable bulk of the fifth enlargement scholarship has focused on examining individual 
applicant countries, although as pointed out previously, the applicants of the first wave 
appear more prominent in the literature in contrast to the second wave members (Andor, 
2000; Böröcz, 2000; Wilga, 2006; Korek, 2007; Bochsler and Szöcsik, 2013). As part of the 
second wave, studies of the Romanian enlargement have remained rather reduced, though a 
number of scholars have engaged with this particular enlargement (Henderson, 1999; Boia, 
2001; Farrell et.al., 2002; Phinnemore, 2006b; Ortino et al., 2004; Gallagher, 2005, 2009; 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a; Bochsler and Szoecsik, 
2013). In particular, three pieces of research have extended our understanding of the 
Romanian enlargement. First, Dimitris Papadimitriou and Phinnemore’s Romania and the 
European Union (2008) captures a substantial account of this enlargement, which includes an 
overview of the historical chronology of the enlargement process, while diverting the last 
chapters to discussions of the structural changes in Romania. The volume brings to light 
details about the failures and the successes of Romania during enlargement, addressing both 
the influential role of the EU and the rather negligent attitude of Romania towards EU 
demands regarding justice and home affairs (2008:140-141).  
 
Second, Tom Gallagher’s Romania and the European Union. How the weak vanquished the 
strong (2009) addresses how and why Romania managed to achieve its accession target 
despite severe challenges and lack of significant progress. Gallagher maintains that Romania 
joined the EU on rather relaxed accession criteria (2009:261), as the EU did not pay “major 
attention” or at least not the same attention as it did to the 2004 candidates (2009:5). Even in 
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situations when the EU did pay attention and reprimanded Romania, the Romanian 
government tended to immediately “present revised reform strategies” in order to insure the 
EU that progress was under way, but such strategies were never sustained for long 
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:124). Overall, Gallagher sees the Romanian accession as an 
EU failure, as the latter “mishandled” the Romanian membership application by allowing a 
rather under-developed state, who did not satisfactorily fulfill the membership criteria, to find 
“itself inside the Union” (2009:263). As it will later be discussed in Chapter 4, European 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn also raised concerns that although all negotiation 
chapters had been closed with Romania in December 2004, the country had not successfully 
implemented the accession criteria by the time of its accession (2009:172-173).  
 
Third, Phinnemore’s The EU and Romania. Accession and Beyond (2006) is of particular 
strength in the literature, as unlike most research, it provides insights and voices from a 
number of Romanian officials, academics and parliamentarians, alongside non-Romanian 
officials, who had been involved in the Romanian enlargement. For instance, Phinnemore 
included chapters written by Romania’s key Chief Negotiators, Leonard Orban and Lazăr 
Comănescu, where both reveal their own reflections on Romania’s road to accession, the 
actual accession, the effects of membership and the implications with the South-Eastern 
European region after accession (2006:XIV). Following Eli Gateva’s criticism of the 
enlargement literature (2014), Phinnemore’s volume is of importance, as it acknowledges the 
opinions of what Gateva calls the “EU hopefuls” (2014:1), meaning the candidate countries. 
In Gateva’s words, these countries are extensively overlooked in EU enlargement studies, as 
the literature significantly focuses on the voices of the EU or the member states (2014:3). 
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Following from the above, two different literatures stand out when examining the fifth 
enlargement and power relations and which will be discussed below. One strand has 
predominately focused on power asymmetry between the EU and the applicants, highlighting 
the EU’s leverage in the fifth enlargement. Another strand stands in contrast to the previous 
one, as it presents the applicants’ agency capacity in the fifth enlargement, challenging the 
perspective that applicants were powerless actors in the enlargement process.  
 
1.1.1. Asymmetry in the fifth enlargement  
A large number of scholars agree that EU-candidates interaction in the fifth enlargement is an 
element of importance, in particular during accession negotiations, as such a conduct was 
asymmetrical and the EU was always in “the stronger bargaining position” (Avery, 2012:171; 
see also Baun, 2000; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002:43; Nugent, 2004:53-54; Pridham, 
2006a:397; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:9; Michalski, 2014; Magone et al., 2016). 
As negotiations were identified as a process in which each candidate country tried to satisfy 
the EU regarding the Copenhagen criteria (Nugent, 2004:53), the candidates had “little choice, 
but to accept the acquis and procedures of the Union” (Michalski, 2014:284). It was within 
this context that scholars observed an unequal encounter between the EU and the candidate 
countries. In particular, studies of the Romanian enlargement have engaged with criticism 
regarding the stricter enlargement process that Romania endured and which led to questions 
of the extent to which this process impacted upon EU-Romania relations (Blokker, 2008:266; 
see also Pridham, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore 2008; Andreev, 2009).   
 
One branch of the literature has addressed that the application of the conditionality principle 
in the fifth enlargement raised serious concerns regarding asymmetry, as the principle was 
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identified as preconditioning any candidate country to accept the so called European values17 
in “a non-egalitarian way” (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:132; see also Grabbe, 2002; 
Poole, 2003; Pridham, 2007a, 2007c; Blokker, 2008; Gateva, 2015), as well as accept the 
EU’s demands and apply all the EU’s rules, “without exception or modification” (Avery, 
2009:267). For instance, Heather Grabbe argues that due to the conditionality principle, the 
candidate countries became client states and observers, while the EU enjoyed a powerful 
bargaining position (2002:266; Poole, 2003:10). In particular, in the case of Romania, the 
conditionality principle “was more sustained” than in previous enlargement rounds (Pridham, 
2007a:354), exposing Romania to “an ‘even more rigorous system of conditionality’” 
(Blokker, 2008:266), especially “in the final stage of accession” (Pridham, 2007a:353 and 
351; 2007c:534; see also Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:160). This created “profound power 
asymmetries between the negotiating parties” (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6), as the 
leverage of the EU forced Romania into an unequal partnership. This questioned therefore 
whether Romania joined a group of equals or whether Romania’s accession was a matter of 
control and power asymmetry (Bellier, 2004:146; Phinnemore, 2006c:17, 2007a:347; 
Zielonka, 2008:476). 
 
Another set of scholars particularly address the asymmetrical relations that can be identified 
in the monitoring reports (Pridham, 2007a:354; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36; see 
also Baun, 2000:126; Maniokas 2004:28; Raik, 2004:579; O’Brennan, 2006:83; Lass-
Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-274; Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470), which were also 
regarded as “new instruments for furthering conditionality” (Pridham, 2007a:351-352). 
Despite being recognized as helpful tools and gaining significant importance in the 
enlargement process, scholars argue that the production of the monitoring reports was a one-
                                                          
17  Such as human rights, good governance, the open market economy and parliamentary democracy (see 
Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:141). 
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way process, monopolised by a small group of Commission officials (Bellier, 2004:145), 
which allowed the EU to control the trajectory of negotiations and enlargement (Pridham, 
2007c:531; see also Raik, 2004:579-580). Another criticism raises concern that such reports 
concealed, denied and played down the EU’s leverage in the enlargement process and the 
subordinate position of candidate countries (Raik, 2004:580-581; Pridham, 2006a, 
2007a:353; Kuus, 2007:161; Zielonka, 2008:476; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; 
Avery, 2012:166). Grabbe also points out that for instance the Regular Reports were too 
general and often too vague to give the Council of Ministers and the European Councils a 
detailed analysis on which the former could base their decisions regarding candidates’ 
negotiations, highlighting therefore that the Reports were not as reliable as they were made to 
be (2001:1022, 2002:265).  
 
One insightful aspect in the debate of asymmetry in the fifth enlargement is O’Brennan’s 
discussion of how a discourse analysis of the Regular Reports identifies how the EU 
controlled the enlargement process and maintained power. Such an analysis reveals how 
different mechanisms in enlargement allowed the EU and the member states to be “’regime-
makers’ and applicants ‘regime-takers’” (2006:129-130; see also Grabbe, 2002:266; Poole, 
2003:10; Pridham, 2006a:397). The distinctive aspect that O’Brennan identifies here is an 
asymmetrical distribution of power between the EU (large, powerful entity) and the 
candidates (small, vulnerable entities) (2006:129). O’Brennan particularly argues that this 
asymmetric power relation was most obvious in first, the EU’s demands of the candidates to 
fully accept the acquis, which was non-negotiable and unprecedented and second, the EU’s 
introduction of a conditionality principle, which was employed as “a key instrument of EU 
negotiating strategy” (2008:129-130; Zielonka, 2008:476).  
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Furthermore, another substantial study, which examines discourse and power relations is 
O’Brennan’s discussion of the European Commission’s discursive framing of the fifth 
enlargement (2006:83-87), which O’Brennan identifies as producing asymmetric power 
relations. This “discursive framework” was characterised by “a special responsibility” 
towards the candidate states due to “shared historical experience, a common cultural 
repertoire, and the sense of kinship” (2006:85) with the EU and which foregrounded three 
distinctive discourses (2006:84). First, the fifth enlargement is regarded as an “expansion of 
the EU value system and legal and democratic norms to Eastern Europe”, which transformed 
“Eastern Europe” according to the EU norms. Second, the enlargement is seen as a solution 
to “Eastern Europe”’s desire to return to Europe, but which was achieved under the 
conditions of the EU. Third, the enlargement is regarded as a “’win-win’ scenario” for all 
actors involved once the economic system of the EU was imported to “Eastern Europe” and 
therefore the infiltration of the EU economic values was completed (2006:83-84). What 
O’Brennan’s study reveals is the identification of the EU’s leverage in the fifth enlargement 
and the asymmetrical power relations between the EU and the candidates, by analyzing the 
enlargement discourse and demonstrating the importance of discourse in understanding 
inequality in power relations. Further in the chapter, the importance of discursive analysis in 
the study of power relations will be raised.  
 
1.1.2. Candidate agency capacity in the fifth enlargement 
In contrast to the research on asymmetry discussed above, other scholars have studied the 
agency capacity of the candidates in the negotiation and enlargement process, arguing that 
although asymmetry may have occurred, the candidates were not totally powerless 
(Schimmelfennig, 1999; Baun and Marek, 2001; Pridham, 2006b, 2007c; Wilga, 2006; 
Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Gateva 2014, 2015).  
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An interesting study by Frank Schimmelfennig reveals how the EU’s enlargement rhetoric 
can be identified as a key element in understanding “under which conditions” the EU took the 
decision to launch the fifth enlargement, but also how the candidates exploited the EU’s 
rhetoric in attaining accession (see 1999:1 and 39-40). On the one hand, Schimmelfennig 
maintains that the enlargement language rhetorically entrapped the EU to commit itself to 
enlargement, as by denying membership to candidates could have clashed with the EU’s own 
“ideology and basic norms of its international community … and put at stake its “European” 
reputation, i.e. its credibility and legitimacy as a community member” (1999:39; see also 
Schimmelfennig, 2003:272-278; Risse, 2009:157). On the other hand, the candidates 
exploited such a language and entrapped the EU through a “rhetorical action” (2001:48). 
What this meant was that as long as the candidates followed “the liberal norms of the 
community” and implemented the acquis as required, the EU was rhetorically entrapped and 
could not deny the candidates accession (1999:44). This demonstrates that the candidates did 
not helplessly wait for the EU to invite them in, but used different opportunities to influence 
the enlargement policy.  
 
In a sense, Schimmelfennig’s study may explain the later “subtle and at times significant 
shifts … in the language and rhetoric of the EU” in future enlargements (Phinnemore, 
2006c:15). For instance, Phinnemore suggests that in the newer round of accession 
negotiations with the south-eastern candidates18 the EU is avoiding “the explicit use of the 
words “‘membership’”, “becoming ‘members’” or referring “to ‘accession’ in a way 
reminiscent of the Copenhagen commitment to the CEE countries and subsequent 
statements”. The preferred vocabulary includes expressions such as “‘its determination to 
                                                          
18 The Western Balkans. 
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continue the process it has engaged with the candidate countries, thus contributing to 
Europe’s prosperity, stability, security and unity’”, which implies “a weaker commitment to 
south-eastern enlargement compared to eastern enlargement” (2006c:13; see also 
Phinnemore, 2005, 2006c:15). This can be identified as a mechanism in deterring the 
rhetorical entrapment discussed by Schimmelfennig and thus acknowledges the candidates’ 
agency capacity in enlargement.  
 
Another significant examination of the agency of the candidates is addressed by Gateva 
(2014, 2015), who convincingly argues that the enlargement scholarship has one-sidedly 
focused on the agency of the EU, while overlooking the candidates’ power in the fifth 
enlargement. Gateva’s comparisons of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements bring to light the 
agency of the candidates in two different ways. First, Gateva maintains that the EU’s 
membership conditions and conditionality agenda were influenced by key challenges that the 
applicants and later candidates faced as future EU member states (2014:19). She claims that 
especially in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU’s application of “differentiated and 
targeted conditionality” (country specific conditions) was put into place in order to prepare 
these two candidates for a smooth transition to EU membership (2014:20). Based on such 
findings, Gateva concludes that indirectly the “profile of the candidate countries has a 
substantial impact on the scope of the EU conditions” (2014:20). Her second major finding 
reveals that group dynamics played an important role in the candidates’ agency capability. 
For instance, Gateva demonstrates how the group dynamics of the twelve candidate countries 
put pressure on the EU to establish clear “timetables and target dates”, especially in the case 
of Romania and Bulgaria. As an outcome, the EU was pressured into establishing 2007 as the 
target year for Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accessions (2014:12).  
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Similar to Gateva’s second finding about group dynamics, Gergana Noutcheva and Dimitar 
Bechev maintain that although applicant states had “a narrow scope for maneuvering in the 
accession process” (Gateva, 2014:19), they shaped the EU enlargement agenda through group 
pressure (2008:119). For instance, Noutcheva and Bechev argue that the candidates 
belonging to the Visegrád group19 put “pressure on the EU to show commitment to the 
enlargement process and to reinforce the credibility of the incentives” for accession. This led 
to the establishment of for instance the EU’s accession conditions for the fifth enlargement 
(2008:119), demonstrating therefore the candidates’ ability of agency and leverage in the 
enlargement process through group dynamics.  
 
While the above has looked at the enlargement literature, identifying two contrasting strands 
in which power relations have been discussed, the below section will examine the theoretical 
aspect of enlargement literature, arguing that departing from positivist mainstream 
approaches and bringing to the fore an engagement with post-positivism will advance the 
application of such approaches and will introduce an alternative understanding of the 
production of power relations in the enlargement context.  
 
1.2. Post-positivist theories in the fifth enlargement scholarship 
Theoretical studies of EU enlargement have come a long way since May 1950 when French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented the Schuman Declaration as a first building 
stone towards a united and integrated Europe. In the same way as the Schuman Declaration 
stated that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan” (European 
Union, 2015b), the enlargement literature has been gradually built on a diverse theoretical 
spectrum of research. We can certainly identify this considerable theoretical richness in the 
                                                          
19 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Fitzmaurice, 1998) 
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literature of European integration theory (Rosamond, 1995, 2000, 2006; 2007; McCormick, 
1999; Nelsen and Stubb, 2003; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Wiener and Diez, 2009; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Hill 
and Smith, 2011; Bomberg et al., 2012a; Saurugger, 2013). Identified as “the field of 
systematic reflection”, which helps to explain and understand different aspects of the Union 
(Diez and Wiener, 2009:4), Diez and Antje Wiener refer to the collection of theories of 
European integration theory literature as “a mosaic”, suggesting that each approach can be 
identified “as a stone that adds to the picture that we gain of the EU” (2009:19). Two of the 
most established volumes of such mainstream theories are Rosamond’s Theories of European 
Integration (2000) and Diez and Wiener’s European Integration Theory (2009), where both 
volumes demonstrate the “explanatory, analytical, and constructive” role of rationalist and 
reflectivist theoretical debates (Diez and Wiener, 2009:7; see also O’Brennan, 2006:4-5).  
 
However, in a recent special edition20, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2016) argue that 
positivist theories have been more widely applied to the study of the EU, which has led to 
“reducing the pluralism of research, excluding critical voices and diminishing the ability of 
scholarship to recognise and address the causes and symptoms of EU crises” in the past 15 
years (2016:5). In particular, the two scholars maintain that post-positivist theories remain 
“largely excluded from core EU journals and discussions of the EU (Manners and Whitman, 
2016:9), to which postcolonialism also belongs to. For instance, in the case of 
postcolonialism, with the exception of a handful scholars (Kovács, 2001; 2006; Kelertas, 
2006; Bailey, 2011; Zielonka, 2013), whose work have minimized the postcolonial void in 
EU enlargement studies (Tlostanova op.cit, p.130), the involvement of EU scholars with 
postcolonial perspectives is rather limited. Thus, the theoretical literature of EU enlargement 
                                                          
20 Journal of Common Market Studies, 54 (1). 
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is lacking a wider engagement with postcolonial perspectives. Instead most scholars, who 
have considered the EU as a postcolonial space, belong to other disciplines, such as 
geography (Engel-Di Mauro, Kuus), international politics (Behr), sociology (Bhambra, 
Böröcz) and predominantly English and literary studies (Alexandru, Bottez, Cornis Pope, 
Kołodziejczyk, Lazarus, Simms). Ultimately, what Manners and Whitman advocate is the 
expansion of post-positivist theories to the study of the EU.  
 
1.2.1. Critical theories 
Due to a range of changes in the EU, particularly in the 1990s, which witnessed the 
emergence of new processes of enlargement and integration, significant changes to the 
structure of the EU, as well as transformations of the power balance in Europe, EU scholars 
faced new ontological and epistemological questions, which required new ways of 
understanding and explaining (Diez and Wiener, 2009:10). It was during this time that critical 
theories, which apply a reflectivist paradigm, provided “a new and intriguing ontological and 
epistemological foundation” in studying the EU (Jørgensen, 1997; Geyer, 2003:15-16; 
Jørgensen et al., 2007; Rosamond, 2007, 2013; Bailey, 2011; Bache et al., 2014:64; 
Saurugger, 2014; Lynggaard et al., 2015; Haughton, 2016; Manners and Whitman 2016:4). 
Owen Parker underlines that adopting a critical approach does not mean rejecting mainstream 
theories, which rely on a positivist approach, but recognizes the different questions that these 
are posing, which could offer a broader and alternative understanding of the EU (Parker, 
2016:46).  
 
Overall, critical theories focus on the study of unequal power relations and of those groups 
that are subordinated by these unequal relations, as well as of ways to emancipate the 
subordinated and transcend these unequal relations (Bailey, 2011:39). Due to such a focus, 
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critical theories emerged as a new way, which could capture the reality of the EU and the 
“much broader range of” voices, which never got captured by positivist theories (Parker, 
2016:38). In particular, post-positivist scholars maintain that such approaches are important 
to the study of the EU, as they highlight the significance of power relations in understanding 
the Union (Manners and Whitman, 2016:8 and 13-14) and can develop “more robust 
scholarship on the EU” (2016:10).  
 
The different types of critical theories seek to identify a particular type of unequal power 
relation affecting subaltern actors and advocate different means by which emancipation and 
change can be attained (Bailey, 2011:39). Such critical theories can be identified in the 
frameworks discussed by Marxism, feminism, normative theory, poststructuralism and 
postcolonialsm, just to mention a few (Bailey, 2011:39; Manners and Whitman, 2016:9). For 
instance, a key contribution of critical theories to the study of power relations and EU 
enlargement has been provided by feminism (Watson, 2000; Kronsell, 2005, 2016; Weiner, 
2009; Wiener and Diez, 2009; Brianson, 2016). In particular, Annica Kronsell argues that 
feminism can answer questions about “masculine underpinnings of power” within the context 
of enlargement, underlining the importance of gender power (2016:104). Kronsell 
acknowledges that he strength of feminist analysis lies in its understanding of how power 
hierarchies, which are rooted in gender, are operationalized in the practices of the EU and are 
organized and embedded in the institutions of the EU (2016:106).  
 
In particular, critical theories are interested in the study of discourse, as a mechanism through 
which unequal relations can be understood. Especially as “discursive forms of power are less 
visible than legal and material ones”, it becomes important not to discount the significance of 
discourse in the production of inequality in power relations (Ryan, 2006:23-24). 
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1.2.2. Discourse in critical theories 
Discourse has been a preferred element of analysis by critical theories, when examining 
power relations in the EU (Shore, 1993; Jørgensen, 1997; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; 
Wæver, 2009; Bailey and Bossuyt, 2013; Biegon, 2013; Schmidt, 2013, 2015; Larsen, 2014; 
Beauguitte et. al., 2015; Lynggaard et. al., 2015; Musliu and Orbie, 2015; Blanco, 2016). For 
instance, Beauguitte et al. (2015) engage with a textual analysis of seven official EU 
documents, which include the latter’s opinions on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
(2015:853). Beauguitte et al. suggest that a textual analysis is significant in exploring the 
usefulness of discourse analysis in revealing how the EU produced power relations to its 
immediate neighbourhood (2015:871).  
 
In particular, poststructuralism has been largely involved with the examination of power 
relations “inherent in discursive articulations” (Borg and Diez, 2016:138; see also Diez, 
1999a; Rutazibwa, 2010; Kurki, 2011; Stern, 2011; Matin, 2011; Merlingen, 2011; Biegon, 
2013; Staeger, 2016) and has aimed to reveal how unequal power relations are produced 
“through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, 
a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”’ in discourse (Arkan, 2016:136). In 
particular, the special issue of Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 18 (2), published 
in June 2010, opens up about the importance of discourse in understanding and explaining the 
EU from the perspective of a range of critical theories. In one of the articles, Olivia U. 
Rutazibwa examines from both a post-colonial21 and poststructuralist perspective the EU’s 
discourses in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) and the Cotonou Agreement (2010:2014). 
With the help of discourse analysis, Rutazibwa demonstrates that the EU’s normative power 
                                                          
21 Rutazibwa’s own use of the spelling, as this thesis will apply the un-hyphened spelling (postcolonialism). A 
discussion about the significance of the spelling of the term will follow in Chapter 2.  
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creates unequal power relations, by constructing opposing images of the EU and Africa 
(2010:215-216) through the perpetuation of colonial “unequal”, “inferior” “incapable” 
representations (2010:217). Similarly to Rutazibwa, Ueli Staeger’s postcolonial and 
poststructuralist examination of Normative power Europe 22  discourses reveals how such 
discourses shape Africa–EU relations (2016:987). In particular, Staeger demonstrates that as 
these EU discourses create a certain (orientalist) knowledge about Africa, while African 
voices are not heard, a distinction between the EU as the entity embodying “imperial moral 
superiority” and Africa as “the Other” is being produced (2016:981 and 985). A common 
thread in the above poststructural contributions is the fact that scholars identify discourse as a 
place in which “structures and patterns” control and produce power relations (Wæver, 
2009:165).  
 
The above discussion has shown that a specific advantage of critical theories is that they offer 
new and different “possibilities and understandings” (Manners and Whitman, 2016:4) of EU 
enlargement and in particular address production of unequal power relations (2016:8). The 
next chapter will therefore assess the postcolonial scholarship, in particular the EU focused 
postcolonial literature, arguing that such an examination of EU discourses in the Romanian 
enlargement will reveal an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania. This thesis aims 
therefore to make a theoretical contribution to the post-positivist and postcolonial 
enlargement studies.   
 
1.3. Postcolonial scholarship 
The postcolonial scholarship provides a voluminous literature when it comes to addressing 
unequal power relations and in particular legacies of colonial and imperial inequality in 
                                                          
22 Which will be discussed further in section 1.3.1 
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present power relations (Chakrabarty, 2000:5). Largely, the key argument of postcolonial 
perspectives is the recognition of the present as postcolonial (Bhabha, 1992:437; Spivak, 
1993:280; Ahmad, 1994:204, 1995:8; Dirlik, 1994:332; Slemon, 1994:16-17; Ashcroft et.al., 
2010:168; Quayson, 2000a:1; Sharp, 2009; McLeod, 2010:6), as scholars identify that 
colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, continuing to function and 
therefore producing a postcolonial present (McLeod, 2010:39; see also Williams, 1994:3; 
Childs and Williams, 1997:103; Ashcroft et.al., 1998:187, 2002:2, 2010:64; Young, 2003:3; 
Heywood, 2014:200; Sylvester, 2014:185). Thus, postcolonial scholars engage with different 
approaches, which analyze how power structures of the present are influenced by colonial 
history (Manzo, 2014:330).  
 
The main research interest of the literature has primarily focused on postcolonial experiences 
of the non-European world (Loomba et.al., 2006:3; see also Fanon, 2008; Memmi, 1967; 
Rushdie, 1982; Prakash, 1995; Bhabha, 1997; Loomba, 1998; James, 2001; Escobar, 2004; 
Grovogui, 2007; McLeod, 2007a; Kaiwar, 2014). Such a preference has raised questions 
regarding what Anne McClintock refers to as the “plurality of postcolonialisms” (1995:10-
11; see also Young, 2001:63, 2003:7; Sharp, 2009:7), which calls for a wider employability 
of postcolonialism to so called non-traditional colonies (Ahmad, 1995:9; McClintock, 1995; 
Young, 2001; Hiddlestone, 2009; Sharp, 2009; Epstein and Jacoby, 2014; Jabri, 2014). In 
particular, John McLeod argues that although postcolonial studies focus on “locations with a 
history of colonialism … it is not a field of study which is exclusive to selected nationalities, 
cultures or races” (2007b:6), as the postcolonial is to be found “everywhere” (Moore-Gilbert 
et.al., 1997b:5). Moreover, D.C. Moore maintains that postcolonial scholars cannot only 
“privilege” the postcolonial experiences of former European colonies, which is often the case 
(2001:123; see also Childs and Williams, 1997; Sethi, 2011:8), as imperial and colonial 
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processes can be identified in many parts of the world, “so that everyone gets the privilege, 
sooner or later, at one time or another, of being coloniser, colonised and postcolonial - 
sometimes all at once, in the case of Australia, for example” (Ahmad, 1995:9).  
 
Following on from the above, this has raised concerns that the postcolonial scholarship 
overlooks broader examinations of unequal power relations (see Hooper and Kramsch, 
2007:528). In particular by overlooking “the experiences of colonialism in a wide variety of 
situations” (Ashcroft, 2001:13), this indicates that postcolonial experiences can only be 
studied in relation to the history of colonial and imperial European powers and their colonies 
(McClintock, 1995:10-11). Such an aspect may become problematic as, although different 
European states have been identified as leading imperial/colonial powers in global history 
(Wesseling, 2004; Hart, 2008), the degree of colonial and imperial hegemony differed 
amongst European powers and not all European states have been empires/colonizers (Hooper 
and Kramsch, 2007:532; see also Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:5; Sharp, 2009:27; Lazarus, 
2011:16).  
 
In contrast to the above concerns, in recent years, the postcolonial scholarship has bifurcated 
(Young, 2003:7), allowing a broader application of its key arguments to “a heterogeneous set 
of subject positions, professional fields, and critical enterprises” (Slemon, 1994:16; 
Deltcheva, 2000:589; Wilson et al., 2010). Yet, some postcolonial scholars have been vocal 
that such a bifurcation can develop an “increasingly unfocused use of the term ‘post-
colonial’”, which may produce “a danger of it losing its effective meaning altogether” 
(Ashcroft et al., 2006:2). Nevertheless, two distinctive growing bodies of postcolonial 
scholarships established themselves in the 1990s, suggesting that postcolonialism can be 
usefully employed to examine power relations in non-traditional areas.  
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First, a central contribution to postcolonial scholarship is the literature on the colonial and 
imperial implications of Soviet power in Europe during the communist years (Kołodziejczyk 
and Şandru 2012:114; see also Barkey and von Hagen, 1997; Sakwa, 1999; Alexandru, 2000; 
Lefter, 2001; Deltcheva, 2000:590; Moore, 2001:123; Groys, 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; 
Kelertas, 2006; Chari and Verdery, 2009:15-17; Korek, 2007; Kovačević, 2010; Andreescu, 
2011; Bottez, 2011; Kangilaski, 2011; Fătu-Tutoveanu, 2012; Popescu, 2012; Terian, 2012). 
In particular, Henry F. Carey and Rafal Raciborski argue for an identification of imperial 
domination and colonization process imposed by the Soviet Union upon the satellite states in 
Europe, but accentuate that due to differences to traditional colonies, the satellite states can 
be identified as arguable colonies or semicolonies 23  (2004:210; see also McClintock, 
1995:12; Sidaway, 2000:596). Even though such a scholarship has been met with 
disagreements (Szporluk, 1994; Said, 1993:xxv, Alexandru, 2001:6; Cornis-Pope, 2012:146; 
Owczarzak, 2009; Todorova, 2010; Kangilaski, 2011:23; Lazarus, 2012:119; Ștefănescu, 
2012; Tlostanova, 2012:132), the literature has had an impact on the recognition of the 
“plurality of postcolonialisms” as discussed by McClintock and thus has enabled a break 
from the image that postcolonialism is largely suitable for the examination of postcolonial 
experiences in the non-European world (see Deltcheva, 2000:589).  
 
Second, a significant scholarship, upon which this research is built, is the EU focused 
postcolonial scholarship, which examines the EU as a postcolonial space (Hooper and 
Kramsch, 2007:526; Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014). Even though some scholars have 
claimed that such a literature is “rare” and “tentative” (Kuus, 2004:482; Kovačević, 
2012:363), the EU focused postcolonial scholarship has been fruitful in theorizing 
                                                          
23 Further reading on similarities and differences, see Carey and Raciborski (2004:203, 206, 211, 215-216), Raik 
(2004:569) and Tlostanova (2012:132). 
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postcolonial experiences in the context of the EU. Notably, the literature captures four main 
contributions. First, one assesses the EU as a colonial and imperial power (Mezzadra, 2005; 
Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010; Fischer Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). Second, one recognizes the 
fifth enlargement as an imperial product and colonization process (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; 
Engel-Di Mauro, 2006a). Third, one distinctive area of research engages with the 
postcolonial perspective of orientalism in order to make sense of postcolonial experiences in 
the EU (Kelertas, 2006; Alexandru, 2011). Fourth, one engages with the examination of EU 
language as a way through which unequal power relations might operate (see Jackson and 
Sørensen, 2013:253). The below subsections will present key arguments, consider 
contributions and identify what gaps still exist and which this thesis will aim to rectify. 
 
1.3.1. The EU as colonial and imperial power 
Three academic branches signpost the study of the EU as a colonial and imperial power. The 
first one aims to reveal the colonial and imperial power of the EU, drawing upon similarities 
to traditional colonial and imperial powers (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Zielonka, 2008; 
Gravier, 2009; Marks, 2012; Foster, 2013; Simms, 2013a, 2013b; see also Hansen and 
Jonsson, 2014). Such a literature has drawn a great deal of interest in the last two decades 
with scholars revealing colonial and imperial similarities between the EU and for instance the 
Austro-Hungarian and Roman empires respectively (Brague, 1993; Mourier, 1993; Farago, 
1995, cited in Wæver, 1997, p.65) and the Holy Roman Empire (Simms, 2013a, 2013b). 
More recently, the seminar The Dark Side of EU-rope: ‘Imperium Europaeum’?, held at the 
University of Birmingham in December 2014, draws attention to existing parallels between 
the EU and the late Roman Republic (Brunkhorst, 2014) and thus highlights a continuing 
interest in postcolonial applications to the study of the EU. 
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The second branch takes a different turn, by addressing how legacies of European 
colonialism and imperialism directly “continue under the auspices” of the EU, especially in 
EU enlargement, embarking on an acknowledgement of the continuity of the past into the 
present (Kovačević, 2012:361; Deltcheva, 2000; Sidaway, 2000; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; 
Böröcz, 2005; 2006a, 2009; Mezzadra, 2005; Engel-Di Mauro, 2006a; Behr, 2007; Bhambra, 
2007; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007; Mälksoo, 2009; Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013; 
Kinnvall, 2015). In particular, such scholars argue that, as some of the EU member states are 
heirs to former imperial and colonial powers, which at one point “have literally carved up the 
rest of the world for centuries” (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:162; Carey and Raciborski, 
2004:228), it is only “natural” to expect the formation of a colonial and imperial EU “elite 
pact” (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:159). For instance, studies of how “current processes of EU 
enlargement replicate earlier practices of continental imperialism” (Hooper and Kramsch, 
2007:526; see also Engel-Di Mauro, 2006b:7) have illuminated how the 19th century 
“standards of civilizations” survived in the Copenhagen criteria 24  and the acquis 
communautaire25 (hereafter acquis) (Behr, 2007:247; see also Delanty, 1995:6 and 67; Engel-
Di Mauro, 2001:119; Zielonka, 2008:476).  
 
Third, one particular group of scholars, who have engaged with the imperial character of the 
EU, are the critics of normative power Europe literature 26  (NPE). According to these 
scholars, the practices of NPE can be usefully employed to highlight the EU’s camouflaging 
European imperialism and colonial “mission civilatrice” (civilizing mission) (Forsberg, 
                                                          
24 Also known as accession criteria or conditions, these refer to the fulfilment of political and economic criteria 
and the adoption of the 80,000 pages of the acquis communautaire before accessing the EU (Pridham, 
2004:524-525, 2007c:530; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:115; Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; 
European Commission, 2014a).  
25 The acquis refers to the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states. 
The rights and obligations, which are binding for EU member states (European Commission, 2014c). 
26 Employs the key argument that the EU is a promoter of its norms in external relations (Manners, 2002:236), 
known as normative power, “power of opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological power’” (Manners, 2002:239, 2006; 
Haukkala, 2008; Keene, 2013). 
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2011:1184 and 1187; see also Rosecrance, 1998; Diez, 2005; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007; 
Bachmann, 2013; Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014). For instance, Richard Rosecrance 
raises the argument that “the continent which once ruled the world through the physical 
impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms” 
(1998:22), implying that the EU’s normative power is a camouflage for imperial activities. 
While NPE scholars reject that NPE can be anything imperial (Manners, 2002:253; Hettne 
and Söderbaum, 2005), critics have found such a defense somewhat inconsistent (Lundestad, 
1998; Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; Diez, 2005; Chandler, 2008; 
Figueroa, 2010; Arfire, 2011; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; Haukkala, 2011; Fisher Onar 
and Nicolaïdis, 2013:284; Silander and Nilsson, 2013). Especially research on EU 
enlargement suggests that NPE was an imperial instrument, which was driving the 
enlargement process (Chandler, 2008:71) by building “asymmetrical power relationships” 
(Arfire, 2011:6; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:141; see also Hettne and Söderbaum, 
2005:15; Haukkala, 2008), similar to the ones produced by mission civilatrice (Arfire, 
2011:5). However, even though concerns have been raised that NPE may simply be “an 
expression of Eurocentric imperialism” (Sjursen, 2006:241-242 and 248), the postcolonial 
examination of the NPE has been rather tentative than assertive (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; 
Arfire, 2011; Silander and Nilsson, 2013), especially as in recent years we have seen a 
decline in studies of NPE and asymmetrical power relations (Haukkala, 2008:1601; see also 
Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:532; Forsberg, 2011:1184).  
 
In contrast, other scholars have challenged the study of the EU as an imperial and colonial 
power (McClintock, 1995:13; Wæver, 1997; Lundestad, 1998; Cooper, 2002, 2004; Delanty, 
2006; Zielonka, 2006; Chandler, 2007a; Colomer, 2007; Haukkala, 2008; Todorova, 
2010:179; Hansen and Jonsson, 2012; Marks, 2012:2; Ungureanu, 2012:16). Often, these 
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scholars argue for an imperial dimension, but which is unlike traditional empires. For 
instance, in the early 1990s Jürgen Habermas suggested that “Europe as a whole is being 
given a second chance”, referring to an upcoming empire, but which Habermas saw as a far 
cry from “the power politics of yesteryear” (cited in Heffernan, 1998, p.242). More recently, 
Barroso indicated that "sometimes I like to compare the EU as a creation to the organisation 
of empire. We have the dimension of empire", but clarified that the EU is “the first non-
imperial empire” (cited in Waterfield, 2007; Zielonka, 2008:584). The rejection of the EU as 
a traditional empire, but which is showcasing an imperial dimension, has been supported by 
several scholars, arguing for instance that the EU is a post-imperial empire (Delanty, 
2006:199), a neo-medieval empire (Zielonka, 2006), a reluctant empire (Haukkala, 
2008:1610), a soft empire or hegemony (Wæver, 1997:86), a cooperative empire (Cooper, 
2002:7; Cooper, 2004:72), a cosmopolitan empire (Beck et.al., 2007, cited in Henry, 2010, 
p.268), an innovative empire, but without displaying the behaviour and ideology expected 
from a traditional empire (Ungureanu, 2012:15).  
 
1.3.2. The fifth enlargement as imperial and colonial product 
Another branch of the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, which has attracted a great deal 
of interest in recent years, examines the fifth enlargement as an imperial and colonial product 
of the EU, in particular by highlighting that EU practices towards candidates were a clear 
“pattern of both renewed imperialism and colonialism”, which maintained and reproduced 
past colonial and imperial unequal power relations (Engel-Di Mauro, 2001:112, 2006a; 
Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:158-159; Stenning, 2005:37; see also Burgess, 1997:107). One of 
the most outstanding supporters of this argument, József Böröcz, suggests that especially EU 
practices in the fifth enlargement “replicate earlier practices of continental imperialism” 
(cited in Hooper and Kramsch, 2007, p.526). In a more critical vein, H. Van Zon indicates a 
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“’perverted colonial attitude’: ‘the EU and other Western states and institutions are imposing 
their model on South and on Eastern Europe’” (cited in Domański, 2004, p.378), implying a 
transfer of EU norms, similar to the way in which past empires dictated the transfer of norms 
to colonies.  
 
Moreover, two substantive contributions, Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro’s The European’s 
Burden (2006a) and Böröcz and Melinda Kovács’ Empire’s New Clothes (2001), also 
signpost this literature. In particular, the above two studies suggest that the persistence of 
colonial and imperial strategies in the fifth enlargement was “more present here than in 
previous enlargements” (Sher, 2001:239). For instance Attila Melegh argues that the EU’s 
categorization of the candidates on a “civilization slope” was a clear reminder of the practices 
of mission civilatrice (2006a:167 and 169, 2006b; see also Bakic-Hayden, 1995:918; Wæver, 
2000:263; Sher, 2001:236; Kuss, 2004:479 and 480, 2006:231; Zielonka, 2013:37), which 
indicates the perpetuation of past colonial and imperial practices. 
 
By contrast, not all scholars agree with the idea that the fifth enlargement is a colonization 
process (Deltcheva, 2000; Alexandru, 2001:6; Bottez, 2011; Lefter, 2001; Cornis-Pope, 
2012:146; Lazarus, 2012:119; Ștefănescu 2012; Tlostanova, 2012:130). Perhaps the central 
defence of such scholars is the argument that candidate countries are not entering the 
enlargement process by “the traditional means of conquest, but … by means of invitation” 
(Haukkala, 2008:1610; see also Lundestad, 1998; Miles, 2004:255) and that the application to 
EU membership is a “voluntary movement” of the applicants (Cooper, 2002:7; Cooper, 
2004:72).  
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Although the above body of work has engaged with a postcolonial examination of how 
unequal power relations are produced in the fifth enlargement, such studies focus 
predominantly on the postcolonial experiences of the first wave of the fifth enlargement, 
while little research appears to have reached down to the postcolonial experiences of the 
second wave. Such a gap restricts the literature in presenting a broader examination of 
unequal power relations in the fifth enlargement. On the other hand by taking into 
consideration the 2007 enlargement, this research aims to contribute to a more nuanced 
examination of postcolonial experiences in the fifth enlargement (see Diez and Wiener 
op.cit., p.21). Nevertheless, in recent years we have seen a slow, but growing interest in the 
application of postcolonialism to the second wave of the fifth enlargement (e.g. Bojkov, 
2004; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009), which suggests that there is an overt 
interest in such perspectives and that the research of this current thesis will be fruitful in 
furthering our understanding of postcolonial experiences in this particular enlargement round.  
 
1.3.3. The orientalist reading of the EU 
When it comes to the examination of the EU and the fifth enlargement, EU focused 
postcolonial scholars predominantly discuss power relations through the concept of 
orientalism (Bakic-Hayden, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Böröcz, 2000, 2001a; Kovács, 2001, 
2006; Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001; Kuus, 2004, 2006; Best, 2006; Melegh, 2006a, 2006b; 
Velickovic; 2012). Orientalism, which will be further presented in the next chapter, was 
coined by Edward Said, who largely argued that orientalism is an imaginative discourse, 
based on binary representations between Western (Occidental) superiority and Eastern 
(Oriental) inferiority, which was created by Western colonial and imperial powers in order to 
justify domination of the Orient (Said, 2003:42).  
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One of the most established orientalist debates has concerned the employment of the word 
“East” or “Eastern” as an “orientalizing tool” in the fifth enlargement (Böröcz, 2001a:6; see 
also Böröcz, 2000; Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001:173; Zielonka, 2013:38-39). Scholars have 
argued that the EU created binary representations, by establishing knowledge that the 
candidates were part of an inferior Eastern Europe (Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001:147) and 
thus distant from the superior Europe (Sharp, 2009:12), while the EU was conceptualized as 
the European “idealised self” (Kovács, 2001:196, 2006:215). The correlation between 
orientalism and unequal power relations is that EU discourses produced alterity by 
representing the EU as the superior Europe and Eastern Europe as the inferior Other (Knight, 
2000:76; see also Kürti, 1996; Neumann, 1999:207; Böröcz, 2001a:6; Kovács and 
Kabachnik, 2001; Best, 2006; Kuus, 2004:474-475, 2007:152 and 155; Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004; Pagden, 2004a; Moisio, 2002; Rovisco, 2010:242; Šarić et al., 2010; 
Lazarus, 2012:122).  
 
Although such studies are important in conceptualizing orientalism in the context of EU 
enlargement and in demonstrating the manifestation of postcolonial experiences in the 
present, one apparent dearth is that this research is mainly done without references to other 
postcolonial perspectives. For instance, while it is fruitful to engage with orientalism, the 
perspective alone does not adequately and fully explain postcolonial experiences in the EU 
and thus provides a limited postcolonial examination. This thesis maintains therefore that the 
broader applicability of different postcolonial perspectives, such as ambivalence, mimicry, 
subalternity, etc., still constitutes a largely unexplored field within the EU focused 
postcolonial scholarship. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that scholars have tentatively 
engaged with these postcolonial perspectives, such as mimicry (Kovačević, 2010; Alexandru, 
2011; Bottez, 2011; Ștefănescu, 2012; Tlostanova, 2012) and subalternity (Csepeli et.al., 
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1996:497; Timár, 2004:535; Thieme, 2005; Böröcz, 2006b:163; Mälksoo, 2009:655; Buden 
2010a:4-5; Kovačević, 2010:147; Deltcheva, 2000:590; Kolodziejczyk and Șandru, 2012; 
Velickovic, 2012:167), but to a limited extent. This thesis argues therefore that in order to 
achieve an adequate postcolonial examination of the current research, broader applications of 
different postcolonial perspectives will introduce “an ever more faceted and nuanced picture 
of the European Union” (Diez and Wiener, op.cit, p.21). 
 
1.3.4. Discourse analysis in EU focused postcolonial research 
A large number of EU focused postcolonial scholars favor the method of discourse analysis 
in order to examine postcolonial experiences in the EU context (Sher, 2001; Bellier, 2004; 
Phinnemore, 2006c; Zielonka, 2013). This aspect is shared with other critical theories, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Fundamental to these scholars is the argument that language 
is “a pre-given reality … located at the centre” of the colonial and imperial power (Ashcroft 
et al., 2002:88) and a tool through which colonial and imperial unequal power relations are 
produced in the present (Ashcroft et al., 2002:7 and 88; Said, 2003). Therefore examining 
language, in the form of for instance written texts or oral speeches, is pivotal as language may 
include representations, which produce unequal power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 
2013:253).  
 
Within this literature, a substantial part of research has focused on the discourse analysis of 
the Regular Reports, which scholars have identified as significant in revealing and 
understanding the EU’s “imperialistic and colonizing strategy” in the fifth enlargement  
(Engel-Di Mauro, 2006b:7; see also Kovács, 2001:228, 2006; Sher, 2001; Bellier, 2004; Raik, 
2004; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009; Villalba, 2008; Avery, 2009; Joenniemi, 2012). For 
instance, Kovács has contributed two studies, which have examined power relations between 
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the EU and Hungary during the Hungarian enlargement process. Kovács’ first study, which 
analyzed the political criteria in the 1998 and 1999 Hungarian Regular Reports, reveals that a 
discourse analysis of the EU language of these reports indicated that Hungary was excluded 
from Europe based on a discourse of inferiorization and backwardness, in comparison to the 
EU (2001:212), which was illustrated as “an idealised self” (op.cit., p.215). Her second study 
on the other hand exposes a different view. Kovács argues that the study of the political 
criteria in the later Hungarian Regular Reports (published 2000-2002) demonstrates an 
approachment in power relations between the EU and Hungary (2006:212 and 220), which 
contradicts the inferiorization of Hungary identified in earlier Reports. Although these studies 
are pivotal in understanding the production of unequal power relations, as an examination of 
the Regular Reports opens up the manifestation of inequality in language, this research has 
been done with mainly references to Regular Reports, especially the earlier Regular Reports 
(as in the case of Kovács). This thesis argues that a broader examination of these reports will 
bring the analysis of EU language a step forward in adequately understanding postcolonial 
experiences.  
 
Another group of scholars have particularly focused on how words and grammar in EU 
enlargement documents can be analyzed in order to reveal the EU’s hidden agendas, which 
perpetuate colonial and imperial legacies in the fifth enlargement (Raik, 2004:580-581; see 
also Schimmelfennig, 1999, 2001, 2003; Bellier, 2004; Pridham, 2006, 2007a:353; Kuus, 
2007:161; Villalba, 2008; Zielonka, 2008:476; Avery, 2009, 2012:166; Lass-Lennecke and 
Werner, 2009:272-273; Joenniemi, 2012). For instance Jan Zielonka brings to the attention 
the preservation of the “imperial discourse” in the wording of the Copenhagen criteria 
(2013:35; see also Böröcz, 2000:869-870, 2001a:18, 2001b:52), while Helmut Behr suggests 
that the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis are new forms through which colonial and 
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imperial dictation of European standards as the benchmarks for civilization are implemented 
(2007:240, 242, 244 and 250). In the same vein, Geoffrey Pridham raises concerns that the 
Copenhagen criteria gave unprecedented power to the EU in controlling who was included 
and excluded as part of the EU (2006a:376; Zielonka, 2008:476). Furthermore, Giuditta 
Caliendo and Antonella Napolitano have examined how EU grammar, such as nouns, 
adjectives and verbs, were applied in enlargement documents to produce the image that the 
enlargement process was “a ‘captivating product’ that everybody would wish for and aspire 
to” (2008:329). Moreover, the EU strengthened such an image with the use of grammatical 
comparatives and superlatives, which stressed the exceptional and unparalleled results of EU 
enlargement (2008:328). Finally, Böröcz argues that by studying the grammar of the EU’s 
communication strategy in the fifth enlargement, we can identify how the EU produced 
representations of the candidates as “distant, inferior, and disposable”, while the EU was 
represented as superior and authoritative (2000:871). 
 
Furthermore, the EU’s conditionality principle27 has also attracted a great deal of scholarly 
interest in understanding how the application of this principle creates “profound power 
asymmetries between the negotiating parties” (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6; see also 
Gower, 1999:12; Schimmelfenning 2001:54; Scharpf, 2002; Böröcz, 2005:157-158; Pridham, 
2007a:347 and 353). Scholars have in particular examined the extent to which the principle 
preconditions “a non-egalitarian way” of negotiations, which can be identified in the 
language of conditionality (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:132). In particular, Grabbe has 
noted that the EU’s application of a vague vocabulary and “the substance technical” as part of 
the conditionality principle indicates that such a vagueness and technicality was not arbitrary, 
but had a hidden agenda in creating ambiguity, in order to consolidate the EU’s power in 
                                                          
27 Conditions for accession. 
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accession negotiations (2002:249 and 265). On these grounds, it is easy to understand why 
scholars raised concerns that the conditionality principle was “a new colonisation mechanism 
presented by a new empire called the European Union” (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 
2011:140).  
 
Other discourse analyses have brought to the fore the argument that processes of revamping 
(Kuus, 2006:225; Behr, 2007:247; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:52 and 528) and remapping 
(Kuus, 2006:225 and 232; see also Deltcheva, 2000:591; Kamińska, 2005:192; Kuus, 
2004:482; Raik, 2004; Stenning, 2005:378) have occurred in the language of the EU. This 
suggests that despite the postcolonial argument that continuity of “imperial and colonial 
practices” occurs in the present, such a continuity has also “continued to evolve, mutate and 
adapt across space and time” (Hopper and Kramsch, 2007:52; see also Stenning, 2005:378). 
For instance M. E. Kamińska argues that the Enlightenment discourse on Eastern Europe has 
continued to be applied in the fifth enlargement, but the location of Eastern Europe has been 
remapped through a process of migration to the East (2005:192). In the same vein, Merje 
Kuus suggests that a revamping of Eastern Europe has occurred in later years. This indicates 
that although the candidates of the fifth enlargement were still identified as distant from “the 
real Europe” (Kuus, 2006:231), candidates were also categorized as “on the doorstep of 
Europe” and more European than for instance non-applicants (Kuus, 2004:482, 2006:231; 
Raik, 2004). What we identify here is the fact that although a continuity of the exclusion of 
Eastern Europe from the real Europe has been maintained, closeness to Europe has also taken 
place in particular by transforming who (revamping) and where (remapping) Eastern Europe 
is.  
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On a final note, in a more recent study, Bailey and Fabienne Bossuyt (2013) borrow from 
postcolonialism in examining discourses and identifying mechanisms of domination in the 
EU’s trade policy discourses. Bailey and Bossuyt demonstrate that in contrast to the 
traditional EU image as “’force for good’”, the EU is identified as a location in which 
domination is being produced and where one mechanism of such production is achieved via 
othering, identifying therefore the EU as a site of domination (2013:561). The application to 
such a study of discourse and the EU is identified as a way to broaden our understanding of 
the EU, its policies and the production of relations from a critical approach (2013:572).  
 
Although the application of discourse analysis has been ground-breaking in the examination 
of how unequal power relations might operate in language, discourse analysis tends to largely 
describe “how the physical world works in order to understand it” and why it works that way 
(Gee, 2011:9). This thesis argues that in order to engage with the critical aspect of 
postcolonialism and attain a more adequate examination of unequal power relations, we need 
to not only describe what it is in language, but also engage in revealing problems, such as 
inequality in power relations and how to emancipate marginalized groups (see Galasińska and 
Kryzyżanowski, 2009). Such an aim can be achieved by applying for instance the method of 
critical discourse analysis. As previously mentioned, CDA not only examines the production 
of unequal power relations in and behind discourse, but also aims to reveal instruments of 
inequality in order to attain change and emancipation.  
 
Overall, postcolonial scholarship is of prominent importance as it opens grounds for 
introducing postcolonial perspectives to the study of the EU and power relations. Especially 
the EU focused postcolonial literature has taken postcolonial perspectives to new levels by 
applying these to the study of the EU. Nevertheless, as discussed above there is a postcolonial 
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dearth within the literature, due to the limited application of postcolonial perspectives, 
overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement and using a limited research 
method. The thesis argues that tackling these gaps is of particular value for trying to come to 
terms with the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations and introducing a 
critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space.  
 
1.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has engaged with a critical assessment of EU enlargement literature, 
highlighting that so far the literature is missing adequate postcolonial perspectives. The 
chapter proposes that by building upon existing postcolonial research, this thesis will advance 
the application of postcolonial perspectives to the study of how the EU produces unequal 
power relations and bring to the fore an engagement with post-positivist, critical and 
interpretivist approaches and offer new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical 
exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement. 
 
First, the chapter argued that the enlargement literature provides a distinctive gap, as it 
appears to have so far overlooked the relevance of postcolonial perspectives, despite opening 
up for other post-positivist theories. The absence of postcolonial perspectives in the literature 
sustains a theoretical gap, by limiting the assessment and understanding of the EU and 
unequal power relations (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013:284). In particular, given the 
importance of the study of power relations in EU enlargement, such a gap raises one 
particular question: why has a postcolonial approach not developed? This is a major 
theoretical caveat, as such an omission limits capturing a post-positivist understanding of the 
extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations.  
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Second, the chapter maintained that although EU focused postcolonial studies offer a key 
scholarship to the study of the EU and power relations, such studies tend to include a limited 
application of postcolonial perspectives and research methods, as well as limited research 
interest in the 2007 enlargement. However, in order to move beyond these gaps and to 
address the research questions, this thesis will engage with different postcolonial perspectives 
in order to advance the application of postcolonialism to the study of the EU and power 
relations. 
 
As the mobilization of a postcolonial examination provides a fruitful theoretical tool for 
conceptualizing postcolonial experiences in relation to enlargement and unequal power 
relations, the next chapter will introduce the framework of postcolonialism, providing a case 
for arguing that theoretical and empirical studies of EU enlargement and unequal power 
relations need to pay much closer attention to postcolonial perspectives. Thus, by providing a 
postcolonial springboard for the investigation of the EU and unequal power relations, this 
research aims to make important contributions to EU enlargement literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
POSTCOLONIALISM 
 
 
This chapter argues that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the gaps 
identified in the previous chapter, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in 
adequately demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. To 
start with, as the previous chapter presented, the study of EU enlargement has been examined 
from the perspectives of a variety of theoretical approaches, which Diez and Wiener call “a 
mosaic” (op.cit., p.19), referring to the level of theoretical “heterogeneity” (Andreatta, 
2011:22). Perhaps, the most applied have been those theories, which are accounted for by the 
European integration theory literature. These include mainstream theories such as the 
positivist liberal intergovernmentalism and the middle-ground social constructivism, as well 
as the less frequent applied post-positivist theories such as normative theory and gender 
approaches (Wiener and Diez, 2009; Hill and Smith, 2011). However, with the emergence of 
new developments within the EU in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of scholars started to 
question the assumptions on which mainstream theories were explaining and understanding 
the EU (Diez and Wiener, 2009:10). Such discussions opened up for new theoretical post-
positivist contributions, which included a broader range of ontological, epistemological and 
methodological standpoints (Manners and Whitman, 2016:4; Parker, 2016:38). Thus, it was 
through such developments that postcolonialism was introduced into EU research as an 
alternative approach to the study of the Union.  
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In line with the above, this chapter argues that the application of three postcolonial 
perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, will introduce a critical exploration and 
rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement and in particular in adequately 
understanding how unequal power relations are produced. As postcolonial scholars maintain 
that “it is not possible to engage with postcolonial studies without them” 28  (McLeod, 
2007b:13; see also Young, 1995:163; Ashcroft, 2001:7), the choice of the three perspectives 
is based on the contributions they have made to our understanding of inequality and power 
relations and on the development of postcolonialism as an academic framework. Moreover, 
apart from orientalism, which has been steadily applied, subalternity and mimicry have so far 
been obscured to a great extent from EU studies (see Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:26). Thus, 
examining EU enlargement from the standpoints of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry 
will set out a preliminary discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to analyze 
the EU and unequal power relations.   
 
This chapter aims to outline key postcolonial arguments, consider contributions and more 
importantly, identify what these arguments and contributions can bring to the study of the EU 
and unequal power relations (see Dunleavy, 2003; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012:101). The 
chapter proceeds in a four-step engagement. First, after a brief outline of the emergence of 
postcolonialism, the following section presents the argument that the present is postcolonial 
due to the fact that the colonial and imperial past is somewhat “still very much with us today” 
(McLeod op.cit., p.39). What is central to this argument is the fact that postcolonial scholars 
maintain that “continuing, often covert” colonial and imperial traces are particularly making 
themselves noticeable in unequal power relations in the present (Young, 2001:58; McLeod, 
                                                          
28 This refers to subalternity, orientalism and mimicry.  
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2007b:5). Examining power relations will therefore contribute to an alternative understanding 
of how the past may influence the present and in particular inequality in power relations.  
 
Second, as postcolonialism is concerned with the invisibility of marginalised groups and the 
need to represent these groups, scholars argue that paying attention to for instance 
“perceptions, motivations and beliefs” of such actors is important as it will allow their voices 
to be heard (Young, 2003:20; see also Bhabha, 1992:437; Sharp, 2009:5 and 7; Jackson and 
Sørensen, 2013:241; Heywood, 2014:200) and their resistance struggles to be seen from the 
bottom-up (Childs and Williams, 1997:28; Boehmer, 2005:100; Grovogui, 2007:231; 
Heywood, 2014:519; Sylvester, 2014:188). As the chapter will aim to demonstrate, 
subalternity is one particular theorization of how the bottom-up approach can be applied in 
order to understand production of unequal power relations (McLeod, 2010:223). The 
contribution of subalternity is that its application enables attention to be given to groups 
whose voices and forms of resistance and struggles have been ignored (Young, 2001:354; see 
also Childs and Williams, 1997:28).  
 
Third, the postcolonial interest in discursive analysis has been ground-breaking, as it has 
introduced an understanding that inequality can take place through language or what is 
commonly referred to as discursive domination (Young, 2001:383; Jackson and Sørensen, 
2013:253; Sylvester, 2014:185). This section will specifically turn to orientalism and 
mimicry, which are two ways of theorizing how colonial discourses function and impact upon 
power relations (McLeod, 2010:47). The application of such perspectives contributes in 
particular to our understanding of how discourses construct “objects of reality and the ways 
in which they are perceived and understood” (Young, 2001:388).  
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Fourth, this section argues for the relevance of the above postcolonial perspectives, 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, in accounting for the extent to which the EU produces 
unequal power relations. The section indicates that drawing upon the above, not only enables 
us to examine the EU in a postcolonial present, but also identifies the EU as a postcolonial 
space in which unequal power relations are being produced and thus will set out a 
preliminary discussion of how these postcolonial perspectives might be applied to the EU and 
power relations. In sum, this chapter maintains that drawing upon postcolonial perspectives is 
of paramount importance, as it offers new ways of theorizing and displays a new critical 
exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU and EU enlargement. 
 
2.1. The emergence of postcolonial scholarship 
Although postcolonialism has been “a site of disciplinary and interpretative contestation” 
(Ashcroft et.al., 2010:168; see also McClintock, 1995; Childs and Williams, 1997:6; Moore-
Gilbert et.al., 1997b:1 and 3; Young, 2001:57; Ashcroft, 2001:7; McLeod, 2007b:7, 2010:279 
and 313), it has also offered an engaging framework for examining and understanding the 
world, in particular through three key perspectives, which will be discussed below. However, 
before examining the importance of these, let us first look at the origins of postcolonialism in 
order to better understand where its arguments originate from, the contributions it has made 
and more importantly how postcolonialism can be useful to the study of EU enlargement and 
the production of power relations.  
 
Initially postcolonialism emerged as a reaction against (European) mainstream theories 
(Smith et al., 2014:6; see also Grovogui, 2013:250-252; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:232), 
which postcolonial scholars regarded as unable “to deal adequately with the complexities and 
varied cultural provenance” of countries with a history of European colonialism and 
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imperialism (Ashcroft et.al., 1989:11; McLeod, 2010:12). Based on this critique, a range of 
scholars from largely the non-Western world established “a multiplicity of perspectives, 
traditions, and approaches” (Grovogui, 2013:248; Smith et al., 2014:6), which engaged with 
the study of postcolonial experiences of European colonies (Loomba et.al., 2006:3; see also 
Fanon, 1963, 2008; Memmi, 1967; Cabral, 1972; Rushdie, 1982; Prakash, 1995; Bhabha, 
1997; Loomba, 1998; James, 2001; Escobar, 2004; Grovogui, 2007; McLeod, 2007a; Sethi, 
2011:5; Kaiwar, 2014; Manzo, 2014). In short, the key argument of postcolonialism is that 
“practices and consequences” of colonial and imperial traces have lingered into the present 
and thus impact upon power relations (Moore-Gilbert, 2007b:6). The aim of postcolonial 
scholars is to reveal such practices and consequences, change unequal relations and 
emancipate subordinated groups (see Bailey, 2011:39). 
 
Although research has predominantly focused on locations identified as victims of Western 
European colonial and imperial aggression (see Childs and Williams, 1997:11; Ashcroft et 
al., 1998:187, 2002:2;), postcolonialism has not remained “a field of study, which is 
exclusive to selected nationalities, cultures or races” of the colonized world (McLeod, 
2010:6; see also Ashcroft, 2001:12; Wilson et al., 2010:2; Heywood, 2014:16), but has 
expanded to various “historical, political, sociological and economic analyses” (Ashcroft 
et.al., 2010:169; see also Deltcheva, 2000:591; Kamińska, 2005:192; Kuus, 2004:482, 
2006:225 and 232; Raik, 2004; Stenning, 2005:378; Behr, 2007:247; Hooper and Kramsch, 
2007:52 and 528). This development has been mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, 
when indicating a “plurality of postcolonialisms” and thus a wider employability of 
postcolonialism to non-traditional colonies (Ahmad, 1995:9).  
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It should also be noted that a number of scholars have questioned the application of 
postcolonialism outside the study of the experiences of European colonies (see Childs and 
Williams, 1997:11). For instance, Arif Dirlik argues that the application of postcolonialism to 
new areas breaks with what the framework is supposed to do, as scholars include “so much 
beyond” and exclude “so much of its own postulated premise, the colonial …” (1994:339). 
However, the postcolonial expansion to new areas of study coincided with a range of changes 
in the EU, particularly in the 1990s, which witnessed the emergence of new processes of 
enlargement and integration, significant changes to the structure of the EU, as well as 
transformations of the power balance in Europe. These changes faced new ontological and 
epistemological questions, which required new ways of understanding and explaining (Diez 
and Wiener, 2009:10). Based on alternative key arguments, which mainstream theories did 
not offer, postcolonialism became a fruitful avenue to take when examining the EU. Or, in 
the words of Siba N. Grovogui, postcolonialism offered “necessary steps to re-envisioning” 
(2013:250) our understanding of the EU. As the below three sections will aim to demonstrate, 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are in particular offering new ways of theorizing and 
displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU and 
power relations in the present.  
 
2.2. Recognizing a postcolonial present 
One of the central points of departure in postcolonial research is the recognition of the 
present as postcolonial (Bhabha, 1992:437; Spivak, 1993:280; Ahmad, 1994:204, 1995:8; 
Dirlik, 1994:332; Slemon, 1994:16-17; Williams, 1994:3; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:168; 
Quayson, 2000a:1; Sharp, 2009; McLeod, 2010:6; Sylvester, 2014:185). In short, this refers 
to the argument that colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, 
continuing to function in today’s world and thus producing a postcolonial present (McLeod 
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op.cit., p.39; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:103; Ashcroft et.al., 1998:187, 2002:2, 
2010:64; Young, 2003:3; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:239; Heywood, 2014:200). For 
instance McLeod maintains that the contemporary postcolonial world can be recognized 
through the identification of “forms of colonial and imperial representations, reading 
practices, attitudes and values”, which persist to function in the present (2010:6 and 38). 
 
The recognition of the present as postcolonial has been further solidified by a scholarly 
dispute, which has become “a source of vigorous debate” in postcolonialism (Ashcroft et.al., 
2010:169; see also Slemon, 1994:16; Loomba, 1998:7; Ashcroft et al., 2006:2). This is 
related to the debate of whether the spelling with or without a hyphen alters the meaning of 
how scholars articulate postcolonialism (Ashcroft, 2001:9-13; Ashcroft et.al., 1998:186-187, 
2010:168-169; Young, 2001:57; McLeod, 2007b:9, 2010:5-6; Sharp, 2009:4-5). Although 
interchangeably applied, a number of scholars argue that the spelling postcolonialism29 has a 
different meaning to the hyphened version of post-colonialism30 (Shohat, 1992:101; Childs 
and Williams, 1997:1; Ashcroft, 2001:10; Sharp, 2009:4-5; McLeod, 2010:5-6). For instance, 
McLeod claims that post-colonialism refers to “a particular historical period or epoch” 
(2010:5) when colonial territories moved to formal independence (Sharp, 2009:4-5). On the 
other hand, postcolonialism refers to the persistence of colonial and imperial power systems 
into the present and the need in combating such legacies (Young, 2001:58). Consequently, 
such a scholarly dispute not only indicates an existing academic debate, but also draws 
attention to the extent to which colonial and imperial consequences and outcomes have 
configured the present into a postcolonial one31. Although such an academic debate is still 
ongoing, the common point for both postcolonial and post-colonial scholars is the argument 
                                                          
29 Applied by e.g. Loomba (1998), Quayson (2000a) and Sharp (2009).  
30 Applied by e.g. Adam and Tiffin (1990), Slemon (1994), Childs and Williams (1997) and Ashcroft (2001). 
31 In order not to complicate things further, in this thesis I will employ the spelling of postcolonialism and the 
meaning associated with such a spelling. 
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that these “continuing, often covert” colonial and imperial traces are particularly making 
themselves noticeable in unequal power relations in the present (Young, 2001:58; McLeod, 
2007b:5). Such an argument has enabled scholars to engage with the correlation between 
power relations and inequality in the postcolonial present. 
 
2.2.1. Power relations in the postcolonial present 
One central aspect of postcolonialism is the argument that lingering colonial and imperial 
legacies are particularly making themselves noticeable in power relations and 
resistance/struggles to power in the present (McLeod, 2007b:5; see also, Moore-Gilbert et.al., 
1997b:26; Young, 2001:6; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:36-37). Thus postcolonial scholars are 
particularly interested in revealing how colonial and imperial legacies perpetuate in power 
relations and how they contribute to the production of power inequality and resistance 
struggles in the present (Sylvester, 2014:185; see also Ashcroft, 2001:11 and 16). This 
argument has been featured in the writings of various scholars such as Edward Said, who for 
instance was interested in understanding how inequality in power relations “transmit or 
reproduce itself from one epoch to another” (Said, 2003:15). In the same vein, more recent 
scholars, such as McLeod, have tackled unequal power relations by questioning in which 
ways colonial and imperial “historical and cultural consequences remain very much a part of 
the present and still have the capacity to exert ‘pressures’ today” (2007b:4).  
 
One distinctive aspect raised in recent postcolonial studies is the fact that although we 
identify continuing and lingering colonial and imperial elements in the power relations of the 
present (Young, 2001:6; Greene, 2004:423; McLeod, 2007b:7), scholars have also observed 
that such features may have been “remoulded and refashioned in our contemporary world” 
(McLeod, 2010:313). Such an observation implies that the perimeters of postcolonial studies 
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have to some extent changed. For instance, Bill Ashcroft draws attention to the fact that in the 
present, unequal power relations may be “re-emerging in very different political and cultural 
circumstances” than those shared by colonized societies (Ashcroft, 2001:7; see also Hopper 
and Kramsch, 2007:52 and 528; McLeod, 2010:39). In the same vein, McLeod maintains that 
postcolonial spaces in the present may not be contained to a particular location, periodization 
or form, but postcolonialism can be applied to a variety of areas (2010:6). What we identify 
here is recognition that although colonialism and imperialism matter in analyzing power 
relations, the areas of study may have changed from how postcolonialism was applied in its 
earlier stages. In particular, the processes of remapping and revamping, which were discussed 
in the previous chapter, internalize the logic of how scholars may identify the persistence of 
colonial and imperial “relations of power in the contemporary world” (McLeod, 2010:279), 
but that such aspects could have evolved, mutated and adapted (Hopper and Kramsch op.cit., 
p.52).  
 
2.3. Understanding the postcolonial present through a bottom-up approach  
A second central point of departure in postcolonial research is the application of a bottom-up 
approach (Childs and Williams, 1997:21; Young, 2003:6-7; Bhabha, 2006:155; McLeod, 
2007b:9, 2010; Bailey, 2011; Grovogui, 2013; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013; Heywood, 
2014:71). The bottom-up approach embodies a very useful trait, which is also related to the 
postcolonial position as a critical theory, which not only aims to identify the effects of 
colonial and imperial traces in the present and in particular upon power relations, but also 
attempts to combat and change such relations and emancipate exploited groups (Young, 
2001:58; see also Dirlik, 1994:352; Sharp, 2009:4-5; Bailey, 2011:39; Jackson and Sørensen, 
2013:245).  
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From a postcolonial perspective, a bottom-up approach can therefore be usefully employed to 
enable emancipation, as it allows scholars to examine the postcolonial present “from the 
position of its victims, not its perpetrators” (Young, 2001:58). By allowing voices of 
marginalized groups to be heard (Young, 2003:20) and their forms of resistance and struggles 
to be seen (Childs and Williams, 1997:28; Young, 2001:354), postcolonial scholars aim “to 
recover alternative ways of knowing and understanding – often talked of in terms of ‘other 
voices’ – in order to present alternatives to dominant western constructs” (Sharp, 2009:5; see 
also Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:4). Such a take is grounded in the objective of producing “a 
more just and equitable relation between the different peoples of the world” (Young, 2003:7; 
see also Quayson, 2000b:94). Thus, the bottom-up approach enables a transformation of “the 
conditions” of unequal power relations by allowing new knowledge, representations, views, 
voices, etc. to be heard and listened to (Young, 2003:6). One particular postcolonial 
perspective, which employs a bottom-up approach, is the subalternity framework, which will 
be discussed next.  
 
2.3.1. Subalternity 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s subalternity is a salient point of convergence for adequately 
understanding the postcolonial present, as it enables scholars to correlate postcolonial 
experiences of subalternity with unequal power relations. Deemed “one of the most 
influential and notorious essays in postcolonialism” (McLeod, 2010:217), Spivak’s Can the 
subaltern speak? (1988) introduced the concept of subaltern, which is identified as a 
heterogeneous Other that comprises the marginalised groups of colonized societies, such as 
“subsistence farmers, unorganized peasant labour, the tribals and the communities of zero 
workers on the street or in the countryside” (Spivak, 1994:84). This categorisation of the 
subaltern was expanded by Spivak in later works, which came to include for instance women 
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and migrant workers in the First World (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:452). Spivak’s expansion of 
what the term subaltern may entail is of enormous value, as it allows the concept of 
subalternity to be applied to a variety of marginalised group, not only the colonized.  
 
Subalternity influenced the postcolonial examination of unequal power relations through 
notably two aspects, instruments of subjugation and muteness of the subaltern. First, Spivak 
identifies how instruments of subjugation, which are represented by “colonial 
representational systems”, render the subaltern mute (McLeod, 2010:221). Such 
representational systems are defined as any form of colonial and imperial representations, 
“which claim to identify and articulate subaltern consciousness” (McLeod, 2010:219). 
Although Spivak’s research initially focused on gender 32 , the impact of instruments of 
subjugation upon the muteness of the subaltern is instrumental as it introduces an 
understanding of how subalterns are subjected to the hegemony of dominant classes (known 
as the elite) and reveals how such a subjection may create an imbalance in power relations 
(Ashcroft et. al., 2010:198-199).  
 
Second, it is against the above background that Spivak questions whether the subaltern can be 
“retrieved and restored to history” (McLeod, 2010:221), whether the subaltern is able to be 
heard, to be listened to and to have one’s experiences considered or whether the subaltern 
will always be spoken for by colonial representational systems (Spivak, 1994; Chakrabarty, 
2000:102). Spivak concludes that the subaltern has “no history” and thus “cannot speak” 
(Spivak, 2006:32; see also Moore-Gilbert, 2000:453; Hiddlestone, 2009:156-157), but will 
                                                          
32 Spivak examined the situation of Indian women, which she claimed were the most oppressed, not only 
through a “double colonization“ by the domestic (Indian) and colonial (British) patriarchy of men (Young, 
1995:162), but also by insurgency groups against the colonial and imperial power, as insurgency prioritised the 
male (McLeod, 2010:220). 
 
. 
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remain mute. Rather than being heard, the subaltern’s voice is ventriloquized (Moore-Gilbert, 
2000:453; see also Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:30) and “known, represented, and spoken for” 
by the elite (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:452; McLeod, 2010:27). Spivak has however been 
criticised for not allowing the subaltern to write back into history (Hiddlestone, 2009:162: 
McLeod, 2010:222), but instead replicating the same ventriloquism produced by colonial 
representational systems by concluding that the subaltern will remain mute and cannot be 
heard (Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:32; Parry, 2004:23).  
 
Moreover, Spivak adds that the domination of the subaltern is not only a matter of not being 
heard, but also of “not being understood with accuracy and that others do “not know how to 
listen”” to the subaltern. The muteness of the subaltern is therefore a result of “a failure of 
interpretation and not a failure of articulation” (cited in McLeod, 2010, p.223). Thus, by 
remaining mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, the subaltern is subjected to a 
marginalized position, which produces inequality in power relations between the subaltern 
and the elite.  
 
Overall, as Spivak argues that traces of colonial and imperial representational systems have 
lingered into the present and enabled muteness as part of the postcolonial present (1994:104), 
the application of subalternity has the potential to make a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced in the present, but also how a 
bottom-up approach can restore voices of marginalized groups.  
 
2.4. Understanding the postcolonial present through colonial discursive analysis 
A third central point of departure in postcolonial research is the application of colonial 
discourse analysis, which emerged as a way of employing a discursive and linguistic 
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examination of colonialism and imperialism (Young, 1995:159; Jackson and Sørensen, 
2013:239). This method was ground-breaking in postcolonial studies as it introduced the 
prospect of colonial and imperial domination taking place through language or what 
postcolonial scholars commonly refer to as discursive domination (Young op.cit., p.383). 
 
Colonial discourse analysis developed from the argument that language is “the medium 
through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated, and the medium through 
which conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘order’, and ‘reality’ become established” (Ashcroft et.al., 
2002:7). In other words, language is identified as a vehicle through which colonial and 
imperial traces, which impact upon unequal power relations, are perpetuated. In turn, such a 
perpetuation has implications upon discourse, which in postcolonial thought is identified as 
“a collection of statements … unified by the designation of a common object of analysis, by 
particular ways of articulating knowledge about that object” (Childs and Williams, 1997:98).  
 
As postcolonial scholars maintain that colonial and imperial discourses are powerful as they 
create knowledge and the very reality that they appear to describe (Young, 2001:388), in 
order to identify colonial and imperial perpetuation, scholars often apply colonial discourse 
analysis to for instance texts in order to reveal how colonial and imperial beliefs inform both 
past and present power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253). For instance, applying 
colonial discourse analysis to colonial and imperial documentation, which is regarded as 
“something more” than just text (Young, 1995:163, 2001:388), enables scholars to examine 
“concepts and representations used in literary texts, travel writings, memoirs and academic 
studies”, reveal “diverse ideological practices” hidden in discourses and identify the extent to 
which such ideological practices produce inequality in power relations (Young, 1995:159; 
Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253). Thus, the focus on language and discourse is of vital 
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significance as it highlights how knowledge can be “talked and written into existence” 
(Neumann, 1996:2) and thus offers an alternative way of identifying and examining power 
relations in the postcolonial present.  
 
Although colonial discourse analysis has been largely applied on colonial and imperial 
locations, in recent years it has seen an ascent in examining Western European discursive 
domination in relation to Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994, 1995:933; Bakic-Hayden, 1995:917-
918; Delanty, 1995; Kürti, 1996; Wilson and van der Dussen, 1996; Burgess, 1997; 
Goldsworthy, 1998; Agnew, 2001; Pagden, 2004a; Stenning, 2005:378; Best, 2006:186; 
Franzinetti, 2008; Wallace, 2008; Šarić et.al., 2010; Lazarus, 2012). For instance scholars 
such as Todorova (1997) and Gábor Kármán (2010) have applied colonial discourse analysis 
on a selection of documents, revealing how Western Europe produced discourses about its 
superiority, while evaluating Eastern Europe as backward (Todorova, 1997:14; Kármán, 
2010:560). Moreover, in recent years, colonial discourse analysis has seen an ascent in 
examining the discursive domination of the EU in the fifth enlargement, which was discussed 
in the literature review.  
 
Two different ways of understanding the application of colonial discourse analysis is through 
the identification of orientalism and mimicry. The next two sections will therefore look at 
how these two opposed postcolonial perspectives (McLeod, 2010:65) account for unequal 
power relations in the present (see Young, 2001:6). 
 
2.4.1. Orientalism 
Edward Said’s orientalism, which is often regarded as the concept that “inaugurated the 
postcolonial field” (Bhabha, 1992:465; Ashcroft et.al., 2006:10), is a postcolonial perspective 
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examining how colonial discourses produced a “context that was decisive in paving the way 
for actual colonization” and for producing unequal power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 
2013:240). Considered by many as the personification of postcolonial thought (Young, 
1995:163), “the work from which virtually all contemporary postcolonial theory derives” 
(Larsen, 2000a:45) and “the source book in our discipline” (Spivak, 1993:56), Said’s 
Orientalism (2003) was groundbreaking, as it changed the course of the study of postcolonial 
experiences and power relations. The book introduced the concept of orientalism, whose 
application aimed to reveal the existence of “a consistent discursive register of particular 
perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation common to a wide variety of texts” 
(Young, 2001:387; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:239). The centrality of such discursive 
registers was that they share “a form of knowledge that was developed simultaneously with 
its deployment and utilization in a structure of power, namely colonial domination” (Young, 
2001:388). Based on the above, orientalism can then be understood as a discourse, through 
which European colonial powers produced “the Orient politically sociologically, military, 
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” 33 
(Said, 2003:3; see also Said, 1997:128; Todorova, 1997:188; Kovács, 2001:199). In the 
words of Said, orientalism is defined as:  
 
“a library or archive of information ... What bound the archive together is a 
family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be 
effective. These ideas explained the behavior of the Orientals; they supplied 
the Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, 
they allowed the Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a 
phenomenon possessing regular characteristics” (Said, 2003:41-42).  
 
In other words, orientalism enabled postcolonial scholars to question and to examine colonial 
and imperial language and to demonstrate how discursive registers included particular 
                                                          
33 In the writing of Said, the colonized is identified as the Orient. 
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“perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation”, which created a particular 
knowledge about the Orient. However, in Said’s perspective, these registers were not 
innocent, but they created imaginative truths about the inferiority of the subjects they 
described, in order to control them, but also to gain credibility about the Western superiority 
(see Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:19 and 279). Similarly, Homi Bhabha remarks that the 
colonial discourse was a vehicle “to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate 
types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and establish systems of 
administration and instruction” (2000:70; see also Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:19). What 
both Said and Bhabha suggest here is the fact that the aim of colonial discourse was to 
produce certain knowledge in order to justify colonial domination and Western superiority 
(Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:24).  
 
Thus, based on the above, Said argued that this “library or archive of information” was 
simply a Western European imaginative discourse (Said, 2003:57; see also Young, 1995:160; 
Ashcroft et.al., 2010:153), particularly built upon binary representations, which became the 
norms against which the world was measured (Said, 2003:57; see also Said, 1993:44; Young, 
1995:1616; Sardar, 1999:3; McLeod, 2007b:2). Said was resentful against the production and 
applicability of binary representations (2003:57; see also Said, 1993:44; McLeod, 2007b:2), 
because they created imaginative knowledge, which was often grounded in the discourse of 
the superior familiar (Europe, the West, us) and the inferior strange (the Orient, the East, 
them) (Said, 1993:44, 2003:42; Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:23). For instance Said 
highlighted how different binary representations exposed Europe as “powerful and articulate” 
(2003:57), “rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”” (2003:40) against the Orient, which was 
“diametrically inferior to a European equivalent” (2003:72), “childlike, or feminine, 
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incapable of looking after themselves … and requiring the paternal rule of the west for their 
own best interests” (Young, 2003:2).  
 
More importantly, binary representations inscribed certain power relations between the 
colonial and imperial power and the colonized (Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:23), as the 
knowledge created by such representations produced inequality in power relations (McLeod, 
2010:48). For instance Nathaniel Knight indicates that although orientalism may be an 
invention, this orientalist knowledge has a correlation to unequal power relations as: 
 
“the power generated by orientalist knowledge is real and inescapable. At 
every level, the creation of alterity through orientalist discourse is inseparable 
from domination. Knowledge of the Orient is never innocent ... Rather is it the 
mark of subordination, through which the universally inferior "other" 
embodies the full panoply of traits unworthy of civilized man” (Knight, 
2000:76).  
 
What Knight argues here is the fact that orientalist knowledge produces alterity in order to 
subordinate less powerful groups. It is in this respect that orientalism came to be associated 
with unequal relations of power (Said, 2003:5; McLeod, 2010:47) and identified as the 
discourse of power of the colonizer (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:153; see also Young, 1995:160). In 
this vein, Said regarded orientalism as one of the most important mechanisms of colonial and 
imperial domination (Young, 2003:3; see also Williams, 1994:3) and his aim was to reveal 
this hidden part and what it represented (1989:211). 
 
However, despite Said’s scholarly quest in identifying binary representations in colonial and 
imperial discourses, one of the main criticisms of Orientalism was that Said omitted to 
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include any alternative representations to the colonial and imperial ones34 (Sharp, 2009:5). 
Such an inclusion would not only have introduced alternative knowledge to the colonial and 
imperial representations (McLeod, 2010:57; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:107, Moore-
Gilbert et.al., 1997b:24-26; Hiddlestone, 2009:90, Sharp, 2009:27-28), but would have also 
enabled a bottom-up approach, by including the voices and forms of resistance/struggles of 
marginalized groups (Childs and Williams, 1997:145; Chowdhry and Nair, 2002:12 and 15).  
 
Based on this, the application of orientalism is central to colonial discourse analysis as it 
examines how discourses produced knowledge about the Orient and which impacted upon 
power relations by dominating, restructuring and having authority over how the Orient was 
represented (Said, 2003:3). Moreover, especially as postcolonial scholars claim that colonial 
and imperial discourses “are still very much with us today, even if the political map of the 
world has altered through decolonization” (McLeod op.cit., p.39), Said’s orientalism can 
usefully be employed to illuminate the extent to which current discourses produce unequal 
power relations in the postcolonial present by questioning the knowledge they have produced 
and represent (see Said, 2003). As such, orientalism has the potential to make a significant 
contribution to the study of the EU and power relations in the enlargement context.  
 
2.4.2. Mimicry 
While Spivak and Said articulated ways in which subalternity and orientalism were used as 
instruments of power by the colonizer, Hommi Bhabha’s mimicry deals with resistance 
against for instance subalternity and orientalist discourses (McLeod, 2010:221). In other 
words, mimicry is the subaltern’s discourse to resist colonial and imperial unequal power 
                                                          
34 Although Said’s later publication Culture and Imperialism (1994) was a response to this criticism, where he 
acknowledged alternative representations (1994:xii; Hiddlestone, 2009:94). 
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relations (Ashcroft, 2001:3), by producing an “ambivalent relationship between colonizer and 
colonized” (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:124).  
 
Mimicry was first introduced in Bhabha’s The Location of Culture (2000) and refers to a 
practice through which the mimic man35 becomes “entirely knowable and visible” (Bhabha, 
2000:71). Mimicry can therefore be understood as the process through which the colonized is 
reformed and through which the colonized challenges the colonial and imperial power by 
essentially mimicking the colonial power (2000:86). However Bhabha argues that the process 
of mimicry produces a double characteristic of ambivalence, as the mimic man becomes “a 
subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (2000:86; see also Bhabha, 
1997:153). What this entails is that even though the colonized mimics the colonizer, the 
colonized will always maintain features of the colonized (Ashcroft et.al., 1998:118-119). The 
ambivalence rests upon the image that the colonized is almost the same as the colonizer, but 
not fully quite the same. Based on this ambivalence, mimicry is regarded as the intersection 
between the colonized and the colonial power (Ashcroft et.al., 2002:205), as the mimic man 
can be “both similar to and the other of the colonisers” (McLeod, 2010:65).  
 
Moreover, Bhabha argues that this ambivalence or double articulation is “the most terrifying” 
aspect of mimicry (2000:90), as the appropriation of the mimic man to the colonial power 
becomes a threat to the latter (Bhabha, 1997:153; 2000:86). For instance, Ashcroft et.al. 
regard mimicry as “never a simple reproduction of” the colonial traits, but a new 
interpretation, which can mock or even become a threat to the colonial power (2010:125-
126). In the same vein, McLeod underlines that: 
 
                                                          
35 In the writing of Bhabha, the colonized is identified as the mimic man. 
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“hearing their language coming through the mouths of the colonised, the 
colonisers are faced with the worrying threat of resemblance between 
coloniser and colonised … If civilization, learning, even (being) English can 
be learned by the colonised, then just how inherent and exclusive are these 
things to the colonisers?” (McLeod, 2010:66). 
 
The above indicates that when the mimic man actually resembles the colonial power, this 
may be interpreted as a threat that the colonized imposes upon the colonial power. It is in this 
respect that Bhabha maintains that mimicry is a status of “both resemble and menace at once” 
(2000:86; see also Ashcroft et.al., 1998:118-119). The first is defined as “a difference that is 
almost nothing but not quite” and the second as “a difference that is almost total but not 
quite” (Bhabha, 2000:91).  
 
In other words, mimicry is another way in which colonial discourse analysis can reveal 
discursive domination. However, in contrast to orientalism, mimicry engages with the 
discourses of the colonized, as it more likely to reveal a state of ambivalence of the mimic 
man (McLeod, 2010:65). Thus the goal with the application of mimicry is that regardless of 
how often the colonized mimics the colonial power, the appropriation to the latter, by 
becoming “almost nothing but not quite”, as well as “almost total but not quite”, becomes not 
only a threat, but also an empowerment of the colonized. Thus, mimicry is much more than 
just understanding a process of colonization (McLeod, 2010:66). Mimicry can be understood 
as a strategy of power of the colonized (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:459; see also Bhabha, 
1997:156) and thus can be regarded as power of knowledge of the mimic man (Bhabha, 
2000:89; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:129). Following on from the previous point, 
mimicry identifies therefore a flaw in the certainty of colonial dominance in controlling the 
colonized (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:125).  
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2.5. The postcolonial relevance to the study of EU enlargement 
This section argues that by building upon the postcolonial perspectives of subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry, this thesis will enable new ways of theorizing and displaying a new 
critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement. It will also set 
out a preliminary discussion of the extent to which postcolonialism might be applied to the 
case of the EU’s production of unequal power relations.  
 
The argument that the present is postcolonial has enormous value for the examination EU 
enlargement as it enables scholars to engage with the idea that the EU is a postcolonial space 
in a postcolonial present where systems “of economic, political and cultural domination” 
(Young, 2001:58) “that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have 
in many respects not declined” (Hardt and Negri, 2001:43), but have continued “under the 
auspices” of the EU (Kovačević op.cit., p.361). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
although EU focused postcolonial literature has taken tentative steps in examining the 
postcolonial present of the EU (see for instance Mezzadra 2005:4; Fischer Onar and 
Nicolaïdis, 2013), there is still a dearth of postcolonial research. Nevertheless, the EU 
focused postcolonial scholarship has significant importance to the study of enlargement, as it 
embraces the crucial need to question the EU from a postcolonial perspective and better 
integrates the EU as a postcolonial space in the larger debate of the discipline. Such an 
expansion demonstrates that postcolonialism is not “caught behind the posts and unable to 
move to new and/or more promising re-/articulations”, as Carol Boyce Davies argues 
(1994:81).  
 
The bottom-up approach has the potential to make a significant contribution to research on 
enlargement, as it moves beyond some of the gaps identified in the previous chapter and 
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furthers our understanding of the EU in two different ways. First, an extract from Harper 
Lee’s To kill a mockingbird accounts that “’you never really understand a person until you 
consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and walk around in 
it’” (2006:33). Similarly, a bottom-up approach mirrors the meaning behind this extract, as it 
allows an understanding of the EU and in particular unequal power relations to be represented 
from the perspectives of marginalized groups (see Sylvester, 2014:185). In particular, a 
bottom-up approach aims to enable the voices of these groups to be heard, which are missing 
in mainstream analyses and which so far has been “represented” by “the colonial voice of 
the EU” (Polat, 2011:1269). Second, a bottom-up approach not only introduces alternative 
representations and knowledge from the perspectives of marginalized groups, which have 
been invisible in many different ways in the context of enlargement studies (see Sylvester, 
2014:190), but also questions the durability of truths created by the EU and challenges power 
relations inherent from EU practices and forms of representations and knowledge (see Childs 
and Williams, 1997:101 and 103).  
 
By applying a bottom-up approach, subalternity can be of enormous value in examining 
enlargement. As discussed in the previous chapter, the existing postcolonial literature of the 
EU has developed largely without references to the notion of subalternity and thus its 
application will further the use of postcolonial perspectives to such studies. Consequently, 
subalternity enables scholars to engage with questions regarding the extent to which 
representational systems rendered marginalized groups mute and the ways in which 
instruments of subjugation impacted upon power relations within the enlargement context. 
Moreover, the application of subalternity also engages with the extent to which Spivak’s 
argument regarding the muteness of the subaltern can in fact be challenged, by finding ways 
of allowing the subaltern to speak, to be heard and to be listened to.  
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Colonial discourse analysis is of paramount importance to EU enlargement studies from two 
different perspectives. First, colonial discourse analysis expands the discursive and linguistic 
turn in EU studies (see Neumann, 2002; Torfing, 2005) and draws attention to an alternative 
way of understanding EU enlargement (see Diez, 2005:615; see also Diez, 1999a, 2001, 
2006; Moisio, 2003:76). Second, colonial discourse analysis establishes a platform in which 
discursive domination can be examined in the postcolonial present. By applying this to for 
instance EU documents, such an analysis expands the examination of how language was used 
as a medium through which unequal power relations were produced (see Torfing, 2005:21-
24). Moreover, colonial discourse analysis enables alternative forms of knowledge and 
resistance to be seen and heard (see McLeod, 2010:57-58). As stated in the previous chapter, 
the existing EU focused postcolonial literature has developed largely with reference to 
orientalism, which has revealed for instance how discursive registers of binary 
representations can mediate unequal power relations in the EU (see Moore-Gilbert et.al., 
1997b:22; see also Young, 1995:159; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:37). The current thesis will 
therefore build upon previous orientalist studies and in particular further our understanding of 
the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the enlargement context.   
 
Engaging with Bhabha’s mimicry is also instrumental, as mimicry opens up postcolonial 
spaces to new intellectual interpretations and thinking (McLeod, 2010:62). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, mimicry has rarely been featured in EU postcolonial literature, even 
though mimicry is paramount, as it engages with the EU on a different level than subalternity 
and orientalism. Mimicry advocates resistance to unequal power relations by acknowledging 
the mimicking of marginalized groups and how mimicry evokes both resemblance and threat 
to the dominant power, which indicates a flaw in the certainty of colonial dominance in 
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controlling the mimic man (Ashcroft et.al., op.cit., p.125). The centrality of mimicry lays in 
the fact that its application reveals a state of ambivalence of the mimic man and which can be 
regarded as a form of power strategy against the dominant power. Moreover, unlike 
orientalism, the application of mimicry recognizes a bottom-up approach and also encourages 
emancipation (see Ashcroft et.al., 2002:175-176; McLeod, 2010:67) by acknowledging how 
subordinated groups can be “knowable and visible” (Bhabha op.cit., p.71), unlike 
subalternity.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the 
gaps identified in the previous chapter, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in 
adequately demonstrating how the EU produces unequal power relations. In particular, the 
chapter indicates that three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, 
are pivotal in achieving the aim of the thesis, by setting out how they are operating in the 
Reports.  
 
The chapter maintained that first, postcolonial scholars recognize the present as postcolonial 
due to the fact that colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, producing 
a postcolonial present. What is central to this view is the fact that colonial and imperial traces 
are particularly making themselves noticeable in power relations. Second, as postcolonialism 
is concerned with emancipation and change of unequal power relations, these can be achieved 
by allowing marginalized groups to be heard through for instance the application of a bottom-
up approach. A bottom-up approach not only introduces alternative representations and 
knowledge of marginalized groups, but also questions the durability of truths created by and 
challenges power relations inherent from the dominant power. One way of theorizing the 
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bottom-up approach is through the application of subalternity. Third, colonial discourse 
analysis has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the way unequal power 
relations are produced in the present by employing a discursive and linguistic examination. 
Orientalism and mimicry are two different ways of theorizing how discourses impact upon 
power relations in the postcolonial present.  
 
Overall, this chapter argued that the application of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry has 
the potential to make a significant contribution to our understanding of how the EU produces 
unequal power relations in the enlargement context, by introducing a critical exploration and 
rethinking of the way we understand the EU and in particular in adequately understanding the 
extent to which unequal power relations are produced. In order to reveal the extent to which 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry operate in the Reports, the next chapter will present the 
research framework of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ADVOCATING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This chapter argues that employing critical discourse analysis and the interviewing technique 
will aim to “shed the maximum light on” (Grix, 2010:121) examining the extent to which the 
EU produces unequal power relations. To start with, EU enlargement has been assessed 
through the application of different research methods. As mentioned previously, discourse 
analysis has been a ground-breaking research method, which has been largely pioneered 
through the work of for instance Diez (e.g. 2001, 2014) and Rosamond (e.g. 2013, 2014), just 
to mention a few. However, this thesis argues that by building upon this previous work, we 
can further expand enlargement research by applying the method of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). Such a method primarily aims to “’critique, expose, deconstruct, counter and … 
transcend’” unequal power relations (see Sidaway op.cit., p.594). As such, CDA addresses 
how unequal power relations are “expressed, constituted, legitimized ... by language use” 
(Weiss and Wodak, 2003:15; see also Fairclough, 1995:132-133, 2001:2, 2003b:135; Van 
Dijk, 2003:352; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357) and aims to change these unequal relations 
(Jones, 2007:356; see also Fairclough, 2001:2; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; 
Weiss and Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357). Moreover, especially as CDA is a 
method that is influenced by the researcher’s own interpretations, the method of conducting 
interviews was employed to ensure an appropriate level of reliability of the research results 
(see Pierce, 2008:46). The interview material will therefore introduce the interplay between 
the EU and power relations seen through the interviewees’ eyes (see Pierce, 2008:45; 
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Bryman, 2012:213). On a short note, it should be added that content analysis was briefly 
employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection and support the 
research findings (Pierce, 2008:264; Grix, 2010:137). 
 
The chapter proceeds in a two-step engagement. The first part discusses the relevance of 
CDA, interviewing technique and content analysis in answering the research questions. In 
particular, the chapter outlines Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA model, which 
entails three different dimensions (stages) that are applied to three corresponding facets of 
discourse in order to reveal the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in and 
behind discourse (see Table 1). Additionally, the chapter outlines the relevance of the 
interviews and interview material as part of the research framework. The practical application 
of CDA, interviewing technique and content analysis will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-8. 
The chapter also turns to a discussion of why examining the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports published during the Romanian enlargement will be 
examined in order to contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s production of unequal 
power relations in and behind discourse.  
 
Second, by investigating potentialities and limitations encountered during field work (Grix, 
2010:32), the chapter aims to reveal how these may have impacted upon research results, as 
well as discuss how they have been dealt with. The chapter concludes that applying CDA, 
interviews and content analysis to the examination of the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports is an appropriate research framework in order to assess 
the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations in the enlargement context.  
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3.1. The three-dimensional critical discourse analysis model 
Although the research method of CDA covers “a variety of approaches, each with different 
theoretical models, research methods and agenda” (Fairclough et. al., 2011:357-358; see also 
van Dijk, 2003:353; Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Krzyzanowski, 2010; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 
2012:180), this method has been largely pioneered by the works of Teun van Dijk, Ruth 
Wodak and Norman Fairclough36 (Van Dijk, 2003:352, 2009:4; see also Wodak, 1995:209; 
Weiss and Wodak, 2003:15; Wodak, 2007:2; Fairclough; 2010). However, this chapter 
argues that the most relevant CDA model for the purpose of the research questions of this 
current thesis is Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA. The centrality of this model is 
sustained by bringing into perspective a research method, which engages with the production 
of unequal power relations “through focusing upon language" (Fairclough, 1989:4, 1995:132-
133, 2001:2 and 34, 2003:135; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; Wodak, 2007:2; 
Krźyzanowski and Wodak, 2009:27; Fairclough et. al., 2011:358). More importantly, the 
three-dimensional CDA model contributes to the research questions through its engagement 
with the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse at a micro, meso and 
micro level of analysis (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:181). 
 
Thus, language or discourse is identified as an important element in investigating unequal 
power relations due to the ideological power hidden in language. Ideological power refers to 
“the power to project one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’” (Fairclough, 
2001:27). This is based on the argument that although language may “appear normal or 
neutral on the surface”, it can in fact hide ideologies (2001:2-3; see also van Dijk, 1990:10; 
Fairclough et al., 2011:358). Ideologies are identified as “practices which appear to be 
universal and commonsensical” and “which people draw upon without thinking”, but which 
                                                          
36 Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model, Wodak’s discourse-historical model and Fairclough’s three-dimensional 
model. 
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can contribute to inequality in power relations (Fairclough, 2001:3) by controlling and 
constraining both discourses and participants37 (2001:59; Machin and Mayr, 2012:5). The 
most effective ideology is the one which appears to be the most common, neutral and is 
shared by most participants, but without participants being aware of the ideological power it 
may bring into discourse and how it impacts upon power relations (Fairclough, 2001:3; see 
also van Dijk, 1990:10; Fairclough et al., 2011:358).  
 
As a consequence, it is through ideological power that language is “centrally involved in 
power, and struggles for power” 38 (Fairclough, 2001:14; van Dijk, 2003:353). However, by 
making participants aware of how ideologies may work as instruments of inequality 
(Fairclough, 2001:3; see also van Dijk, 1990:10; Fairclough et al., 2011:358), change of 
unequal power relations and emancipation of subordinated participants may occur (Jones, 
2007:356; see also Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; Fairclough, 2001:2; Weiss and 
Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357). Hence, the centrality of the three-dimensional 
CDA lays in the fact that, as language has a close relationship to both power and ideology 
(Fairclough, 2001:14), analyzing discourse may reveal the extent to which ideologies are 
connected to the production of unequal power relations.  
 
The three-dimensional CDA model is conveyed through the application of three stages 
(dimensions): 1) description, which relies on an analysis of text, 2) interpretation, which 
analyses the relationship between the productive and interpretive discursive practices and the 
text and 3) explanation, which examines the relationship between discursive practices and 
social practices (Fairclough, 2010:132). When applying this CDA model, the researcher uses 
the above three corresponding dimensions to three corresponding facets of discourse: 1) the 
                                                          
37 Refer to all agents that are involved in discourse. 
38 Struggles for power or power struggles will be discussed further in the chapter.  
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text, which is regarded as a product of discourse practices, 2) the discourse practices, which 
are made up by the process of production of the text and the process of interpretation of the 
text and 3) the sociocultural practices, which are made up by situational, institutional and 
societal practices, which impact upon discourse practices (Fairclough, 2010:133; see also 
Fairclough, 2001:21). Furthermore, the application of each dimension to the corresponding 
discourse facet is performed at a micro, meso and macro level of analysis (Merkl-Davies and 
Kolelr, 2012:181). Each of these three CDA dimensions and three discourse facets (see Table 
1) will be discussed further in the next three sub-sections.  
 
 
CDA dimensions Discourse facets Level of analysis 
Description Text Micro 
Interpretation Discourse practices Meso 
Explanation Sociocultural practices Macro 
Table 1. The three CDA dimensions and the three corresponding discourse facets. 
 
3.1.1. Description  
The description dimension is pertinent to this research as it aims to identify ideologies hidden 
in the text of language and how such ideologies may control and constrain both discourses 
and participants at the micro level (Fairclough, 2010:132; Merkl-Davies and Kolelr, 
2012:181). In short, as texts are regarded as places for ideologies to hide (2006:32), the 
description dimension analyses the formal properties of text, which consists of vocabulary 
(words), grammar and textual structures (Fairclough, 2001:92-93), in order to reveal 
ideologies and examine the extent to which they produce unequal power relations by 
controlling and constraining discourses and participants (2001:21 and 22).  
 
Table 2 indicates that powerful participants (dominant bloc) can constrain three types of 
elements in discourse, by controlling the formal properties in and behind discourse. To start 
with, powerful participants can constrain contents in discourse, referring to what is said and 
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done. Furthermore, participants can also constrain relations, which refer to the relations that 
people enter into and are enacted in discourse. Finally, participants can also constrain 
positions, which refer to the positions that people occupy in and behind discourse 
(Fairclough, 2001:39 and 61).  
 
Elements of discourse Control of and constraints upon 
Contents  what is said or done in discourse  
Relations relations participants enter into in discourse 
Positions positions of participants in discourse 
Table 2. Elements of discourse, which can be controlled and constrained (Source: Fairclough, 
2001:39 and 61).  
 
In order to analyze formal properties and identify what elements of discourse are being 
controlled and constrained, a researcher can ask a set of different questions (see Appendix 1). 
Although not all questions are applicable to all discourses, the aim of these questions is to 
reveal what elements of discourse that the ideological power in discourse controls and 
constrains and how this impacts upon power relations. For instance by asking What relational 
values do words have?, such a question aims to reveal the extent to which words in for 
instance a text create certain relations between participants in discourse and how those 
relations legitimate, reproduce, challenge, etc. inequality (Dijk, 2003:353). Thus, depending 
on what words are used, different relations can be produced, such as relations of trust, 
hostility or distance, which impact on power relations in different ways (see Fairclough, 
2001:97). As an example, the use of a formal vocabulary in discourse can negotiate relations 
of distance and respect, which impact upon how participants relate to one another in and 
behind discourse, but also what power relations are produced and enacted in and behind 
discourse (2001:98).  
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3.1.2. Interpretation 
The interpretation dimension aims to analyze discourse practices of production and 
interpretation of text39 at a meso analysis level in order to reveal how ideological power 
impacts upon power relations (Fairclough, 1989:26; 2001:21 and 118; 2010:132-133; Merkl-
Davies and Koller, 2012:181). The importance of these two practices is based on the 
argument that the way participants produce and interpret texts is based on their “knowledge 
of language, representations of the natural and social world they inhabit, values, beliefs, 
assumptions” etc., which is referred to as members’ resources (MR) (Fairclough, 2001:20-21 
and 74). First, in terms of the process of production, the MR of the producer will be used 
when producing a text and thus will influence text production (2001:118). Therefore, in the 
production process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “traces of the productive 
process” (Fairclough, 2001:20; Fairclough, 1989:26), as traces indicate what MR have 
influenced the text producer. It is when the producer’s MR are used in text production that 
ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations.  
 
Second, similarly to the production process, in terms of the process of interpretation, the MR 
of the interpreter will influence how the interpreter will understand the text, but the text itself 
will also influence and shape the MR of the interpreter (see Fairclough, 2001:118; Titsche et 
al., 2003:150). Thus, in the interpretation process, the formal properties of text are regarded 
as “cues in the process of interpretation” (2001:20), as cues prompt the interpreter to use 
certain MR and interpret the text in a certain way. In the same vein as the process of 
production, it is when the MR are used as interpretative procedures that ideologies can be 
reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations, though interpreters and other 
participants are often not aware of this process (2001:2-3 and 118).  
                                                          
39 Participants in discourse practices produce and interpret discourse based on the situational context and the 
intertextual context (Fairclough, 2001:119), which will be discussed on Chapter 7.  
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3.1.3. Explanation 
The explanation dimension is important to the understanding of how the EU produces 
unequal power relations because it engages with a macro-level analysis of how social 
structures40  at situational (the immediate social environment in which discourse occurs), 
institutional (such as court room, family, etc.) and societal (society as a whole) levels are 
reciprocally shaping and influencing discourse practices. This allows researchers to engage 
with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, taking into consideration how 
social structures are influencing and are being influenced (Fairclough, 2001:135; 2010:132-
33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357; see also Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:22 and 59; Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999).  
 
The explanation dimension is indicated in Figure 1. As it shows, social structures (power 
relations) affect MR and thus reproduce ideologies, which in turn shape discourses, which in 
turn sustain or change (social struggles41) MR and which in turn sustain or change social 
structures (2001:135). In this interplay, ideologies can be reproduced or changed in social 
struggles (2001:31). The explanation dimension engages therefore with how discourse is 
affected by and affects power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels 
(Fairclough, 2001:30). Thus, in contrast to the interpretation dimension, which is concerned 
with how MR reproduce ideologies, the explanation dimension is concerned with both 
reproduction and change of ideologies (2001:135).  
 
 
                                                          
40 Refer to relations of power (see Fairclough, 2001:135). 
41 The process in which participants in a discourse engage with other participants (Fairclough, 2001:28). 
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Figure 1. The explanation dimension.  
 
While it is during the explanation dimension that ideologies are reproduced or discontinued 
(2001:71), this reproduction or change occurs through social struggles. As discourse is 
identified as “the site of power struggles“ and “the stake in power struggles” (2001:61), 
power struggles are won by controlling formal properties and constraining contents, relations 
and positions in discourse (see Table 2). In other words, participants are struggling for 
controlling and constraining discourse as by doing so, they can win the site of power 
struggles, i.e. by controlling discourse and by winning such a control, they have won the 
discourse, which is the stake in power struggles. Thus, the participant, who has won control 
over discourse, is regarded as having “power in discourse and power behind discourse” 
(2001:36). Power in discourse refers to “controlling and constraining contributions of non-
powerful participants” (2001:38-39), while power behind discourse is concerned with 
questions of “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and 
enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Any participant will attempt to impose 
its ideologies on power relations in order to win or maintain power in and behind discourse 
(2001:71) at the situational, institutional and societal level (2001:59). 
 
Social 
structures
•power 
relations
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•ideologies
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• social 
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However, it should be noted that the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in 
social struggles with non-powerful participants (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as the latter also 
engage to win power (2001:59) and thus power in and behind discourse can be lost in social 
struggles (2001:61). It is essential to mention that by having power in and behind discourse, 
the dominant bloc also has power to decide the discourse type (2001:39), which also controls 
and constrains discourse (2001:25) and influences the production and interpretation of text 
and what MR will be used in these practices (2001:124). A discourse type is defined as the 
type of discourse within which participants interact42.   
 
3.2. Relevance of the three-dimensional model to the study of power relations 
This section argues that by applying the three-dimensional CDA model, this thesis will set 
out a preliminary discussion of how CDA can be applied to examine the Reports in order to 
reveal the extent to which ideological power in EU language produces unequal power 
relations. In particular, this model has the potential to make a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced, as it engages with a complex 
analysis at the micro, meso and macro levels. Overall, the application of the three-
dimensional CDA model will attempt to reveal what ideologies are hidden in the language 
produced by the EU and how ideologies impact upon power relations. Furthermore, 
identifying how the EU produces unequal power relations by focusing on language can raise 
“a critical consciousness” of the ideological power hiding in and behind discourse 
(Fairclough, 2001:3 and 34).  
 
The description dimension is vital to the examination of how the EU produces unequal power 
relations because as texts are places for ideologies to hide, applying the set of questions (see 
                                                          
42 Examples of discourse types can be for instance a witness interview, university lecture, medical appointment, 
EU negotiation, etc. 
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Appendix 1) to the formal properties of the Reports will aim to identify ideologies and how 
these produce unequal power relations. In other words, the description dimension targets to 
question how the Romanian enlargement was represented by the EU and what does this mean 
in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181).  
 
Understanding the correlation between the use of MR and the reproduction of ideologies 
through the practices of production and interpretation is important in examining how the EU 
produces unequal power relations. As formal properties of a text are traces of production and 
cues in interpretation, by questioning these practices, the interpretation dimension aims to 
indicate what MR might have influenced the EU to produce a certain discourse and how such 
a discourse impacted upon the MR of the interpreters. Such an examination aims to reveal the 
extent to which the production and interpretation of texts are mechanisms of reproduction of 
ideological power. In other words, the interpretation dimension aims to answer the question 
of why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular 
way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-
Davies and Koller, 2010:181).  
 
The explanation dimension will aim to provide an understanding of how social structures 
(power relations) at three levels influenced the production and interpretation of EU 
discourses. This will be done by assessing how social structures may have impacted upon 
MR, which in turn shaped discourses, which in turn sustained or changed MR and which in 
turn sustained or changed social structures. By doing so, the thesis aims to show whether the 
EU restated its power by enforcing ideologies in social struggles, what forms these ideologies 
took and whether Romania engaged in social struggles and if so, at which levels could these 
social struggles be identified. Similarly to the interpretation dimension, the explanation 
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dimension aims to answer the question why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why 
it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to 
unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181). 
 
3.3. Interviewing technique  
This section argues that by applying in-depth (semi-structured) interviews, the thesis will set 
out a preliminary discussion of how interviews can be applied to examine the Reports in 
order to reveal the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. As part of the 
research framework, the below sections will discuss the selection of the interviewees, as well 
as how the interview questions were set up and the interviews were conducted.  
 
3.3.1. Selecting interviewees 
In total, 10 officials, who had worked as part of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams 
during the Romanian enlargement, were interviewed, a number which is also regarded as 
essential in achieving a reliable study result (Kvale, 2007:44). The interviews, which were 
undertaken with 5 EU officials and 5 Romanian officials, were conducted in Belgium, 
Germany, Romania and the United Kingdom between 2013 and 2014 (see Appendix 2 for 
further details about the interviewees). 
 
Identifying potential interviewees was achieved by accessing for instance public documents, 
official interviews, academic publications, etc. and familiarizing myself with potential 
respondents. The selection of the interviewees was based on their involvement in the 
Romanian enlargement, being part of either the EU’s or the Romanian negotiating teams. A 
list of potential interviewees was prepared and respondents were contacted by email, which 
was sent alongside a consent form and a participant information leaflet, which included 
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information about the research, purpose, benefits from participation and possibility to 
withdraw (see Kvale, 2007:27). Moreover, a number of interviewees were also approached 
through the help of gatekeepers, who introduced potential respondents. A second email was 
sent to the respondents, who had not replied to the first email. Once the interviews were 
granted and planned according to the interviewees’ availability (see Thomas, 1995:9), the 
interviews were conducted. Prior to starting the field work process, I conducted an ethical 
review process (see Grix, 2010:121), which was approved and on which the consent form and 
the participant information leaflet were based.  
 
It should be noted that the interviews are categorized as non-elite and elite interviews. The 
non-elite interviews are defined as interviews conducted with individuals, who are not 
regarded as “prominent” in the area under examination (Vromen, 2010:258). Thus, the 
interviewees, who belong to non-elite interviews, were working as officials, who supported 
the work of the senior executives in the two negotiating teams. In contrast, elite interviews 
are defined as interviews conducted with “persons who are leaders or experts in a 
community, people who are usually in powerful positions” (Kvale, 2007:70; Vromen, 
2010:258; see also Hertz and Imber, 1995). In line with the above definition, the elite 
interviewees exercised a high level of “influence on the outcome of” the Romanian 
enlargement and held what one can describe as senior positions in the EU and Romanian 
negotiating teams (see Pierce, 2008:119). 
 
3.3.2. The interview guide and conducting interviews 
Each interview guide43 included a range of nine open-ended questions44 (see Appendix 3), 
which aimed to reveal the interviewees’ own experiences and views of the Romanian 
                                                          
43 Refers to the list of questions (see Bryman, 2012:468). 
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enlargement as a whole, as well as EU-Romania relations. A number of interviewees asked 
for the questions to be sent to them prior to the interview and such a request was granted. 
Although there are different principles to follow when setting up an interview guide, the 
questions were largely based on the below four criteria (based on Alan Bryman’s suggestions, 
2012:470-471):  
 
 Formulate questions that would help to answer the research questions. 
 The question order has to flow, but also be prepared to alter the order and still be able 
to answer the research questions.  
 Use language, which the interviewees understand.  
 Avoid leading questions.  
  
Each interview lasted approximately one hour (see Pierce, 2008:125). The interviews were in 
most cases audio taped, apart from three, which were conducted by email, one by phone and 
one, which was conducted face to face, but where the respondent requested for the 
interviewer not to record, but to take notes. The interviews were transcribed and the 
transcriptions were sent to each interviewee for approval. Moreover, a number of 
interviewees requested to be anonymous and the request was arranged (see Vromen, 
2010:258). However, in order to maintain consistency, I took the decision to keep all 
participants anonymous. Therefore any data identifying the interviewees will not be included 
in the research (see Kvale, 2007:27) in order to protect the anonymity of the respondents (see 
Beach, 2005:14). The interviewees will be coded as interviewee 1, interviewee 2, interviewee 
3, etc., largely following the chronology of the interviews45.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
44 Question 1 has a sub question.  
45 It should be noted that the interviews will not be cited in the text, but will be referenced in the bibliography, 
entering the following style of reference: Interviewee 1 (2013) Personal communication.  
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3.4. Relevance of the interviewing technique to the study of power relations  
First, as mentioned previously, the research method of conducting interviews was employed 
in order to ensure “a more balanced approach” (Grix op.cit., p.126-127) in assessing how the 
EU produces unequal power relations, as CDA is a method that is largely influenced by the 
researcher (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). Thus, the interviews will enable alternative voices to be 
heard (see Pierce, 2008:45; Bryman, 2012:213), which can be used as a benchmark against 
which to compare the results of the critical discourse analysis of the Reports (Grix, 
2010:133). In relation to the application of CDA, the interview material will also help in 
revealing whether the interviewees were aware of how reproduction of ideologies occurs 
through language and how such a reproduction contributes to inequality in power relations, as 
discussed by Fairclough (see 2001:2-3 and 118). 
 
Second, the interview material will introduce the experiences, understandings, interpretations, 
feelings, etc. of the interviewees (Vromen, 2010:258; see also Kvale, 2007:8; Grix, 2010:121; 
Bryman, 2012:471) and thus allow access to information that otherwise would not have been 
available without conducting interviews (see Beach, 2005:14). In particular, by including 
officials from both the EU and the Romanian negotiating teams, such interviews will cover a 
broader representation of voices. As the interviewees have all been involved in accession 
negotiations during the Romanian enlargement, an analysis of their answers is significant in 
revealing how they perceived power relations and how such relations shaped the enlargement 
and EU-Romania relations (see Boyce and Neale, 2006:7). Questions 7-9 aim in particular to 
reveal the interviewees’ opinions and experiences of power relations during the different 
enlargement phases46, in order to identify whether the respondents identified inequality, but 
                                                          
46 To be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 Page | 92  
 
also whether they detected any change in such power relations during the enlargement 
phases. 
 
Third, the interview material will be discussed in relation to postcolonialism in order to 
provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which the discourses of the Reports 
are a place in which unequal power relations are produced through elements of subalternity, 
mimicry and orientalism. For instance, questions such as Question 5 (Were there any forms of 
resistance against EU demands during negotiations?) was a way in which the interviewees 
could discuss aspects of mimicry, but without directly being asked about mimicry or 
employing the word mimicry, which could have caused misunderstanding and even been 
identified as a leading question (see Bryman, 2012:470-471). Furthermore, the use of non-
elite interviewees aims to include a broader representation of voices and thus enable 
“perspectives, and experiences of people who typically have been marginalized become a 
starting point for inquiry”, by being heard, understood and listened to (Browne et al., 
2005:26; see also McLeod, 2010:223).  
 
Fourth, employing in-depth (semi-structured) interviews allowed flexibility and the pursuit of 
unanticipated lines of enquiry (Grix, 2010:128; see also Kvale, 2007:8; Bryman, 2012:471), 
as the questions often stimulated responses, which inevitably invited further questions, which 
could elaborate on the interviewees’ answers. For instance, Question 1 (In your opinion how 
was Romania perceived by the European Union during the enlargement process?) often 
stimulated the respondents to relate to corruption, which became a key element in the critical 
discourse analysis of the Reports, thus allowing specifying or direct questions on the issue. 
However, as a rule of thumb, especially direct questions were asked towards the end of each 
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interview, in order not to influence the direction of the interview or the answers of the 
interviewees (see Bryman, 2012:473). 
 
3.5. Content analysis 
Based on the idea of triangulation, which refers to the use of more than one research method 
in order to for instance “getting better, more reliable data, and to minimize the chance of 
biased findings” (Grix, 2010:135), a third technique was introduced in the form of content 
analysis. Qualitative methods scholars are usually critical about the use of content analysis, as 
for instance it only counts the recurrent instances of a certain factor (Wilkinson, 2006:183) or 
the researcher is biased regarding the selection of the texts and key words, which are being 
calculated. However, this method was employed because it provides an additional element of 
data-collection and thus supports the research findings (see Pierce, 2008:264; Grix, 
2010:137). In this current thesis, the method of content analysis was used to calculate the 
number of references of formal properties of language in the Reports, in order to reveal a 
“systematic and comprehensive” overview of how these properties may have produced 
unequal power relations (as part of the description dimension) (see Wilkinson, 2006:182-
183).  
 
3.6. Why the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports? 
As discussed in Introduction, the three-dimensional CDA model will be applied to two sets of 
EU documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report, which are 
presented in Table 3. The below section will address why these texts have been chosen in 
order to demonstrate how the EU produces unequal power relations.  
 
Regular Reports 1998-2004 Comprehensive Monitoring Reports 2005-2006 
Regular Report 1998 Comprehensive Monitoring Report 2005 
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Regular Report 1999 Comprehensive Monitoring Report May 2006 
Regular Report 2000 Comprehensive Monitoring Report September 2006 
Regular Report 2001  
Regular Report 2002  
Regular Report 2003  
Regular Report 2004  
Table 3. The Reports. 
 
The reason for choosing these two sets of Reports is two-fold. First, primary sources such as 
EU reports are regarded as more reliable than secondary sources, as for instance newspaper 
reports, as the latter are subjective and manipulated by producers, while primary sources tend 
to be a product of actual research and no interpretation (Rosamond, 2006:469; Grix, 
2010:132; Vromen, 2010:261-262). Thus, in the case of the Reports, these mirror the EU’s 
interpretations of the Romanian enlargement “in their natural context” (Kvale, 2007:xi) and 
thus do not to “have analyses in them” (Vromen, 2010:261-262), allowing us to question the 
EU’s established truths about the Romanian enlargement in the Reports through a critical and 
interpretivist research framework (see Kvale, 2007:xi) 
 
Second, as illustrated by a range of scholars (Phinnemore, 1999:73; Grabbe, 2001:1022, 
2002:266; Kovács, 2001:228, 2006; Bellier, 2004:140; O’Brennan, 2006:34; Papadimitriou 
and Phinnemore, 2008:38; Villalba, 2008; Avery, 2009; Joenniemi, 2012), enlargement 
reports are a pivotal example in understanding the production of unequal power relations. 
This relates primarily to the scholarly criticism of the Regular Reports, which are identified 
as hiding, denying or playing down the EU’s leverage and the subordinate position of 
candidate countries (Raik, 2004:580-581; Pridham, 2006a, 2007a:353; Kuus, 2007:161; 
Zielonka, 2008:476; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; Avery, 2012:166). 
Following this line of reasoning, this suggests that there is much more to these Reports than 
only monitoring the Romanian enlargement progress, as we can ask vital questions about how 
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unequal power relations were produced. Overall, considering the limitation highlighted in the 
Literature Review, that most studies of the Regular Reports have largely focused on the 
earlier Reports of the 2004 enlargement, a broader examination of Reports will further 
contribute to enlargement literature by adding valuable insights about how the EU produces 
unequal power relations47.  
 
3.7. Potentialities and limitations 
The below sections discuss some of the key potentialities and limitations that have occurred 
during field work, how such aspects could have impacted upon the current research and how 
they were dealt with.  
 
3.7.1. Role of researcher 
The three-dimensional CDA is a research method that largely depends on the involvement of 
the researcher in engaging with the examination of inequality in power relations. CDA is 
influenced by a range of aspects such as what the researcher “’sees’ in a text, what one 
regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize” (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). 
For instance, when it comes to the interpretation dimension, the researcher also uses her own 
MR, ideologies, etc., which may influence the results through the researcher’s “capacity to 
herself engage in the discourse processes she is investigating” (Fairclough, 2001:138). 
However, as long as the researcher is aware of the implications of one’s MR, ideologies, etc. 
upon results, a certain level of objectivity is maintained, as the researcher is conscious of the 
conventions applied to research and is self-conscious of her involvement and the need “to 
explicate what she is doing” (2001:139). It should be noted that this current thesis has also 
                                                          
47 It should be noted that the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports have been cited in 
text by using the following format: for Regular Reports, it is cited as RR (as in Regular Report), year and page 
(e.g. RR 1998:1); for Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, it is cited as CMR (as in Comprehensive Monitoring 
Report), year and page (e.g. CMR 2005:1). By using this format, it will be clarified which Report was under 
examination.  
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employed the interviewing technique and the method of content analysis in order to minimize 
the chance of biased findings and attain more reliable data (Grix, 2010:135), as well as 
maintain the research findings as “sound or true as far as can be judged” (Pierce, 2008:74)  
 
3.7.2. Accessing the Reports 
As discussed previously, the thesis will analyze seven Regular Reports and three 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. Accessing the Reports was an informal task, as the 
Reports are available to the public in electronic versions on the European Commission 
Directorate General Enlargement website. The Reports were retrieved from the website, 
using a search for the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports for 
Romania. The Reports are also available to the public in paper format at the Central 
Commission library in Brussels (which was visited in January 2012 during a field work visit). 
Only the English versions of the Reports were analyzed due to the fact that as English is a 
widely spoken language, it might be more suitable for readers of this current research to read 
the original Reports in English, if required, than for instance read the Reports published in 
Romanian, which is a less spoken language.  
 
3.7.3. Limitations during field work 
When conducting the field work, three main limitations were identified, which could have 
impacted upon the results of the current research. First, due to limited accessibility to some of 
the elite interviewees, which may relate to the argument that “visibility is not the same as 
accessibility” (Thomas, 1995:4), I resorted to other forms of interview techniques, such as 
phone and email interviews. For instance, despite being aware of where to locate and how to 
contact interviewee 4, gatekeepers indicated that a face to face interview was not possible due 
to a busy schedule (see Thomas, 1995:8). As a solution, I was required to conduct a telephone 
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interview (see Useem, 1995:23). Similarly, the elite interviews with interviewees 8 and 9 
were conducted by email, due to the respondents’ busy schedules. These forms of interviews 
have their strengths, such as being cost and time effective (Useem, 1995:20; Bryman, 
2012:214 and 488) and even removing the bias (to a certain extent) of the interviewer’s 
characteristics and presence (Bryman, 2012:214). Their shortcoming however lays in the fact 
that such methods offer an impersonal technique and provide short and not expansive replies 
(Bryman, 2012:488 and 215; see also Useem, 1995:20-21; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004; 
Irvine et al., 2010). In contrast, the material recorded in face to face interviews was lengthier 
and more elaborated (see Beach, 2005:14; Bryman, 2012:215). It should be noted that I could 
have opted out from conducting phone and email interviews, knowing the limitations, but 
since these interviewees had occupied central positions in the negotiating teams of the 
Romanian enlargement and could therefore enable a wealth of information “from the inside” 
(Kvale, 2007:x), I opted to conduct these interviews, but considered how such a choice may 
affect the data collected.  
 
Second, in contrast to non-elite interviewees, elite interviewees had a tendency to control the 
interview situation in a variety of ways (see Ostrander, 1995:142). This was an interesting 
aspect to consider when reflecting how such a control may have affected the research. First, 
the elite interviewees decided the flow of the interview through interruptions or requesting to 
switch off the audio recorder during interviews. In other words, the elite interviewees decided 
to a certain extent how the interview was conducted and what and when was recorded. For 
instance, interviewee 2 requested at different occasions during the interview to stop and 
restart. The same procedure took place during the interview with interviewee 10, which was 
interrupted due to work commitments. Second, another interesting aspect was also that elite 
interviewees opted for anonymity, an aspect which was not requested by non-elite 
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interviewees. Third, elite interviewees also seemed to control their responses to a larger 
extent than non-elite interviewees. For instance, such a control was noticeable when the 
initial interview material that was transcribed was amended by a number of the elite 
interviewees, but not by the non-elite interviewees. Furthermore, in particular interviewees 1 
and 5 amended the transcripts to a large extent, although a large proportion of the 
amendments included clarifications or expanded on responses where the interviewees 
suggested that they had not been clear. Nevertheless, such circumstances questioned the 
extent to which the amended interviews include the accurate version of what happened or the 
experiences of the interviewees (Pierce, 2008:86), as well as the elite interviewees’ “capacity 
to control” the discourse, the contributions and the discourse type (see Fairclough, 2001:25).  
 
Third, although all interviewees were advised that their participation would enable insightful 
contributions to the academic literature through this current research, a significant low 
number of Romanian officials, whom were contacted, responded and indicated that they 
wanted to be part of the research. This attitude was consistent regardless of the position that 
the official had. Furthermore, a number of Romanian officials, who were contacted and did 
not respond or declined, had been active in contributing to past academic publications, 
workshops, conferences, etc. regarding their experiences of the Romanian enlargement. This 
in turn raised questions regarding their motives for not responding to or declining the 
interview request. For instance one of the potential interviewees declined the interview, 
explaining that he had only been in the position (of the Romanian negotiating team) for a 
short period of time (circa two years). He suggested that I should contact officials, who had 
been in the same position longer and could provide more information. Nevertheless, the same 
official had previously given interviews about his experiences as part of the Romanian 
enlargement team, though these interviews were conducted by established sources, such as 
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reputable academics and official invitations from recognized institutions (see Pierce, 
2008:119). In contrast, all EU officials, who were approached, did consent to the interview 
and as mentioned previously, a number of them even introduced other potential interviewees, 
as in the case of interviewee 2, who was the gatekeeper for interviewee 3.  
 
3.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that in order to address the research questions, engaging with CDA, 
conducting interviews and applying content analysis is pivotal in adequately demonstrating 
the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The three-dimensional CDA 
model involves the application of three dimensions, which aim to reveal the correlation 
between language and unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 2001:21 and 22; van Dijk, 
2003:363). The chapter argues that examining the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports through the CDA model will allow us to examine the extent to which 
unequal power relations were produced in and behind the discourse of the Reports. The three-
dimensional  model is a significant research method as it establishes an understanding of the 
link between the formal properties of the Reports, the production and interpretation of the 
Reports (discourse practices) and the sociocultural practices and the production of unequal 
power relations (see Fairclough, 1995:87). Furthermore, the conduct of interviews was 
chosen in order to ensure “a more balanced approach” (Grix op.cit., p.126-127), by including 
the experiences, understandings, interpretations, feelings, etc. of officials, who had been part 
of the Romanian enlargement. The interview material was also discussed in relation to 
postcolonialism in order to provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which 
the Reports’ discourses are a place in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised 
and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism. Additionally, content 
analysis was briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection.  
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The reason for choosing the two sets of Reports was addressed. This was based on the fact 
that such primary sources are more reliable, as they are the product of the EU, without 
interference of interpretation by others (Rosamond, 2006:469). Furthermore, as academic 
studies have largely focused on the examination of earlier monitoring Reports, overlooking a 
broader scrutiny of such documents, which would also include later Reports, the current 
thesis can contribute to the enlargement literature by adding valuable new insights. Especially 
as Regular Reports have been criticized for hiding, denying or playing down the EU’s 
leverage and the subordinate position of candidates, the examination of these primary sources 
may provide further understanding about the production of inequality.  
 
The chapter also discussed how potentialities and limitations encountered during field work 
may have impacted upon the research results and how these have been dealt with. The 
chapter concludes that by engaging with the above research framework, this current research 
aims to make important contributions to our understanding of EU enlargement and the 
production of unequal power relations. Before proceeding with the application of the above 
research framework, the next chapter will present the contextual framework of the Romanian 
enlargement in order to reveal significant analytical points that will be made in the empirical 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROMANIAN 
ENLARGEMENT 
 
 
 
This chapter argues that examining the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement 
will not only provide a history of the enlargement process and accession negotiations, but 
will also set out the context in which an unequal encounter was produced and thus reveal 
some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. To start 
with, the European Union has undergone continuous widening and deepening following its 
establishment in 1951 (Dinan, 2014). One of its most successful integration policies has been 
initiated through enlargement (Krasteva, 2009:119). As stated in Chapter 1, the enlargement 
literature often discusses the evolution of different enlargements, in which EU-candidates 
interaction is examined as an element of importance. Accordingly, this chapter will draw 
upon this literature in order to set out the contextual background of the Romanian 
enlargement.  
 
The chapter is divided in two main sections. The first section provides a brief history of the 
Romanian enlargement, in order to set out the context in which the accession negotiations 
took place. Furthermore, a discussion of the annual monitoring Reports, the Regular Reports 
and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, aims to highlight the Reports’ implication upon 
the Romanian enlargement and subsequently the production of an unequal encounter. 
Additionally, the section also clarifies that although we may speak of the EU as a unitary 
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actor in the enlargement process or when producing unequal power relations, a matrix of EU 
institutions are involved in such a process (see Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:69). It is therefore 
significant to highlight the roles and powers of these institutions as vehicles in shaping 
enlargement and through which accession negotiations are enforced (Peterson and 
Shackleton, 2012b:8 and 12).  
 
The second section outlines a more detailed history of the Romanian accession negotiations 
in order to demonstrate that the EU’s practice of assessment monitoring and the monitoring 
Reports, as well as the involvement of EU institutions are significant to our understanding of 
how the EU produces unequal power relations. The section will also consider the fight 
against corruption, which was identified as one of Romania’s outstanding problems in 
fulfilling the accession criteria and which impacted upon the Reports, negotiations and EU-
Romania relations. Overall, the chapter will present key positions of the EU and Romania 
during the enlargement process, how these are reflected in the Reports and flag up some of 
the key analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.  
 
4.1. The Romanian enlargement 
The building stone towards the fifth enlargement started at the Copenhagen European 
Council in June 1993 when the Council agreed on the Copenhagen criteria (European 
Council, 1993:13; Bardi et al., 2002:227), which stated that “the associated countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union” 
(European Council, 1993:13). In a nutshell, the Copenhagen criteria included three important 
conditions that all candidate countries must satisfy in order to become member states: 
political criteria, economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis (European 
Commission, 2014a). The Copenhagen criteria established therefore the recognition that the 
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then European Communities (EC), which later was to become the EU, accepted new member 
states from the former Communist satellite states. On these grounds, in June 1995 Romania 
submitted its membership application (European Commission, 2013f; see also Phinnemore, 
2006a:40; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:35-36). 
 
The Romanian request to join the EU was perhaps not a surprising move. Already in the 
1970s and despite heavy control by Moscow, the then Socialist Republic of Romania (the 
official name until December 1989) (Light, 2006:11 and 13) and the EC cooperated in a 
number of areas (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:18-19; see also Phinnemore, 
2002:223; Dinan, 2014). With the fall of the Eastern bloc in 1989 (Turnock, 2000:241), the 
EC witnessed Romania’s determination to return to Europe and to integrate with the EC as a 
member state (O’Brennan, 2006:14; Avery, 2012:169). Despite initial hesitation (Gower, 
1999:3; Poole, 2003:36; O’Brennan, 2006:15; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:19), the 
EC’s support to integrate Romania was first provided through pre-accession assistance such 
as the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) 
(Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:23), as well as the signing of the Europe agreement 
(Association agreement)48 (Gower, 1999:5; O’Brennan, 2006:19-22). While the latter helped 
in establishing Romania’s position as an associated country49  (O’Brennan, 2006:19), the 
Europe agreement was criticised as a one-sided policy that benefited largely the EC (see 
O’Brennan, 2006:20-21), despite the associated countries’ request to be treated as equal 
partners (Poole, 2003:37). 
 
Once the membership application was in, the Council of Minister requested the European 
Commission to compile an Opinion, which was to include the latter’s technical evaluation of 
                                                          
48 Agreement that the EC concluded with non-member states, setting up a framework to conduct bilateral 
relations and prepare for EU membership (European Commission, 2013d; European Union, 2016b). 
49 Non-member state, who shares an agreement with the EC/EU (Gallagher, 2009:115).  
 Page | 104  
 
Romania’s ability to fulfill the membership requirements (O’Brennan, 2006:29-30). The 
Commission published the Opinion in July 1997 as part of the Agenda 200050 report and 
presented its assessment to the Council of Ministers (European Commission, 2013b). The 
report was not a positive one, as the Commission recommended that “negotiations for 
accession to the European Union should be opened with Romania as soon as it has made 
sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of membership defined by the European 
Council in Copenhagen” (European Commission, 1997b:114; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 
2008:36 and 38). In other words, Romania was not ready to become a candidate country.  
 
It was not until December 1999 that the Helsinki European Council formally recognized 
Romania as eligible for EU membership (European Commission, 2013b) and recommended 
“to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences” (IGCs) 51  (European Council, 1999, 
section I, point 10; Michalski, 2014:279). The actual accession negotiations started in 
February 2000 (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:46; see also Verdun, 2005) when the 
EU opened different negotiation chapters with Romania. These were closed once each 
chapter was approved on. Once all chapters were closed, the draft of the Treaty of Accession 
was agreed between the EU and Romania. This was followed by the Commission’s Opinion 
on the Treaty in February 2005 and the European Parliament’s consent to the Treaty. The EU 
member states and Romania signed the Treaty, after which all signatories ratified it, 
according to the different national processes. Once the Treaty was ratified, it came into force 
and Romania became a member state of the EU in January 2007 (Avery, 2012:169).  
 
Throughout the Romanian enlargement, one particular matter often took center stage: the 
fight against corruption (Grabbe, 2006; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Vachudova, 2008: 
                                                          
50 Included detailed policy proposals, aiming to prepare the EU for the fifth enlargement (O’Brennan, 2006:17).  
51 Meetings between representatives of the governments of the member states and the candidate country, in 
which accession negotiations are discussed (European Parliament, 1998a; Gateva, 2015:17).  
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Gallagher, 2009). The high level of corruption in Romania was no surprise, as post-1989, the 
country had continuously been rated as corrupt, by for instance Transparency International, 
which had labelled Romania “the most corrupt country in Europe” (Pridham, 2006b:11, 
2007a:355). Although attempts had been made to set up systems and campaigns against 
corruption (as the below sections will show), corruption was an extending problem in 
Romania. This was largely enabled by the fact that corruption was “strongly intertwined with 
political parties, the civil service and state agencies”, which governed Romania (Vachudova, 
2009:44) and in particular by the coming into power of a “highly corrupt and unreformed 
former communist party”, which stayed in power until 1996 (Vachudova, 2009:45). 
Additionally, the absence of “a corruption-fighting acquis” within the EU meant that it took 
the Commission longer “to develop the tools to compel candidate states to work harder in 
addressing corruption problems” (Vachudova, 2009:50).  
 
What is of significance here is the fact that corruption came to have implications upon the 
Romanian enlargement, as section 4.2. will demonstrate. For instance, when the Laeken 
European Council decided that Romania was not going to join the first wave of accession, 
such a decision also took into consideration the widespread corruption in Romania 
(Vachudova, 2009:52-53). Another important example in which corruption had a 
determinative role took place in 2006 when the EU realized “the extent of the corruption 
problem” in Romania and included a safeguard clause in the Romanian Accession Treaty, 
which subjugated Romania to unprecedented post-accession conditions (Vachudova, 
2009:51).  
 
Although the above description of the Romanian enlargement may sound straight-forward, 
the enlargement was actually a complex process, ran by various actors and with the 
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application of a variety of mechanisms through which Romania’s enlargement process was 
monitored and which helped in driving the negotiation accessions. One such mechanism was 
the monitoring Reports, which gained important significance in the Romanian enlargement, 
as often these Reports influenced accession negotiations and integration into the EU 
(Michalski, 2014:280).  
 
4.1.1. The monitoring Reports 
In order to better support the fifth enlargement and the successful integration of candidates, 
the end of the 1990s saw the adaptation of the EU’s administrative and institutional structure, 
in particular by setting up the Directorate-General Enlargement (DG ENLARG) and appoint 
a European Commissioner for Enlargement as part of the European Commission (Lass-
Lennecke and Werner, 2009:277; see also Bellier, 2004:140; Nugent, 2004:45; O’Brennan, 
2006:81 and 202; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz, 2009:329; Phinnemore, 2010:299; Michalski, 
2014:294). The key role of DG ENLARG was to navigate the enlargement process and 
support the Council of Ministers handling enlargement issues (Nugent, 2001:8; Michalski, 
2014:283). With such a new solidified structure, the EU also introduced regular publication 
of monitoring assessments52 of each candidate country (Baun, 2000:119; Grabbe, 2001:1022; 
Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274), in order to observe and identify matters, which were 
significant to the accession negotiations (Nugent, 2004:45 and 51). 
 
One set of such reports, which proved to offer the annual “regular up-dating and reporting on 
the candidates’ progress” that the EU needed (Michalski, 2014:280) were the Regular 
Reports, which were introduced in 1998 (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279-280). These 
unprecedented, “extremely detailed” Reports (Nugent, 2004:45) included the Commission’s 
                                                          
52  Such documents included for instance Regular Reports, Strategy Reports, Comprehensive Monitoring 
Reports, Opinions, etc.  
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assessments of Romania’s implementation of the official membership criteria (the 
Copenhagen criteria) and the Accession Partnership53  (Grabbe, 2001:1022, 2002:262), as 
well as discussions regarding problems, solutions and recommendations (Ram, 2003:35; 
Nugent, 2004:45 and 51; Pridham, 2006a:380; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:121; Lass-
Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274). On a similar note, after signing the Treaty of Accession in 
2005 and until September 2006, the Commission replaced the Regular Reports with the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, which similarly to the first set of Reports, continued the 
monitoring of Romania’s preparations for accession (European Commission, 2005b:3; 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:61). Overall, the EU recognized the reporting system 
(monitoring Reports) as telling “the truth about the applicants’ present state” (Raik, 
2004:579-580). For instance, in the 1998 Presentation on Regular Reports to the European 
Parliament, Commissioner for External Relations Hans van den Broek identified the Regular 
Reports as “expert, objective, impartial, and free of political prejudice”. The Commissioner 
pointed out how the Reports were “recognised as high-quality work” and how the 
assessments had improved the work of Commission officials, as the latter “know more and 
we understand better” the candidate countries (van den Broek, 1998:2).  
 
Due to the “extremely detailed” assessment of each Report (Nugent op.cit., p.45), which 
offered a large amount of information, the Regular Reports became “a ‘key mechanism’” 
(Michalski, 2014:284) in the Romanian enlargement. The significance of these Reports rested 
on the fact that the December European Councils54 based their political decisions, which also 
included the directions of negotiations, on the Reports’ assessments (Grabbe, 2001:1022, 
2002:261; Phinnemore, 2006a:41, 2010:292; Pridham, 2007c:530-532; Lass-Lennecke and 
Werner, 2009:274; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6). In other words, the Commission’s 
                                                          
53 Defines the framework of the accession process (European Commission, 2013l).  
54 The Regular Reports were published prior to each December European Council (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 
2009:279). 
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assessments shaped the agenda of negotiations to a large extent, as the discussion on the 
Romanian accession negotiations in section 4.2. will reveal. Although the European Councils 
did not have to consider or follow the recommendations, in most cases, the Councils did 
(Nugent, 2001:315-316; Grabbe, 2001:1022; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47).  
 
The production of the Reports was a rather complex process and involved a variety of EU and 
non-EU actors, as Appendix 4 reveals. Such a procedure involved the setting up of “a clear 
temporal pattern with fixed deadlines and a developed time-frame”, which the involved 
actors had to commit to (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279-280). As part of each Report, 
the Commission clarified that although the monitoring Reports were a product of the 
European Commission, the assessments were based on “numerous sources of information” 55, 
which derived from the Commission’s officials, individual candidate countries and member 
states, other EU institutions, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, etc. (RR, 1998:5; CMR, 2005:6; see also Broek, 1998:2). This however 
highlights an important complication, which will be raised in the analysis: who was actually 
the producer of the Reports? Appendix 4, which looks at the time frame of and the agents 
involved in the production of the monitoring Reports, reveals that both the assessments and 
the production of the Reports were influenced by a variety of actors, questioning therefore 
who exactly had power in and behind the discourses of the Reports and subsequently 
produced unequal power relations. In particular, Chapter 7 will seek to identify who the 
producer of the Reports was and demonstrate that answering such a question may not offer a 
straight-forward answer (see Fairclough, 2001:42-46). 
 
                                                          
55 It should be noted that the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports are even vaguer about what sources have been 
drawn upon in order to compile the Reports in contrast to the Regular Reports.  
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Looking at the above, perhaps another important aspect, which needs to be addressed, is the 
involvement of different EU institutions in the monitoring, assessing and steering of the 
Romanian enlargement. By identifying these and their roles and powers, we can better 
understand the matrix of actors involved in enlargement and accession negotiations and the 
impact upon production of unequal power relations. Thus, while the next section will briefly 
identify these institutions and their roles in the enlargement context, section 4.2. will address 
the influential role that these institutions played in the Romanian negotiations.  
 
4.1.2. The role of EU institutions 
Largely, four EU institutions can be identified as key actors in the Romanian enlargement. 
These are the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament56 
(O’Brennan, 2006:55-56; see also Nugent, 2001, 2004, 2010; Best et al., 2008; Cini and 
Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Bomberg et al., 2012a, 2012b; Peterson and Shackleton, 
2012a; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013; Dinan, 2014). A fourth institution, the European 
Council, also played a significant role, but since the European Council became an official EU 
institution after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 (McCormick, 2011:78; Corbett 
et al., 2012:50), we shall refer to the European Council as a body of the EU in the context of 
the Romanian enlargement.  
 
As O’Brennan argues, enlargement is not a straight-forward process, but a rather complex 
one, where roles, tasks and powers of EU institutions’ can fluctuate, from being limited to 
becoming very influential. Furthermore, the complexity is also aggravated by the 
“multiplicity of institutional entities” of each EU institution (2006:58). This refers to the fact 
that although we speak of each as unitary bodies, this is a misleading image, as within each of 
                                                          
56 For further information about the variety of actors involved in enlargement, see e.g. Nugent (2004:51-52), 
O’Brennan (2006:55-112) and Buonanno and Nugent (2013). For a discussion of the role of national actors of 
the candidate countries, see Grabbe, (2001).  
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these institutions there were “numerous formations organized by policy specialization”, 
interests, roles, seniority, etc., which dealt with the Romanian enlargement and accession 
negotiations (Lewis, 2010:142). The below discussion will therefore address “the multiplicity 
of institutional entities”, as well as their roles and powers in the enlargement context.  
 
The Council of Ministers 
To start with, the Council of Ministers57 , which is comprised by representatives of the 
member states’ governments (Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:84), may be regarded as the starting 
point of any state’s EU accession, as it is to the Council of Ministers that the applicant 
country will submit their membership application (European Council, 2016b). Primarily in 
the fifth enlargement context, the main role of the Council of Ministers was to negotiate the 
accession of candidate states, while representing the interests of the member states (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 2006:15). Such a role was not easy, largely because the Council of 
Ministers was the institution in which the interests and powers of the member states were 
played out (O’Brennan, 2006:59 and 72). One obvious episode in which a member state 
displayed their annoyance with a candidate country and fears of retaliation against the latter 
during the Council’s negotiations grew took place in 2003 when Romania decided to support 
US action in Iraq. French President Chirac criticized Romania’s decision, highlighting that 
their position at the negotiations table was “very delicate” (Gallagher, 2009:138). The 
European Commission however did not endorse France’s reaction, but instead, European 
Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen stressed that such a step was of strategic 
importance to the EU’s Eastern borders (Gallagher, 2009:139).  
 
                                                          
57 Since 1999 also referred to as the Council of the European Union (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006:14).  
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Although we speak of the Council of Ministers as a unitary body, the Council is formed by 
different working units, which form “a complex and variegated institutional construct” 58 
(Lewis, 2010:145). For instance, the Romanian enlargement and accession negotiations were 
not a matter taken care of by the Council per se, but it was largely handled by a division of 
three units, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States to the European Union59 (COREPER II), the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council60 (GAERC) at the ministerial level and the Enlargement Working group, 
which included a number of middle-ranking officials of the permanent representations 
(O’Brennan, 2006:60-61; Michalski, 2014:283). Furthermore, all three can be regarded as 
“the tip of the iceberg”, as their work was supported by a large number of other officials, 
ranging from EU permanent representatives, expert working groups, national officials, 
national civil servant and policy specialists (Lewis, 2010:144). Here we can also add that the 
country holding the Presidency of the Council often played a significant role in setting the 
enlargement agenda, pushing for conclusions on various chapters and reaching agreements on 
problems in the enlargement process (O’Brennan, 2006:62; Michalski, 2014:283).  
 
The European Council  
While the Council of Ministers can be regarded as the start point of a country’s accession, the 
European Council can be regarded as the end point, as it is the Council that has the final 
saying in whether “the country meets all the necessary criteria for consideration as an official 
candidate for EU membership” and whether it can join as a member state (Tallberg, 
                                                          
58 For an in-depth understanding of the different layers of actors involved in the work of the Council of 
Ministers, see Hayes-Renshaw (2012:70-75).  
59 Responsible for preparing the work of the Council of Ministers, it consists of representatives from the EU 
countries with the rank of ambassador to the EU and is chaired by the EU country, which holds the Council 
Presidency (European Union, 2016a). 
60 Prior to 2002 the GAERC was known as the General Affairs Council (GAC). The GAERC, formed by 
member states’ foreign affair ministers (Lewis, 2010:143; European Union, 2016a), is one of the ten 
configurations under which the Council of Ministers meets (Corbet et al., 2012;54-55; European Council, 
2016a, 2016b). 
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2008:686; European Council, 2016b). The European Councils are regular meetings of the 
Heads of State and Government of the EU member states, the European Commission 
President and the High Representative for foreign affair and security policy (and is assisted 
by the Secretary-General of the Council), where political directions are taken, guidelines are 
provided and enlargement priorities and agendas are shaped (Tallberg, 2008:685; Avery, 
2012:60-6; Michalski, 2014:283; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47; European Union, 2016c; 
see also Tallberg, 2007). 
 
Enlargement matters, such as negotiations, take place among senior officials, such as the 
permanent representatives in the case of the EU member states and the ambassador to the EU 
in the case of the candidate countries, which are in turn supported by a variety of other 
officials (Michalski, 2014:283). Often, the President of the European Council can have an 
influential role in the enlargement and negotiation proceedings (Tallberg, 2008:691; 
European Council, 2016c). The European Council works closely with both the Council of 
Ministers, which implements the decisions taken by the former and with the European 
Commission, which often provides solutions to existing problems as advised by the European 
Council (Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470; Avery, 2012:166; European Union, 2016c). As 
the below will demonstrate, the European Councils are largely dependent on the work of the 
Commission, as enlargement decisions are often endorsed by the Commission’s assessments 
(Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47).  
 
The European Commission 
The European Commission is often regarded as the key player in the enlargement and 
accession negotiation process and exercising more influence than any other EU institution 
(O’Brennan, 2006:56; Gallagher, 2009:30; Avery, 2012:166; Michalski, 2014:283; European 
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Union, 2016d; see also McCormick, 1999:84; Egebert, 2010:128; Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:70). 
The main role of the Commission in enlargement is to assist applicants, candidates and 
acceding states in meeting the accession criteria, monitor and evaluate the enlargement 
process and support accession negotiations as defined by the European Councils (European 
Commission, 2016b).  
 
The Commission’s involvement in the enlargement process and with the applicants is 
established early on, often during the pre-applicant phase and to a larger extent during the 
applicant phase (Nugent, 2001:316-317). In the case of the fifth enlargement, the 
Commission’s interaction with the applicants started via the PHARE assistance and later 
through the Opinions. In the case of PHARE, this gave the Commission the opportunity to 
shape the PHARE content, which included the initiating, management and implementation of 
the pre-accession program (O’Brennan, 2006:88). Furthermore, the twinning model61, which 
was presented in 1998 by the Commission, expanded the latter’s role in the enlargement 
process (O’Brennan, 2006:89), by introducing a new instrument for institutional cooperation, 
which proved to be successful (Grabbe, 2001:1024; European Commission, 2016a). It should 
be noted that the introduction of twinning was criticized, as it was seen as enabling the 
Commission to colonize “important parts of the enlargement process” and thus, extending its 
leverage (O’Brennan, 2006:89; see also Grabbe, 2001:1026-1027, 2002:266; Poole, 2003:10; 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004:625; Pridham, 2006a:397).  
  
During accession negotiations and until the applicant joins the EU, the Commission 
maintains a continued dialogue via the delegation in the candidate/acceding state. Such a 
dialogue acquires “extensive expertise and knowledge” about each applicant and solidifies 
                                                          
61 In which twinning projects bring together expertise from member states to the applicant countries in order to 
achieve concrete operational results through peer to peer activities (European Commission, 2016a). 
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the Commission’s influence (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36 and 38; Avery, 
2012:163; Michalski, 2014:280). Especially in the case of the fifth enlargement, the 
production of the monitoring Reports enabled the Commission to gain knowledge about and 
interact with the candidate countries (Nugent, 2001:318), as well as shape the enlargement 
discourse (see O’Brennan, 2006:79). During the acceding phase when the Treaty is ratified, 
the Commission’s role is limited and almost replaced by the Council and Parliament, 
although the Commission still provides information to both institutions (Nugent, 2001:318).  
 
Just like in the case of the Council of Ministers, although we speak of the European 
Commission as one body, the Romanian enlargement was not the responsibility of the 
Commission per se, but of DGIA 62  (Nugent, 2001:136; Bretherton, 2002:15). With the 
reorganization of the Commission in 2000 during the presidency of Prodi, the Romanian 
enlargement was moved into the hands of DG ENLARG (Egebert, 2010:133). Furthermore, 
as the fifth enlargement came to include new actions and unprecedented measurements, 
special Enlargement Task forces were set, which also included the so called designated 
country desks (Egebert, 2010:133). The Romanian enlargement was therefore also handled 
by officials at Romania country desk (Gallagher, 2009:172). Moreover, European 
Commissioners for Enlargement often showed a high dedication to the enlargement process 
(O’Brennan, 2006:76), which meant that they got involved in the process to a large extent. As 
the section on the Romanian accession negotiations will demonstrate, Commissioner for 
Enlargement Verheugen was in particular highly involved in the Romanian enlargement.  
 
One salient aspect, which deserves closer attention and which has raised questions about the 
level of leverage in the EU (McCormick, 1999:84; Nugent, 2001:320; Egebert, 2010:128; 
                                                          
62 Directorate-General of external relations, with a focus on Europe and the new independent states, as well as 
common foreign and security policy and external missions (Nugent, 2001:136).  
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Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:70), is the Commission’s role as key enlargement advisor to the 
Council of Ministers and in particular the European Councils (Nugent, 2001:320; see also 
Bellier, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Avery, 2012:166; 
Bomberg et al., 2012a; Peterson and Shackleton, 2012a). Such a position was established by 
Article 49 in the Treaty on European Union, which advised that the Council of Ministers and 
the European Councils shall consult with the Commission on EU matters, including 
enlargement (European Union, 2016d). As mentioned previously, although accession 
negotiations are in the hands of the Councils, the decisions are more than often based on the 
Commission’s assessments and recommendations, which are published for instance in the 
monitoring Reports (Avery, 2012:169; see also Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470). The 
discussion on the Romanian accession negotiations will further provide an overview of the 
interplay between the Commission and the European Councils and the impact upon 
enlargement and negotiations.  
 
The European Parliament  
Although the European Parliament may not be involved in accession negotiations to the same 
extent as the Council of Ministers, the European Councils and the Commission, its power 
cannot be overlooked (O’Brennan, 2006:95; Corbett et al., 2011). First, one of the legislative 
roles of the Parliament is to decide on enlargements (European Union, 2016e). In particular, 
once the European Council has confirmed that a candidate state can join the EU, the 
Parliament’s key task is to “vote by an absolute majority at the end of the accession 
negotiations, in order to permit the ratification of each individual accession treaty” 
(O’Brennan, 2006:97). Second, due to its supervisory role, the Parliament is the institution, 
which enforces democratic scrutiny to a larger extent than any other EU institutions 
(European Union, 2016e). For instance, in the context of the fifth enlargement, the Parliament 
 Page | 116  
 
insisted that the EU’s democratic norms were at the core of the enlargement and that the EU 
needed to apply equality of treatment of all candidates in the process (O’Brennan, 2006:98-
99). Additionally, its supervisory role gives the Parliament power to question the 
Commission and the Council (Corbett et al., 2012:64; Hurka et al, 2015:1230; European 
Union, 2016e), by for instance debating enlargement progress and passing resolutions on the 
various documents released by the Commission and on the situation in every candidate 
country (Michalski, 2014:284).  
 
Similarly to the Commission, the Parliament also monitors candidate countries through the 
Parliament’s own reports63, which are compiled by the rapporteurs64 (Hurka et al, 2015). 
Such reports can be influential on a country’s enlargement and accession, as the discussion 
on the Romanian accession negotiations will reveal. Furthermore, just like in the case of 
Council and Commission Presidents, Presidents of the European Parliament can also become 
highly involved in the enlargement procedure. For instance Pat Cox enjoyed a close working 
relation with both Verheugen and the Enlargement Task force, as well as the Council of 
Ministers, due to their support of similar targets in the fifth enlargement (O’Brennan, 
2006:106; see also Cameron, 2004:14; Napel and Widgrén, 2006). 
 
O’Brennan identifies that in comparison to other EU institutions, the Parliament showed a 
more “consistent willingness to champion the macro goal of enlargement, while urging the 
accommodation of CEE preferences to the greatest extent possible within the process” in the 
fifth enlargement (2006:105). One such situation, which also benefitted the candidate 
countries, took place in 2002 when the Parliament opened “the chamber to candidate state 
                                                          
63 Contain proposals for resolutions or legislative amendments to be voted on by the Parliament. The reports are 
known by the personal names of the rapporteur, who drafts and presents them, i.e “the Nicholson report” 
(European Parliament, 2006). 
64 MEPs, who write reports, are known by the French term “rapporteur” (European Parliament, 2006). 
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representatives before their accessions had been successfully negotiated”. O’Brennan 
emphasizes that such an act was unprecedented, as it allowed representatives of the candidate 
countries to be “included inside the European Parliament’s structures whilst negotiations on 
accession were still at a very delicate stage” (2006:105). Such an inclusion gave for instance 
the Czech Republic and Hungary the opportunity to negotiate and demand, on behalf of their 
countries, 22 seats in the European Parliament, the same number of seats that the member 
states of Belgium and Portugal were enjoying (2006:107; see also European Parliament, 
2002a:4; Laursen, 2006).  
 
While the above has briefly outlined an overview of the monitoring Reports and EU 
institutions, the next section will include a broader discussion of the implications of the 
Reports and institutions upon the Romanian accession negotiations and EU-Romania 
relations, in order to reveal the context in which an unequal encounter between the EU and 
Romania emerged and understand the production of unequal power relations. 
 
4.2. The Romanian accession negotiations 
This section argues that the Romanian accession negotiations are instrumental in 
understanding the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations. The section will 
be discussed in terms of three distinctive phases of the Romanian enlargement process, where 
each phase marked the transition of Romania to the next stage in the enlargement process and 
accession negotiations: applicant phase (1995-2000), candidate phase (2000-2005) and 
acceding phase (2005-2007) (see also Nugent, 2001:316-319). The significance of the 
monitoring Reports and EU institutions will also be discussed, as well as the fight against 
corruption in order to identify implications upon negotiations and flag up some of the key 
analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.  
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4.2.1. Applicant phase  
The applicant phase spans from the time of the Romanian submission of the membership 
application in June 1995 and until February 2000 when the EU opened the first accession 
negotiation chapters with Romania, becoming a candidate country (European Commission, 
2013m).  
 
Following the submission of membership to the Council of Ministers in June 1995 and the 
Madrid European Council’s request of an Opinion (also known as avis) (European 
Commission, 1997b:5), the Commission assessed Romania’s readiness to comply with the 
Copenhagen criteria. The work involved the efforts of all Commission’s DGs, but primarily, 
the assessment was done by the Enlargement Task force, through the help of a questionnaire 
sent in April 1996 and which the Romanian authorities had to complete and return within 
three months (Nugent, 2001:317; see also European Commission, 1997b:11). The aim of the 
questionnaire was “to enable the Commission to evaluate the extent of approximation of laws 
and present it with a picture of the extent of the country’s development” (Stawarska, 
1999:827). The results were published in the Commission Opinion on Romania's application 
for membership of the European Union (European Commission, 1997a) as part of Agenda 
2000 in July 1997. The Opinion concluded that “Romania is experiencing serious problems in 
transposing the Community acquis” and recommended to only open accession negotiations 
after “sufficient progress to meet the accession terms” has been made (European 
Commission, 1997a:1, 1997b:114; Agnew, 2001:32; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 
2008:36-38). The Commission’s recommendation was also endorsed by the European 
Parliament’s Rapporteur Pierre Bernard-Reymond’s own conclusions that it would be 
"premature to open accession negotiations with Romania" (European Parliament, 1999). 
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Primarily, the recommendation of leaving Romania out was based on the Commission’s 
dissatisfaction with the fulfilment of the conditionality principle. The conditionality principle 
referred to the conditions for Romania’s accession to the EU and was based on “the 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria” (Pridham 2007c:530, Noutcheva and Bechev, 
2008:115; see also Grabbe, 2001, 2002; Türkes and Gökgöz, 2006; Pridham, 2007b; Avery, 
2012:163) and the adoption of the 80,000 pages of the acquis before membership 
negotiations were opened  (Pridham, 2004:524-525; Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 2009:272-
273; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a; see also Dimitrova, 2004b:8; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004:662).  
 
Based on what Pridham deemed as a “cautious or pessimistic” Opinion assessment of 
Romania (2007c:535-536; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:14), the Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997 proposed that the accession process should be launched 
with all applicants in March 1998, but only “convene bilateral intergovernmental 
conferences” and thus begin accession negotiations with six applicant states, while continuing 
“preparation of negotiations“ with the remaining applicants to which Romania also belonged 
(European Council, 1997, point c27; see also Phinnemore, 2006a:41; Noutcheva and Bechev, 
2008:121; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:38-39; Michalski, 2014:293). Such a 
decision shows not only that the European Council had power to decide whether Romania 
met “the necessary criteria for consideration as an official candidate for EU membership” 
(European Council, 2016b), but also that the Commission’s assessments and 
recommendations shaped the European Council’s decisions (Michalski, 2014:283).  
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Romania’s exclusion by the Luxembourg European Council raised concerns. Notably, the 
decision infuriated former Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, who raised fears of 
discrimination and unequal treatment by the EU (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:38). 
Romanian Chief Negotiator Lazăr Comănescu explained that such a decision implied 
distancing Romania from Europe and maintaining the old division of East and West 
(Comănescu, 2006:96; see also Grabbe and Hughes, 1999:189; Phinnemore, 2006a:48). 
Moreover, Radio Free Europe correspondent Ron Synovitz described the omission of 
Romania as “splitting into packs" (Synovitz, 1997), suggesting that by leaving Romania out, 
the EU produced a distinction between candidates. Criticism grew amongst EU member 
states, as France, Italy and Greece raised concerns about a sense of isolation against Romania 
in the accession proceedings (Baun, 2000:120 and 122-123). Criticism also resonated in the 
European Parliament (Baun, 2000:124; Michalski, 2014:293), arguing that the EU’s strategy 
of dividing the candidate countries into an internal (made up by mostly the 2004 entrants) and 
an external buffer zone (made up by the 2007 entrants) created a “two-tiered” system of 
candidates, in which Romania as part of the external buffer zone enjoyed a “lower, third tier 
of rights” than the internal buffer zone (Böröcz, 2006b:154).  
 
The EU also recognized that a successful implementation of conditionality could be 
implemented through the twinning exercise, which had been launched by the Commission in 
May 1998 (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004:620). For instance, the Commission sent a 
range of pre-accession advisers from the member states’ civil services to lead twinning 
projects within the Romanian Ministry of Interior. Although tensed at times (2004:624 and 
630), the EU advisers enjoyed “a close working relationship with both the Head of the 
European Integration Directorate and the Secretary of State for European Integration” within 
the Ministry. The advisers reported that the Romanian officials had welcomed the twinning 
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projects and had showed tremendous efforts to commit to the success of such an exercise. 
However such a commitment was not always well received, as in the case of the Ministry of 
Development and Prognosis, whose officials were rather less keen in implementing the 
recommendations of the EU advisers (2004:631-632).  
 
Following the Commission’s screening process65 of Romania, which was completed in April 
1998 (Orban, 2006:90; Avery, 2012:163 and 169), the publication of the 1998 Regular Report 
was the first monitoring report to follow the Opinion. The Report presented a negative image 
of Romania, which “fell far short of meeting the necessary economic criteria for 
membership” and underlined a deteriorating situation within the country since the 
membership application had been received by the EU (Baun, 2000:119 and 122). Similarly to 
the Opinion, the Report concluded that Romania had “a long way to go … before the country 
would be able to assume the obligations of membership” (European Commission, 1998:51). 
Such a conclusion mirrored the decision taken at the Vienna European Council in December 
1998, which welcomed “progress in preparation for accession negotiations”, but not to begin 
negotiations with Romania (European Parliament, 1998b, section V – ENLARGEMENT, 
point 60).  
 
In contrast, the 1999 Report echoed Romania’s progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria and adopting the acquis (see European Commission, 1999:77-78). The Commission 
proposed opening accession negotiations with Romania, a recommendation, which was also 
seen as a solution towards the increasingly unstable situation in Eastern Europe due to the 
Kosovo conflict (Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:43). With much more positive 
assessments, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council formally recognized Romania as 
                                                          
65 Also known as the analytical examination of the acquis, it includes the familiarizing process of the applicant 
state with the acquis and identifies their level of alignment and need of progress (European Commission, 2013g; 
see also Beach, 2005:10; O’Brennan, 2006:35). 
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eligible for EU membership (European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m; see also Baun, 
2000:127) and recommended “to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in 
February 2000” (European Council, 1999, section I, point 10; see also Phinnemore, 
2006b:25).  Also, taken into consideration the Parliament’s criticism regarding the division of 
applicants in two groups, the EU revised “its enlargement strategy” and opened negotiations 
with Romania and the remaining five applicants, who had been left out in 1998, underlining 
that each candidate country was to progress towards accession based on concrete 
achievements and not based on a “two-tiered” system of candidates (Baun, 2000:124; 
Michalski, 2014:293).  
 
Overall, the above shows that although negotiations were in the hands of the European 
Councils (Nugent, 2001:318), the Commission’s Reports played a significant role in the 
decisions taken by the former, for instance by setting the agenda for the first round of 
accession negotiations (Luxembourg) and by reconsidering and resetting a new agenda of 
accession negotiations (Helsinki) (see O’Brennan, 2006:61). Additionally, the criticism raised 
by the Parliament also impacted upon the revision of the enlargement strategy (see Baun, 
2000:124).  
 
On the other hand, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur Baroness Emma Nicholson 
criticized the Commission’s assessments of the Romanian fulfillment of the Copenhagen 
criteria in the 1999 Regular Report and the Helsinki European Council’s decision to open 
accession negotiations in 2000 by adding that “the Commission would have to reconsider its 
evaluation of the political criteria”. What Nicholson meant was that in her opinion Romania 
had not fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and thus questioned the Commission’s 
 Page | 123  
 
assessments and the European Council’s decision to open negotiations (European Parliament, 
2001:6-7). 
 
During the applicant phase, one of the main poor credentials and shortcomings in Romania, 
which was raised in every monitoring Report and which remained, even after accession, a key 
concern, was the fight against corruption and the slow implementation of a functional anti-
corruption policy (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:42; 
Gallagher, 2009:226; Phinnemore, 2010:295). While the 1998 Report dedicated two short 
paragraphs to discuss the situation of corruption and called the Romanian anti-corruption 
measures “incomplete” (RR 1998:10), the 1999 Report offered a more detailed discussion 
about this “widespread problem (RR 1999:13) and criticised Romania for not addressing the 
corruption problem with “sufficient determination” (RR 1999:14). The implication of 
corruption during the Romanian enlargement was that it affected EU-Romania relations, 
which in turn had an impact upon the accession negotiations. As the upcoming sections will 
demonstrate, corruption came to play a rather significant role in how negotiations came to be 
shaped.  
 
4.2.2. Candidate phase 
The candidate phase refers to the period during which accession negotiations were taking 
place in intergovernmental conferences between the EU and Romania (Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, 2008:46). The period spans from February 2000 when Romania convened its 
first bilateral conference and until April 2005 when the Treaty of Accession was signed 
(Orban, 2006:78) and Romania became an acceding state.  
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According to Romanian Chief Negotiator Leonard Orban, the Helsinki European Council‘s 
decision to formally recognize Romania as eligible for EU membership prompted Romania to 
work harder towards fulfilling the EU’s requirements. In line with the above, new 
developments emerged in Romania, such as the establishment of the Ministry of European 
Integration for the coordination of accession negotiations in 2001 (Orban, 2006:82; 
Phinnemore, 2006a:41; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:3). In February 2000 with the 
appointment of the first Romanian Chief Negotiator Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, the Romanian 
government set 1 January 2007 as the target date for their EU accession (Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, 2008:3). Furthermore, as the EU demanded “tangible results in reducing the 
level of corruption” (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:121), Romania established different 
mechanisms to help combatting corruption66. In 2000 an anti-corruption and organized crime 
section within the Romanian Prosecutor-General’s office was set up (which the 2001 Report 
deemed as non-functional, see RR 2001:21-22), while in 2003 an anti-corruption legislation 
was set up by the Romanian government, but which was deemed incoherent as corruption 
continued to prosper (Gallagher, 2009:212-213). Neither did the 2004 zero tolerance against 
corruption campaign had much success as the EU’s European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
identified in their research, although a slight decrease in corruption had started to be noticed 
(European Anti-Fraud Office, 2003; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:86).  
 
During the candidate phase, Romania opened and closed a variety of negotiation chapters. 
Primarily, negotiations were conducted by the Council of Ministers (Nugent, 2001:318; 
O’Brennan, 2006:56), while the European Councils played an important role in setting 
political directions, priorities and agenda for the Romanian enlargement (Avery, 2012:60-6; 
Michalski, 2014:283; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47; European Union, 2016c). The 
                                                          
66 For further details see Noutcheva and Bechev (2008:137-138).  
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Commission’s Reports revealed a relatively smooth progress throughout the period 
(Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:46 and 49), although concerns did emerge which led 
in December 2001 to the Laeken European Council’s decision, in agreement ”with the report 
of the Commission” (the 2001 Regular Report) that Romania was not going to join the first 
wave of enlargement in accessing the EU in 2004 due to lack of progress (European Council 
2001, section 1, point 8; see also Phinnemore, 1999:73; Moisio, 2002:91; O’Brennan, 
2006:34; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:47 and 80-81).  
 
Such a decision attracted criticism due to its exclusionary nature (Grabbe, 2002; Bellier, 
2004; O’Brennan, 2006; Pridham, 2006a; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008). However, 
the Commission ensured Romania of “a continuous, inclusive and irreversible nature of the 
enlargement process” (European Council, 2002a:6; Phinnemore, 2006c:10). The Copenhagen 
European Council in December 2002 even suggested an anticipated accession date in 2007 
(Council of the European Union, 2003a:4), while the June 2003 Thessaloniki European 
Council addressed that Romania’s accession negotiations could be concluded in 2004 
(Council of the European Union, 2003b:10). The Prodi Commission and Commissioner for 
Enlargement Verheugen also showed their support of Romania. For instance, in early 2003, 
Verheugen visited Bucharest in order to stress and reassure Romania of the continuous 
support of the EU towards accession. However, Verheugen underlined that the 2007 target 
year was only to materialize if Romania was fully committed to fulfill the accession criteria 
and the acquis (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:54; see also O’Brennan, 2006:81-83).  
 
Accordingly, the European Parliament President Cox showed his support of Romania’s 
accession in an address in November 2002, where Cox highlighted that regardless of the 
outcome of the December European Council, the fifth enlargement was to include the 
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accession of Romania, which he called “inclusive and irreversible”, even though such an 
accession would take place at a different time and in a different wave than other candidates. 
Cox also encouraged the European Council to consider 2007 as the target year for Romania’s 
accession, by highlighting that “it is my personal wish that this House and that the European 
Council in Copenhagen will commit the European Union to a headline date of 2007”. Cox 
visualized that such a target might give Romania incentives towards achieving the necessary 
transformations (European Parliament, 2002b).  
 
The criticism raised in the 2002 Report led to the setting up of an Action Plan (became the 
preamble of the Roadmap) in order to support “the remaining criteria for membership by 
identifying the tasks ahead and providing increased financial assistance” (European 
Commission, 2002a:2; European Council, 2002b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:51). 
The Roadmap67 was published in November 2002 and included the main steps that Romania 
needed to implement in order for the accession negotiations to be concluded (European 
Commission, 2002a:2-3). With the setting up of the Roadmap and its endorsement by the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the latter opened all negotiation chapters 
with Romania (Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:4 and 49). 
 
With regards to concluding the negotiations, there were several matters that Romania needed 
to address, in particular progress regarding the fight against corruption, on which the Reports 
and EU civil servants put pressure (see Open Society Institute, 2002:454; Noutcheva and 
Bechev, 2008:136). Although attempts had been made to combat corruption and anti-
corruption policies had been enforced, the monitoring Reports revealed dissatisfaction with 
such a progress. For instance the 2001 Report highlighted that Romania needed to address the 
                                                          
67 Which Romania shared with Bulgaria. 
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problem of corruption if the country was serious about accessing the EU (RR 2001:22). The 
2002 Report identified the corruption level as “a cause for very serious concern” (RR 
2002:37), while revealing a complex and broad network of corruption activities at different 
national levels (Open Society Institute, 2002:454; Gallagher, 2009:207). The OLAF also 
continued to identify corruption as an impediment to Romania’s progress towards 
membership (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:86-87). Even Commissioner for 
Enlargement Rehn and Commission President Barroso recommended at one point not closing 
the last chapters with Romania (Phinnemore, 2010:302; see also Phinnemore, 2006a:45) due 
to growing apprehensions “on conditionality grounds” and “continuing disquiet over the 
political conditions”, where in both cases corruption was one of the seminal factors (Pridham, 
2007a:359). The resignation in October 2003 of Romanian Minister for European Integration 
Hildegard Puwak, due to accusations of using EU funds for personal interests, did not help 
the image of the Romanian government as moving away from corruption (Noutcheva and 
Bechev, 2008:136).  
 
Even reports produced by other EU institutions, endorsed the Commission’s corruption 
concerns. For instance, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur Nicholson reported in 
February 2001 that the main obstacles to Romania’s accession were “corruption, the problem 
of institutionalized children, the implication of the political into public administration” 
(Denechere and Scutaru, 2010:143). Notably, the Parliament’s 2004 report on Romania’s 
progress recommended to “reorient the accession strategy” (European Parliament, 2004:11) 
due to “serious difficulties”, including corruption (2004:5). Such pressure from various EU 
institutions resulted into the publication of Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase’s To Do 
List (Lista cu priorităţi), which included 30 problem issues to be implemented by Romania 
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by July 2004 in order to ensure the EU that Romania was capable of joining (European 
Commission, 2013h; see also Anghel, 2004; Pridham, 2007a:357, 2007c:531-532).  
 
Alongside the concern regarding the fight against corruption, the Parliament was also critical 
of the Romanian child protection policy. In particular, Nicholson condemned international 
adoption of Romanian children and blamed the Romanian state in how “these children can be 
swiftly drawn into a well-established, financially led international trafficking system whereby 
they are sold for profit under the guise of fake or inappropriate adoptions worldwide” 
(European Parliament, 2001:17). Nicholson worked closely with Verheugen, as the latter had 
also been critical about the situation of child protection in Romania (Michalski, 2014:71; see 
also O’Brennan, 2006:81; Gallagher, 2009:155-156). As an outcome, under EU pressure, 
Romania banned international adoptions of children in June 2001 (Euractiv, 2002). It should 
be noted that such concerns were important, as in the case of the Parliament, Romania needed 
the former’s assent in order for accession to take place (O’Brennan, 2006:56; European 
Union, 2016d). 
 
Supported by the Roadmap and with pressure from France and Germany, the 2003 December 
Brussels European Council confirmed welcoming Romania as a member state in January 
2007 (Papadimitriou and Phinemore, 2008:4). A year later, the 2004 Brussels European 
Council closed all negotiation chapters with Romania and established the 1 January 2007 as 
the official target year for accession. The Council also decided that the signing of the 
Accession Treaty was to take place in April 2005 (European Council, 2004:3; Papadimitriou 
and Phinnemore, 2008:5 and 59; Avery, 2012:164-165). Such a decision was however not 
popular with members of the European Parliament, who showed dissatisfaction with the 
Commission, Verheugen and the European Council’s decision, on the basis that Romania had 
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not yet satisfied the accession criteria (Gallagher, 2009:159). Thus, as a precaution against 
“serious problems that may arise, as the case may be, before accession or in the three years 
after accession”, the Council introduced a range of preventing safeguard clauses (European 
Council, 2004:3), which will be discussed next.  
 
4.2.3. Acceding phase 
The acceding phase refers to the period following the completion of the accession 
negotiations (European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m). The period spans from April 
2005 when Romania signed the Treaty of Accession and until January 2007 when Romania 
accessed the EU as a member state.    
 
During the acceding phase the Commission continued its assessment of the Romanian 
enlargement through a new set of monitoring reports, the Comprehensive Monitoring 
Reports. These were used as a tool of “monitoring Romania’s preparations for accession in 
order to ensure that this country can meet all duties and requirements of a full-fledged 
Member State” (European Commission, 2005b:3). As in the case of the Regular Reports, the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports also revealed concerns regarding Romania’s ability to 
comply with the accession requirements and thus the image of Romania as a laggard, which 
had started during the applicant phase, continued into the acceding phase (see Phinnemore, 
2006b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004, 2008; Verdun, 2005:12-13; Pridham, 2007c; 
Noutcheva and Bechev 2008; Lawrence, 2010; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a). For instance, 
the May 2006 Report revealed hesitation about Romania’s ability to join in 2007, followed by 
President Barroso’s warning to Romania of rolling up their sleeves (see Bilefsky, 2006). 
Even a June 2006 study of the image that Brussels officials, working with European affairs, 
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had of Romania six month prior to its accession highlighted that respondents linked the name 
of Romania with poverty, lack of modernity and corruption (Euractiv, 2006).  
 
The Commission published three detailed Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, a practice, 
which was unprecedented, as the 2004 acceding states only had had one report each 
(Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:11-12). Similar to the Regular Reports, the assessments of 
the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports impacted upon the Romanian negotiations. For 
instance, due to concerns about Romania still being “unreformed in crucial aspects” 
(Gallagher, 2009:263), the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report included four 
specific benchmarks to be monitored by the Commission post accession (European 
Commission, 2006b:10; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:14). The inclusion of the 
benchmarks in the final stage of an accession and which were to be monitored after accession 
(fourth bench mark) was unprecedented and differed from the first wave (Pridham, 
2007a:351-354 and 361, 2007c:534; see also Grabbe, 2002:255; Pridham, 2004:523-524; 
Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:9-12).  
 
Evidently, one of the benchmarks was aimed at one of the main concerns, judicial reforms 
and fight against corruption. In particular, the September Report acknowledged the setting up 
of an unprecedented mechanism for continued monitoring post accession, in the form of the 
Cooperation and Verification reports (European Commission, 2006b:13; Phinnemore, 
2011:98; European Commission, 2013n), which indicated that Romania would be observed 
for another year and a half after accession (Pridham, 2007a:360 and 353; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, 2008:60; Phinnemore, 2010:295 and 303; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:10). 
Such unprecedented implementations were identified as a tool through which the EU 
preserved leverage over Romania after accession (Pridham, 2007d:173). However, the EU 
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defended such an inclusion and justified this as a way to facilitate the Commission’s 
monitoring of Romania, in order to ensure the latter’s smooth transition into a functional 
member state (Michalski, 2014:294; see also Heidbreder, 2011; Holzer and Mareš, 2016).  
 
During the acceding phase and following Finland’s concerns regarding Romania’s level of 
corruption, European Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn re-opened a number of key 
chapters, which had been closed with Romania in December 2004. He highlighted that 
satisfactory reforms had not been made during the term of Verheugen and demanded that 
further reforms needed to be implemented during 2005, stressing that Romania had to show 
significant progress by “the spring of 2006” in these areas. Two of the chapters were the 
competition policy and justice chapters68 (Gallagher, 2009:172-173). Rehn’s dissatisfaction 
with how the chapters had been concluded, can be related to an interview with a senior EU 
official, whose attempts to bring corruption in Romania to the attention of Verheugen were 
unsuccessful. Verheugen told the EU official that corruption in Romania was not much 
different from how things were in Bavaria. The senior EU official regarded such an episode 
as a circumstance in which Verheugen was overlooking and underestimating the problematic 
side of corruption (Gallagher, 2009:159).  
 
Notably, due to the concerns raised in the Regular Reports prior to signing the Treaty, the 
Commission’s solution to an impending halt of accession was the inclusion of a safeguard 
clause in the Treaty. Although the first three provisions of the clause had been applied to all 
candidates of the fifth enlargement, in the case of Romania, a fourth unprecedented provision 
was added (see Article 39, Treaty of Accession, 2005). This latter provision comprised the 
possibility of postponing the date of accession “by one year”, if failures of meeting 
                                                          
68 Corruption was discussed as part of the justice chapter (see for instance CMR 2006a:35-36).  
 Page | 132  
 
membership requirements by “1 January 2007 in a number of important areas” would take 
place (European Commission, 2005a:41, Article 39, point 1; Pridham, 2007a:360). 
Particularly, such a fourth provision had a notably “stringent” nature, as the activation 
method was much relaxed and so Romania was at larger risk to be excluded from the 2007 
accession (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:93; see also Pridham, 2007a:360). In 
particular, the Commission had the power to decide upon the safeguard clause, apart from the 
postponement clause, which was in the hands of the Council, but “on the basis of a European 
Commission recommendation” (European Commission, 2005c). Again, this demonstrates the 
close working relation between the Commission and the Council in accession matters.  
 
Another striking aspect of the safeguard clause was its “unprecedented extension of 
conditionality beyond the end of negotiations and the signing of the accession treaty” 
(Pridham, 2007a:360; 351 and 353; 2007c:534; see also Phinnemore, 2005). This related to 
the 11 points69 included in the safeguard clause “over which Romania would continue to be 
monitored for the following year and a half” post-accession (Pridham, 2007a:360). Such 
unprecedented conditions raised reservations of whether Romania was being singled out for 
special treatment in comparison to other acceding states (Pridham, 2007a:360; Phinnemore, 
2005). It was however no surprise that one of the 11 points in the safeguard clause was aimed 
at “the acceleration of the fight against high-level corruption” in Romania (Pridham, 
2007d:173, see also 2007a:360), which the Commission had identified as a persistent 
problem (Pridham, 2007a:357 and 360).  
 
In February 2005 the Commission issued its Opinion on the Treaty, which was positive of 
Romania’s progress (Phinnemore, 2006a:46). In April 2004, the Parliament’s rapporteur 
                                                          
69  Four points on the competition chapter and seven on the justice and home affairs chapter (Pridham, 
2007d:173). 
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Pierre Moscovici published the Parliament’s recommendation on the membership application 
of Romania. Moscovici, on behalf of the Parliament, confirmed that the latter gave its “assent 
to the application by Romania to become a member of the European Union”, while the 
Parliament President forwarded its assent to “the Council and Commission, and the 
governments and parliaments of the Member States and Romania” (European Parliament, 
2005; Phinnemore, 2006a:46). The Treaty of Accession was signed in April 2005 (Orban, 
2006:78) and was ratified by the Romanian Parliament in May 2005, followed by all EU 
member states (Phinnemore, 2006a:46; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:62).  
 
In June 2005, the Commission sent 7 early-warning letters (yellow cards) to Romania, 
indicating continuing poor credentials in a number of areas (Rehn, 2005; Phinnemore, 
2006c:18; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:126). Once more, corruption was identified as a 
problem, which endorsed the findings of Transparency International, who had positioned 
Romania as number 85 in the ranking of the most corrupt countries in the world 
(Transparency International, 2005; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:89). Finally, in 
December 2006, a few days before Romania’s accession, the Parliament approved Leonard 
Orban, who had once been Chief Negotiator for Romania, as the first Romanian member of 
the European Commission (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:6).  
 
Despite hesitation, warnings, negative assessments and unprecedented measures, Romania 
became an EU member state in January 2007 (European Council, 2004:3; Gallagher, 
2009:199).  
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4.3. Conclusions 
This chapter has aimed to outline the Romanian enlargement process and accession 
negotiations and set out the background in which an unequal encounter was produced and 
thus reveal some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. 
Although such an unequal counter may be seen as conventional in enlargement politics, as 
Romania was asking to become member of an already established structure and thus the 
membership criteria needed to be fulfilled according to EU demands, it is significant not to 
discount the importance of how different elements of the enlargement could have impacted 
upon the production of unequal power relations.  
 
First, the chapter captured a brief description of the Romanian enlargement, highlighting that 
that monitoring Reports played a significant role, as not only did they include assessments of 
Romania’s progress in implementing the accession criteria, but the Reports were considered 
by the European Councils when negotiation decisions were taken. The chapter also engaged 
with the role of EU institutions. It was clarified that although we may speak of the EU as a 
unitary actor in the enlargement process or when producing unequal power relations, a 
variety of institutions and actors were involved in the Romanian enlargement and accession 
negotiations and which played a significant role in the production of power relations. The 
discussion of the monitoring Reports and EU institutions also raised the question of who was 
the producer of the Reports, questioning who had power in and behind the discourse of the 
Reports and subsequently produced unequal relations. 
 
Second, the chapter looked at the Romanian accession negotiations in order to reveal the 
extent to which the EU’s practice of assessment monitoring and the monitoring Reports, as 
well as the involvement of EU institutions are significant to our understanding of how the EU 
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produces unequal power relations. For instance, the progress of the Romanian negotiations 
was dependent on the different institutions’ level of satisfaction of the accession criteria 
(Phinnemore, 2010:292). Furthermore, the monitoring Reports influenced “the political 
decisions at the European Council’s December summits”, which in turn impacted upon the 
“opening and closing chapters in the accession negotiations” (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 
2009:279).  
 
Additionally, the chapter considered the fight against corruption, which was identified as one 
of Romania’s outstanding problems in fulfilling the accession criteria and which impacted 
upon the Reports, negotiations and EU-Romania relations. The Reports, as well as EU and 
non EU institutions continuously acknowledged corruption as a main problem, which could 
impend Romania’s accession. Inevitably, the unsuccessful establishment of a functional anti-
corruption system led to a range of often unprecedented measures to be included in 
negotiations and finally in the Treaty of Accession. This demonstrates that corruption was a 
determinative element, which significantly impacted upon the relationship between the EU 
and Romania and on the enlargement process as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSING THE VOCABULARY OF THE REPORTS 
 
 
This chapter argues that analyzing the vocabulary (words) of the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports by applying the description dimension will demonstrate 
the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, as vocabulary is identified as a 
place where unequal relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough, 2001:36).  
 
To explore the above argument, the chapter follows a four-step structure. First, the chapter 
will briefly outline the description dimension of vocabulary, establishing what this particular 
CDA stage entails when it comes to production of unequal power relations with a focus on 
language. Second, the chapter discusses how the description dimension has specifically been 
applied to the vocabulary of the Reports. Third, this section includes the findings of the 
analysis of vocabulary, interview material and content analysis. Fourth, the section presents a 
discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal 
power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry. As a concluding remark, the chapter summarizes in which ways the 
description dimension can be applied to extract observations of interest to the postcolonial 
analysis and sets out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
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5.1. Outline of the description dimension 
This section briefly summarizes what the description dimension entails (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) and the importance of this dimension in analyzing how vocabulary can be a place 
where unequal power relations are produced.  
 
The description dimension involves an analysis of the formal properties of language, which 
include vocabulary (words), grammar and textual structures (Fairclough op.cit., p.92-93). 
This particular chapter will focus on the analysis of vocabulary, while Chapter 6 will look at 
the grammar of the Reports. The centrality of this dimension is related to the argument that 
although language may “appear normal or neutral on the surface”, it can in fact hide 
ideologies (2001:2-3), which are projected upon language and thus impact upon how 
language is produced and interpreted. As mentioned earlier, ideologies are practices, which 
appear commonsensical and neutral and which people often draw upon, but without 
considering that the ideological power may in fact shape how we perceive reality, events, 
people, etc. and thus can impact on the production of power relations (Fairclough op.cit, p.3).  
 
More importantly, ideological power is held in and behind discourse by powerful 
participants, who control and constrain discourses and contributions of non-powerful 
participants through what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into and 
what positions participants occupy in and behind discourse. The control and constraint imply 
particular linguistic forms and vocabulary is one form that can be a place where unequal 
power relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough, 2001:38-39 and 59). 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, by identifying how unequal power relations are 
produced through vocabulary may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of 
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ideological power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation 
from such relations.  
 
5.2. Applying the description dimension 
This section discusses how the description dimension has been applied to the vocabulary of 
the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between vocabulary and unequal 
power relations by establishing that although the choice of vocabulary properties may have 
been automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot neglect the fact that this choice may 
also have been ideologically motivated (2001:100). In order to do so, each Report has been 
analysed by asking a set of questions of the vocabulary (see Appendix 1). The aim is to reveal 
who held power in discourse, by identifying through what vocabulary features participants 
controlled and constrained what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into 
and what positions participants occupy in and behind discourse. In other words, the 
description dimension aims to question how the Romanian enlargement was represented by 
the EU with a focus on vocabulary and what does this mean in relation to unequal power 
relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181). Conducting interviews and content 
analysis were also employed to provide further support to the CDA findings.  
 
In order to explore the extent to which vocabulary can reveal production of unequal power 
relations, this chapter builds upon four arguments, which are elaborated next. First, the 
chapter argues that the choice of the words Eastern and European in the Reports produced 
unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 2001:97-98) by shaping relations of distance and 
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solidarity (in the case of the word Eastern) and relations of distance, synonymy 70  and 
similarity (in the case of the word European).  
 
Second, as formality is identified as a way of constraining access to discourse, the chapter 
argues that the choice of formality in the Reports produced unequal power relations (see 
Fairclough, 2001:97-98) by limiting contents, positions and relations (these constraints are 
related to the elements of discourse in Table 2). Due to the fact that participants are often not 
aware of its impact (2001:54), formality is referred to as power behind discourse. In order to 
demonstrate the extent to which power behind discourse produces unequal power relations, 
researchers aim to question “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to 
impose and enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Closely related to 
formality are also the aspects of heightened self-consciousness and politeness. The first one 
refers to the expectation of applying the “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in formal 
situations (2001:55 and 98), while politeness is a way of marking the position, status and 
“face”, power and social distance of participants in formal situations (2001:55).  
 
Third, the chapter argues that the choice of vocabulary in the Reports produced unequal 
power relations by expressing negative representations of the Romanian enlargement, but 
which were counterbalanced with positive representations (see Fairclough, 2001:98).  
 
Fourth, the chapter argues that the choice of visual aids (see Fairclough, 2001:41) in the 
Reports produced unequal power relations by controlling the representations of participants 
in the Romanian enlargement through the use of two distinctive forms of visual aids, bold 
style and repetitions, which trigger certain reactions with readers (2001:45). Although such 
                                                          
70 Synonymy here refers to the fact that the term European is regarded as the embodiment of the EU and they 
sometimes are used as synonyms (see Pagden, 2004a).  
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representations are usually produced through the use of more conventional visual aids such as 
photographs, the examination argues that as photographs are missing in the Reports, using 
bold style (when writing certain words in the Reports) or using repetitions of specific words 
can be regarded as additional forms of visual aids, which impact upon production of power 
relations by triggering certain reactions with readers, as for instance photographs would.  
 
The findings of the analysis of vocabulary will be supported by the interview material in 
order to provide clear evidence of how vocabulary can be examined to extend our 
understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations. Furthermore, as mentioned 
previously the method of content analysis was employed, in order to reveal a more 
comprehensive overview of how the use of formal properties may have produced unequal 
power relations. The findings will be discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to 
provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which vocabulary is a place in 
which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted through elements of 
subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.  
 
Overall, in exploring the extent to which vocabulary can reveal production of unequal power 
relations, this thesis argues that the control and constraint implied particular linguistic forms 
and vocabulary is one form that can be a place in which unequal power relations are 
produced, exercised and enacted (see Fairclough op.cit, p.36). The findings therefore will 
reveal observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and will set out how subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
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5.3. The word Eastern as referent 
This section argues that the choice of the word Eastern71 in the Reports produced unequal 
power relations by controlling representations of participants in the Romanian enlargement 
and constraining contributions, which produced relations of distance and solidarity.  
 
The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that the application of the word Eastern 
produced relations of distance through expressions such as “East European applicant states” 
(RR 1998:6) or “Eastern European applicant State” (RR 2000:5). Such expressions indicate 
that the EU categorized Romania as East/Eastern European and thus the word Eastern is a cue 
in how the EU perceived Romania in the enlargement process. However, by making 
references to Romania as Eastern, the EU implies a distinction between the EU and Romania, 
as such expressions indicates that the EU and Romania belonged to different entities. As it 
was discussed in the Literature Review, a range of scholars have drawn attention to the fact 
that the word Eastern has often been used in order to differentiate between the EU and the 
candidate states, by reproducing the old distinction between the superior Europe and the 
inferior Eastern Other (Kuus, 2006:225). Thus by associating the Romanian enlargement with 
the term Eastern, such a choice brings in the “stigma of inferiority”, which Eastern Europe 
has been identified with (Kovačević, 2012:168). The choice of this vocabulary reaffirms not 
only that the Romanian enlargement was “framed by the geopolitical imagination of a 
progressive and secure Europe and a backward insecure East (of Europe)” (Kuus, 2007:150), 
but also that such a word had ideological power in the sense that it sustained the connection 
between Eastern and inferiority.   
 
                                                          
71 And its derivations, such as East.  
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One notable difference between the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring 
Reports is that the latter Reports ceased to use the term Eastern, as well as Central and 
Eastern European72 (apart from one occasion), as the instances of the terms in Table 4 and 
Table 5 demonstrate.  
 
Vocabulary RR 1998 RR 1999 RR 2000 RR 2001 RR 2002 RR 2003 RR 2004 
Eastern 2 3 5 6 9 9 5 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
4 3 3 5 6 4 3 
Table 4. Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Regular Reports.  
 
Vocabulary  CMR 2005 CMR 2006 May CMR 2006 September 
Eastern 1 0 0 
Central and Eastern Europe 1 0 0 
Table 5. Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports.  
 
The lack of the terms Eastern and Central and Eastern European in the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports, as indicated in Table 5, may relate to the changing status of Romania 
from a candidate country to an acceding state. As the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports 
were produced after the Treaty of Accession was signed, this change of vocabulary indicates 
that the EU produced a language, which was based on the then current relations to Romania. 
Furthermore, this implies that the vocabulary used in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports 
enacted the then changing relations between the EU and Romania, which were no longer 
relations of distance as identified in the Regular Reports, but relations of solidarity, as 
Romania was now closer to EU membership in its position as an acceding state. In other 
words, the use of the term Eastern was not purposive for the relations that were shaped after 
the signature of the Treaty and thus the relations of distance were not enacted in discourse.  
 
                                                          
72 This term was included as it includes the word Eastern.  
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It should be noted that when references to the term Central and Eastern European were made 
in the Reports, Romania was not per se recognized as being Central or Eastern, but the 
vocabulary only indicated that Romania was part of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless such a choice indicates an important implication, as it allows readers 
(interpreters of the Reports) to produce their own interpretations of the relations between 
Romania to the term Central and Eastern European. However, as it will later be elaborated in 
Chapter 7, such an act may impact upon power relations when interpreters rely on their MR, 
which reproduce ideologies. 
 
The interviewees differed in their opinions on the implications of the word Eastern in two key 
aspects. First, a number of interviewees commented that its use was likely to shape a negative 
image of Romania. For instance, interviewee 10 had a negative association of the use of 
Eastern in the Romanian enlargement, as such a notion was identified as “ideological”73 and 
which according to the interviewee created separation between Romania and the EU. 
Interviewee 10 argued that Romania was “not part of East”, regardless of what the Reports 
and the EU said. Moreover, interviewee 5 maintained that “there is some baggage” associated 
with Eastern and thus, even though the word was “an understandable term”, its use suggested 
that the candidates of the fifth enlargement were identified as “a quite different phenomenon” 
to the EU. Interestingly, interviewee 5 pointed out that such a word was not “consciously 
used in that sense”. By this, interviewee 5 meant that Eastern was not applied to create 
relations of distance or inferiority, but it was just “normal EU usage”. However, this is 
exactly the point that the three-dimensional CDA tries to make. It is exactly the vocabulary, 
which people find “normal” and do not question that produces unequal power relations, as it 
prompts certain representations (inferior, distant, etc.) of the Romanian enlargement in 
                                                          
73 Here the word refers to political ideologies.  
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relations to the EU, but without considering how such a vocabulary prompted participants to 
connect the word Eastern to for instance inferiority, then to the Romanian enlargement and 
then to the understanding that Romania was distant from the superiority of the EU 
(Fairclough, op.cit., p. 3). In this sense, by using a certain vocabulary, the EU as the producer 
of the Reports shaped unequal power relations by influencing the way readers of the Reports 
may have understood Romania and the Romanian enlargement. As we will see in the next 
sub-section, the EU counterbalanced such an image by relating the EU to the word European, 
which prompted different representations.  
 
Second, by contrast, other interviewees did not share the same negative connotation. For 
instance, although interviewee 2 expressed being “very much against it” (the use of Eastern 
when referring to the fifth enlargement as the Eastern enlargement), as Eastern Europe was 
understood as “a Marxist wording”, the interviewee argued that the use of Central and 
Eastern European enlargement was an appropriate term, as it was recognized as “the official 
wording of the Commission”. In other words, interviewee 2 agreed to the use of Eastern as 
part of Central and Eastern European due to its acceptance as the “official wording” of the 
EU. Similarly to respondent 2, interviewees 5, 6 and 8 suggested that the use of Central and 
Eastern European was appropriate as it belonged to EU terminology. Furthermore, 
interviewee 3 suggested that Romania was seen by the EU as an “other joining Europe”, but 
also maintained that “I do not think they were treated as second class countries”. Such 
statements indicate that the word Eastern as part of the term Central and Eastern European, 
which was produced by the EU, had credibility, as it belonged to EU terminology and as 
Interviewee 5 mentioned above, it was legitimized by its use in the Treaty of Accession as 
“standard usage in all EU documents”. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, the credibility of 
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EU language may be related to the position of authority that the EU shaped in relation to 
Romania.  
 
However, the application of the term Central and Eastern European does not mean that such a 
vocabulary is less problematic than when using Eastern. First, the use of Central and Eastern 
European not only continues the distance between the EU and the candidate states by 
emphasizing the existence of two different entities, but second, it also creates additional 
distance between the candidate states themselves, as these can be either Central or Eastern 
European. Thus it can be argued that the term Central and Eastern European negotiated 
further relations of distance not only to the EU, but also between the candidates (see 
Fairclough, 2001:97). Third, although the term Eastern (as part of Central and Eastern 
European) may seem as a commonsensical term that people drew upon without thinking, by 
not questioning the extent to which such a word impacted on how power relations is 
significant, as it proves the commonsensical implications of vocabulary.  
 
5.4. The word European as referent  
As noted above, as production of unequal power relations may be determined by controlling 
representations of participants and constraining contributions, the below section demonstrates 
how the choice of the word European in the Reports produced unequal power relations during 
the Romanian enlargement by shaping relations of synonymy, distance and similarity.  
 
The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that the EU applied the word European as a 
synonym of the EU. This has been indicated in Table 6, as content analysis signposts that the 
word European was largely correlated to the EU, but its application to the Romanian 
enlargement was sparse. This interchangeability has also been emphasized in the Literature 
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Review, as scholars often identify a synonymy between Europe and the EU and that “one 
could then not be a ‘real’ European without being an EU member” (Risse, 2009:154; see also 
Böröcz 2000:853, 2001b:65; Miošić-Lisjak, 2006:110; Behr, 2007:254; Orban, 2010). In 
particular, Kovács maintains that the language of the Regular Reports witnessed an extensive 
use of Europe as a synonym of the EU (2006:213). Additionally, Böröcz’s interpretation of 
the Internet address of the EU’s home page also correlates how the EU is producing 
synonymy between the Union and Europe. Böröcz acknowledges that the Internet address, 
http://europa.eu.int should be read as “int” (standing for “international organization”‘), “eu” 
(standing for the European Union) and the full name of the continent Europe, which is a 
different version of the Ancient Greek “europa”. Böröcz claims that such an identification is 
stressing that “being outside the “eu” and being part of “europa” is thus made logically 
impossible” (Böröcz, 2000:853, 2001b:65), stressing the synonymy between the EU and 
Europe. 
 
Referent 
European 
RR 
1998 
RR 
1999 
RR 
2000 
RR 
2001 
RR 
2002 
RR 
2003 
RR 
2004 
CMR 
2005 
CMR 
2006 
May 
CMR 
2006 
Septemb
er 
In relation 
to the EU 
40 53 78 95 112 119 127 61 17 30 
In relation 
to the 
Romanian 
enlargemen
t or the 
fifth 
enlargemen
t  
4 4 9 6 7 4 3 1 0 1 
In total 44 57 87 101 119 123 130 62 17 30 
Table 6. Instances of the word European as related to the EU and the Romanian enlargement (and the fifth 
enlargement).  
 
On a more empirical side, expressions in the Reports, such as “in line with European 
practices” (RR 2000:16), “the Romanian authorities are completely willing to fulfil the 
European norms” (RR 2000:53) or “changes to bring Romanian law in line with European 
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standards” (RR 2000:21), imply that everything European was related to the EU in the shape 
of European practices, norms, standards, etc., while Romania lacked such features. Such a 
use of vocabulary indicates to relations of synonymy. The aspect of synonymy was in 
particular supported by interviewee 4, who maintained that “the EU and Europe are 
synonyms”, while interviewee 1 argued that Europe is “sometimes” used as a synonym of the 
EU. In particular, interviewee 4 identified that the reasons for Romania’s application to the 
EU was “to return to Europe”, implying a correlation between the EU and Europe. 
Furthermore, Interviewee 7 pointed out that the member states of the EU are European and 
that this appears to be part of the “mindset of people, at least in the Commission in Brussels”. 
Although instances where absolute synonyms between the EU and European are not to be 
found in the Reports, the above examples highlight an aspect in which “relations of near 
synonymy” between the EU and European can be identified (see Fairclough, 2001:96).   
 
How were the relations of distance then being created? In most cases, the references to the 
term European were articulated in relation to something that Romania was missing, 
emphasizing its lack of European elements (see Tileaga, 2006:300). Examples such as 
“funding for RTD activities is low compared to many European countries” (RR 2001:75) or 
“the Romanian standardisation institution has continued its programme of transposing 
European standards” (RR 2002:56) are just two instances where Romania was declared 
incompatible with being European due to lack of certain features. Even if the first example 
does not directly suggest that Romania was not European, the comparison “to many European 
countries” expressed a “less” European position. The second example implies an explicit 
exclusion of Romania as not European, but on its way to become European due to the 
transposition of European standards. In both examples, such choices of words create relations 
of distance between Romania and the European as Romania is lacking “European elements”, 
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but also, as indicated previously, continues to shape relations of synonymy between European 
and the EU by exposing Romania as lacking such a feature.  
 
Additionally, the use of European in the Reports also seems to create relations of similarity. 
For instance, by including the word European as part of the term Central and Eastern 
European, this implicitly suggests that Romania is identified as both Central/Eastern and 
European. What this implies is a “double framing” of Romania (see Kuus, 2006:232). On the 
one hand, Romania is either Central or Eastern (as such a position is not clarified), but on the 
other hand Romania is also regarded as European. The combination of the terms seems to 
indicate that Romania is “not quite European, but in Europe” (Kuus, 2006:232). It can 
therefore be argued that such a vocabulary identified relations of similarity, in that both the 
EU and Romania could be recognized as European, but at the same time the vocabulary 
produced relations of distance, as Romania was identified as Central/Eastern, but the EU 
could not be Central or Eastern. As discussed in the Literature Review, this double framing 
has an interesting implication, as it suggests a remapping of how Romania was perceived and 
represented by the EU.  
 
A number of interviewees drew attention to the fact that the application of the word European 
produced a negative aspect of Romania. For instance, interviewee 10 highlighted that for 
Romania it was “one of the most shocking conclusions” that “Europe meant the European 
Union … We were shocked because we considered we are part of Europe”. Interviewee 10 
argued that although Romania had a different history, it was not less European than any of 
the EU member states. In the same vein, interviewees, 2, 5 and 8 drew attention to the fact 
that using the word European as a synonym of the EU was not accurate, as, in particular as 
interviewee 8 argued, “to me Romania has always been a European state”. Nevertheless, 
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interviewee 10 implied that in the end Europe will become a synonym of the EU, as the 
enlargement process has started a revival and a change of how such a term is used. 
Furthermore, interviewee 9 highlighted that there was a tendency amongst the Romanian 
negotiating team to mimic the EU in order to prove that Romania was willing to become 
European and to clearly show that the Romanians were Europeans. In contrast to the other 
interviewees, the statement of Interviewee 9 points to the fact that Romania was either in 
doubt of their European status or were aware of the fact that they were not considered 
European and thus needed to mimic the EU, which was regarded as European.  
 
5.5. Impact of formal vocabulary  
This section argues that as the Reports were part of a formal situation and thus the language 
applied demanded a level of formality, the choice of words in the Reports was constrained by 
formality, which in turn had constraining effects on the discourses of the Reports and on 
power relations. The below three sub-sections aim to identify how the formal vocabulary 
constrained what was said and done, the relations that were enacted and the positions that 
participants got in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:98 and 54-55).  
 
5.5.1. Constraints upon contents 
To start with, the below maintains that the formal vocabulary in the Reports constrained 
contents, which refers to what was said and done (Fairclough, 2001:39), by imposing a fixed 
structure of contents and topics, as well as a formal vocabulary, which impacted upon power 
relations.  
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First, one noticeable aspect is that every Report followed a fixed structure of contents, which 
was maintained throughout74, although the size of the contents became more complex and 
vast as the Romanian enlargement progressed. Each Report identified four chapters, viz. 1) 
introduction, 2) discussions on the political and economic criteria, 3) discussions of the 
acquis and 4) conclusions75 . Second, the topics, which were assessed within these four 
chapters, were constrained to only enlargement issues and mainly included the assessments of 
the EU regarding the Romanian enlargement.  It can be argued that it was the formality of the 
enlargement process and of the Reports that demanded a certain structure of contents and 
certain constraints on what topics could be included in the Reports. This was suggested by 
interviewee 1, who maintained that the Regular Reports were part of “a formal exercise”, 
which dictated a certain routine of presenting regular information. However, as the structure 
of the contents and topics were mainly decided by the EU, such findings argue that the EU 
was the powerful participant, which constrained what was said and done in the Reports and 
thus who had the power to enforce constraints on contents and access to discourse. In 
particular, interviewee 5 noted that, “ultimately the Reports were … done by the 
Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement”, underlining that untimely the EU (or more exactly 
the Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement) was the participant, who had the power to 
constrain what was said and done in the Reports. This has implications for our understanding 
of unequal power relations, as it demonstrates how by constraining the Romanian access to 
discourse (by deciding what content structure and topics were to be included), the EU 
maintained power behind discourse, while Romania was excluded. This however raises 
implications for the production dimension, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
                                                          
74 The 1998 Regular Report has a somewhat different structure since it was the first Report.  
75 The Regular Reports also included a section on the Accession Partnership and National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis: Global assessment, which was not part of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. 
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Third, due to the formal nature of the enlargement process, there was a certain expectation to 
apply a formal and appropriate vocabulary in the Reports. This is referred to as “a heightened 
self-consciousness” of applying the “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in formal situations 
(2001:55 and 98). For instance, looking at the vocabulary of the Reports, it can be argued that 
the formal vocabulary can be divided into four categories, which are identified in Table 7. 
The first category, the general EU vocabulary, includes words that are broadly used in EU 
related matters, such as alignment, harmonisation, institutional capacity, provision, etc. The 
second category, the unique EU vocabulary, includes words that are unique to the EU, for 
instance acquis communaitaire, euro, Eurobaromer, Copenhagen criteria, Directorates-
General, etc. The third category, the fifth enlargement vocabulary, contains words that are 
applied largely to the fifth enlargement. Here we include words such as conditionality, 
leverage, twinning, Regular Reports, Action Plans, etc. A fourth category, the Romanian 
enlargement vocabulary, included vocabulary related to the Romanian enlargement, such as 
To do list, TAROM, judets, etc.  
 
Category Examples  Application 
General EU 
vocabulary 
alignment, harmonisation, 
institutional capacity, free 
movement of people, benchmarking 
Applied generally in any discourse related to 
EU enlargement.  
Unique EU 
vocabulary 
acquis communaitaire, euro and its 
sign €, Eurobarometer, 
Directorates-General, accession 
criteria, Copenhagen criteria 
Unique to EU language and often used in the 
enlargement discourses.  
Fifth enlargement 
vocabulary 
conditionality, twinning, Regular 
Report, Action Plan,  bench 
marking, safeguard clause 
Applied to the fifth enlargement. 
Romanian 
enlargement 
vocabulary 
To do list, TAROM, Traian 
Băsescu, judets 
Unique to the Romanian enlargement. 
Table 7. Formal vocabulary of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. 
 
 Page | 152  
 
The findings reported in Table 7 suggest that the Romanian enlargement demanded the use of 
a formal vocabulary, as an alternative to an informal vocabulary. However, each of the four 
categories limited the relations that were shaped, as they constrained access to a larger and 
informal vocabulary in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:56). More importantly, an aspect, 
which indicates to the correlation between unequal power relations and the formal 
vocabulary, is the fact that the Reports can be understood as including a “one-way flow of 
knowledge” (Billig, 2008:786). This relates to the argument that the above formal vocabulary 
was produced by the EU and thus recognizes a one-way flow of knowledge. Additionally, 
Chapter 7 will discuss further the implications of the “one-way flow of knowledge” upon the 
process of production. Furthermore, this allowed the EU to have access and to constrain 
access to discourse, as Romania was not participating in the production of such a vocabulary, 
while at the same time ensured that only EU vocabularies (as in Table 7) were distributed, 
through the dissemination of the Reports to readers (see Billig, 2008:786). In this way, 
formality enabled the EU to distribute their ideologies and representations about the 
Romanian enlargement, while excluding the voices of the Romanian negotiating team.  
 
The formal vocabulary of the Reports can also be related to the interviewees’ statements. For 
instance when asked about the style of formality used in the Reports, interviewee 9 stated that 
the EU used a typical diplomatic and political style of language, which the interviewee 
regarded as “classical” for the situation. The interviewee suggested that in particular after the 
Treaty of Accession was signed in 2005, the “tone” of the EU language changed. 
Furthermore, interviewees 2 and 5 highlighted that the language of the Reports “was in pretty 
coded language” (quote taken from interviewee 5). In particular, interviewee 5 underlined 
that such a coded language “was to ensure there was consistent language” and not to frighten 
any applicant “by saying that Romania or indeed any other country - was a complete 
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disaster”. Additionally, interviewee 3 maintained that although the Reports were built upon 
“coded language”, there was no manual to clarify what words meant (“this you cannot find”), 
which suggested that there was no clarity in how the EU as the powerful participants held 
power behind discourse. Interviewee 2 also implied that the coded language was to mainly be 
found “in the assessment part” of each Report (this refers to the sections in each Report, 
which are known as overall assessment), although without reflecting over the implications of 
coded language upon power relations. The above discussion of the style and tone of language 
(interviewee 9) and coded language (interviewees 2, 3 and 5) can be related to the 
“heightened self-consciousness” described above, as the producer/s of the Reports had to 
maintain a certain level of “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in such formal situations. The 
question however is in which way such an aspect of vocabulary produced unequal power 
relations.  
 
5.5.2. Constraints upon relations 
In light of the argument that the formal vocabulary of the Reports had a constraining impact 
on discourses and production of unequal power relations, the below paragraphs maintain that 
the formal vocabulary constrained relations, which refer to the relations that participants 
entered into in discourse (Fairclough, 2001:39), in two different ways: through the use of an 
austere and monotone tone (see Böröcz, 2000:857) and politeness in discourse (see 
Fairclough, 2001:55 and 98).  
 
First, the language of the Reports presented the Romanian enlargement in an austere and 
monotone tone. Such an aspect has also been noted by Böröcz, who argues that the EU’s 
reports were written in a “cold, impersonal, official kind of style” (2000:857). Such a tone, 
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which is related to the formality of the enlargement process, can for instance be identified in 
the below paragraph: 
 
“Romania shows a strong commitment to apply fully the State aid rules as 
regards the steel industry. Nevertheless, Romania must continue to ensure the 
correct implementation of the National Restructuring Programme. It must 
maintain further efforts as regards the recovery of restructuring aid granted to 
steel companies outside the National Restructuring Programme. The 
Commission will continue to monitor the steps undertaken in this respect.” 
(CMR 2005:90) 
 
The above paragraph highlights that the austere and monotone tone or what Böröcz described 
as “cold, impersonal, official kind of style” is enabled by a vocabulary, in which the tone can 
be identified through concise, short sentences, impersonal vocabulary, addressivity in the 
third person and most importantly through a clear understanding of where the EU and 
Romania stood in relations to one another (Romania “to maintain further efforts and to 
continue to ensure” and the EU “to monitor the steps” taken by the first). Furthermore, the 
relations between the EU and Romania are also produced through vocabulary, by for instance 
suggesting who each participate is in the Romanian enlargement: Romania, as in need to 
commit to accession demands (“strong commitment”, “must continue”, “further efforts”) and 
the EU as a monitoring entity (“will continue to monitor the steps”). In other words, the EU 
controlled what relations were shaped in the Reports by producing a “cold, impersonal, 
official” tone, enabled by the formality of the Reports and the enlargement process.    
 
Even in instances when the accession of Romania was inevitable, such as the September 2006 
Comprehensive Monitoring Report and when a change in Romania’s position was 
unavoidable, the tone of the Reports maintained the same format as mentioned previously, as 
the paragraph below demonstrates:  
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“Overall, Bulgaria and Romania have made far-reaching efforts to adapt their 
legislation and administration to the laws and rules of the European Union. 
This has largely brought them into line with prevailing standards and practices 
within the European Union. Sustained support from the European Union will 
be available for addressing the remaining issues. Sufficient guarantees exist in 
the acquis and the Accession Treaty to ensure the proper functioning of EU 
policies and institutions. As a result of the progress made, Bulgaria and 
Romania will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations of EU 
membership on 1 January 2007. The Commission looks forward to welcoming 
Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the European Union on 
this date” (CMR 2006b:13).  
 
 
The above is not much different from the previous example. Here we identify a paragraph 
that includes limited information, is restrained in using individualized references (e.g. names 
of individuals) and uses a restricted, formal vocabulary. Such an example provides empirical 
support that the tone of the vocabulary not only maintained a level of formality, but also 
indicated what relations were shaped: the EU as a supporting entity (“will be available for 
addressing remaining issues”) and as a gatekeeper to membership (“looks forward to 
welcoming”), while Romania was described as a successful tutee (“made far-reaching 
efforts”, “brought them into line with prevailing standards and practices within the European 
Union”), but not equal to the EU (“sufficient guarantees exist in the acquis and the Accession 
Treaty”).  
 
Second, another noticeable feature through which the formality of the Reports constrained 
relations in the Romanian enlargement was through the use of politeness, an aspect also 
highlighted by Böröcz, who argues that the EU maintained a level of respect in the 
enlargement documents by including a “professional jargon” (2000:867). As mentioned 
previously, politeness is a way of marking the position, status, power and social distance of 
participants. For instance politeness can be identified in the “consistent selection of ‘formal’ 
words” (Fairclough, 2001:56), such as using titles as President of Romania, instead of direct 
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names (RR 2002:28; CMR 2005). It can be argued that in a less formal situation, formality 
would have been replaced by a more casual vocabulary. It may be suggested that the EU 
chose to include a polite vocabulary, as a way to show respect to the respective status of the 
EU and Romania (see Fairclough, 2001:55 and 106). Although the above may be seen as 
conventional or standard practice in formal situations, it is the implications of the application 
of formality upon relations that is of importance here.  
 
It should be noted that in a few situations, some of the Romanian words were misspelled. One 
such example is the name of the then Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, but 
which in the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report is spelt as Călin Pospescu Tăriceanu 
(CMR 2005:7). Although this may be regarded as a minor vocabulary spelling mistake, we 
can question as to whether such a mistake was not identified because it was a foreign name, 
which the producer/s of the Report was/were not familiar with. Such an aspect has been 
raised by Böröcz, who addresses the EU’s mistakes in enlargement documents (2000:861). 
Although such mistakes may be regarded as “tiny”, Böröcz argues that this is not the case, 
but it only proves that the document and the candidate country in question did not receive the 
right amount of professional attention from the EU (2000:861). The implications indicate two 
issues. First, this may suggest that Romanian words may have created an image of 
foreignness, which impacted upon its correct spelling (see Alexandru, 2012:6). It can 
therefore be argued that the name Călin Popescu Tăriceanu may have possessed an exotic 
nature, which caused problems for “the EU’s word processing software” (Böröcz, 2000:860). 
This raises questions of whether such a misspelling was a case of producing “aliennes” 
(Böröcz, 2000:860). Second, the misspelling of especially an official’s name of the Romanian 
government questions how politeness was maintained in the Reports. Would the producer/s 
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of the Report allowed a similar mistake of the name of an EU official or would a misspelling 
been identified before distributing the Report?   
 
It should be noted that as the Reports amplified in size as the Romanian enlargement 
progressed, the constraints on relations also expanded. For example, the 1998 Regular Report 
includes 59 pages, while the last 2004 Report scaled to 163 pages. In contrast, due to their 
decreased size, the formality of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports was restricted. It can 
therefore be argued that the EU exudes fewer constraints upon relations in the Romanian 
enlargement during the later stages of enlargement (see Fairclough, 2001:55). The size of the 
Reports was also highlighted by interviewee 1, who implied that previous enlargements were 
“smaller” and “simpler” because the acquis was reduced, but in the case of the fifth 
enlargement, the acquis was much “bigger” and thus the reporting became more complex. 
Interviewee 3 also supported such a statement by arguing that “we have the acquis more 
developed so we have more questions”, indicating that the fifth enlargement did encounter an 
increased level of the acquis.  
 
5.5.3. Constraints upon positions 
In this section it is argued that the formal vocabulary of the Reports constrained positions, 
which refers to the positions that participants can take in discourse (Fairclough, 2001:39), in 
two different ways: through translations and the choice of a vocabulary, which rigorously 
defined positions, impacting upon the production of power relations.  
 
First, translations may be regarded as a way, which constrains positions. Postcolonial 
scholars claim that using foreign words in discourse creates an appearance of exoticism and 
foreignness, but by translating foreign words into a familiar language, the distance between 
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the foreign and the familiar becomes less obvious (Böröcz, 2000:860). In contrast, M.-S.D. 
Alexandru maintains that the use of foreign words is a way of bringing in “the feeling of a 
certain level of untranslatable authenticity that makes the English text all the more successful 
in communicating its meaning to an audience unfamiliar with Romanian realities” (2012:6), 
thus creating distance. For instance, in the Reports there were a few instances when 
Romanian words were not translated, but used in the Romanian language, such as Banca 
Agricolă (The Agricultural Bank) (RR 2001:34). In other circumstances, abbreviations 
adapted from Romanian were used, but the full spelling of the abbreviations were translated 
into the language of the Report (in this case English). For instance, one Report mentioned the 
PNL, which is the Romanian abbreviation of Partidul Naţional Liberal, followed in brackets 
by the English translation, National Liberal Party (CMR 2005:7).  
 
The use of translations in the Reports can be related to interviewee 2:  
 
“The internal conditions of drafting and also because drafting documents in 
different languages is a very difficult exercise. And we were aware that that 
what we wrote would be under scrutiny in the European institutions. We had 
three different audiences, the European institutions, the member states and the 
candidate countries. So it is rather difficult to have one single wording for 
three so different audiences. You know so, and everything was then translated 
into this curious global English and sometimes there was one wording and 
behind the word there was something else”.  
 
In other words, interviewee 2 seems to suggest that because of the different audiences of the 
Reports, the EU needed to find appropriate mechanisms to satisfy these audiences, but it was 
a rather difficult exercise to identify “one single wording for three so different audiences”. 
This may suggest that for instance translations were applied in order to acknowledge the 
presence of such varied audiences, but at the same time it raises questions of the extent to 
which such mechanisms constrained positions.  
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Additionally, the Reports also included instances of what can be identified as fusion words. 
These are not direct translations, but relate to words that were created by combining 
Romanian and English languages. Such an example is the word judets (RR 2001:80, RR 
2002:29), which pronunciation reminds of the Romanian word judeţ76, but the spelling is not 
the Romanian one (as in judeţ). Thus, instead of using the Romanian letter ţ, the producer/s of 
the Report has/have combined the letters t and s, which phonetically are pronounced similarly 
to the letter ţ. So, what we identify in this example is a fusion between Romanian and 
English, which facilitated the pronunciation of the word judeţ. However this example raises 
questions of the extent to which such a spelling constrained the positions of participants in 
and behind discourse. What this relates to is Böröcz’s argument that by replacing unfamiliar 
letters or words with something more familiar (at least what most Europeans may find 
familiar) may be a sign of “alienness”. Böröcz identifies that such an act is actually not 
addressing the candidate country, as by omitting linguistic aspects, which are distinctive for 
the candidate, not only shows lack of respect, but it may also indicate that the producer/s of 
the Reports is/are not actually familiar with the candidate and feel distant. Looking at the 
above example, it can be argued that the EU does not seem to directly address Romania, by 
for instance incorporating “exotic” Romanian characters (see Böröcz, 2000:860). Omitting 
the correct spelling can be seen as a sign of erasing Romania or at least the importance of 
Romania from discourse (see Böröcz, 2000:862). It can therefore be argued that this is a 
subtle structure of addressivity, which identifies the Romanian position as not important. As 
long as the EU is able to convey the pronunciation of a “foreign” word through a vocabulary, 
which is familiar to everyone (who the EU believes is familiar to everyone), seems to suggest 
that the EU is actually not speaking to Romania, but about Romania (see Böröcz, 2000:860).  
                                                          
76 Judeţ means a larger county within Romania (in total there are 41). Judeţ is the singurlar form; judeţe is the 
plural form. 
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Second, another example in which formality was defining positions in the Reports is through 
the use of a vocabulary, which rigorously shaped positions. For instance, the below statement 
indicates such an example:  
 
“Romania will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations of EU 
membership on 1 January 2007. The EU looks forward to welcoming Bulgaria 
and Romania as fully-fledged members of the European Union on this date” 
(CMR 2006b:13). 
 
The above paragraph clearly indicates the position of the EU as the actor, which was to 
welcome Romania and of Romania as not yet a member, but on the way. It should be noted 
that the statement also suggests that Romania was “to take on the rights and obligations of 
EU membership”, which indicates to an aspect of transfer of EU knowledge. What is 
important to note in the above example is that the vocabulary used formulated sentences in 
which the positions of the EU and Romania were rigorously identified, as there is no doubt of 
what positions the two participants occupy. Using such a vocabulary aims to erase confusion 
about the positions of the EU and Romania in the Romanian enlargement. As it will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, the constraint upon positions in the Reports is also enacted through 
different grammatical formulations of verbs.  
 
5.6. Negative and positive vocabulary 
This section argues that the choice of vocabulary in the Reports produced unequal power 
relations by contributing negative and positive representations of participants in the 
Romanian enlargement. First, the negative vocabulary is produced by the use of words such 
as “no substantial progress”, “no progress can be reported”, “a considerable challenge”, 
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“marginal improvements”, “a cause of concern” and “considerable progress is necessary”77, 
which produced negative representations of the Romania enlargement (see Fairclough, 
2001:98), by creating the image of an inadequate candidate. This can largely be related to the 
image of laggardness that has been discussed in the previous chapters.  
 
A second way of identifying the negative vocabulary of the Reports is through direct 
references to what Romania had failed in complying with when it comes to the acquis. 
Examples such as “rules incompatible with … the acquis”, “no progress concerning 
alignment with the acquis”, “a move away from the acquis” and “remains incompatible with 
the acquis”78 permeated negative representations of the Romanian enlargement and further 
consolidated the image of laggardness.  
 
A third way where the negative vocabulary can be identified is through the use of the fifth 
enlargement vocabulary (see Table 7), as some words of this category produced negative 
representations. For instance, the word benchmarking prompted a negative representation of 
the Romanian enlargement. Even though the word itself does not entail any negativity, it is 
the association that people make to benchmarking in the context of EU enlargement that 
prompts a negative connotation. As for instance the September 2006 Comprehensive 
Monitoring Report reported (CMR 2006b:10), benchmarking was an EU mechanism, which 
required the EU to continue monitoring Romania post-accession. Such an unprecedented 
mechanism had been included due to the EU’s hesitation and negative assessments of the 
Romanian enlargement (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:14). Benchmarking was therefore 
not a mechanism, which was associated with a positive evaluation of Romania. Such a choice 
of words implied not only production of negative representations and relations of difference 
                                                          
77 These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports.  
78 These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports. 
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between the EU and Romania, but also between Romania and the applicants of other rounds 
of enlargement. As we remember from the previous chapter, the benchmarks and safeguard 
clauses included in the Romanian enlargement were unprecedented and of a “stringent” 
nature as a result of the EU’s position of Romania as a laggard.  
 
This aspect can also be related to interviewee 5, who referred to the safeguard clause in the 
Accession Treaty as “a suitable “instrument of torture””79, showing a correlation that words 
such as benchmarking and safeguard clause did not have a positive connotation. It can 
therefore be implied that readers of the Reports were prompted to relate benchmarking and 
the Romanian enlargement with unsatisfactory progress, concerns and shortcomings and 
create a negative image. Nevertheless, interviewee 7 highlighted that although such 
unprecedented measures (such as benchmarking) were only applied to a few candidates and 
in Romania’s case, were located in a “different position”, interviewee 7 saw this as a “good 
exercise for the Romanians themselves to make the necessary corrections”. However, such a 
statement of “necessary corrections” indicates that Romania was evaluated negatively and 
thus any unprecedented demands were identified as a way to rectify Romania’s shortcomings.  
 
On a different note, interviewee 5 seemed to suggest that the negative evaluations of 
Romania depended to a large extent on the producers of the Reports. For instance, 
interviewee 5 compared the differences between the Romanian and the Bulgarian 
rapporteurs’ style of reporting, where the first was “heavily involved” with Romania’s 
shortcomings, while the latter was “much less rigorous in his assessment” of Bulgaria. In 
other words, as the Romanian enlargement had “a more rigorous monitoring by the EU 
institutions than did Bulgaria”, it affected production of negative representations of the 
                                                          
79 Interviewee 5 mentioned that this term was “one of my colleagues”. 
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Romanian enlargement. This finding can also be related to the discussion in Chapter 4, where 
it was outlined that the European Parliament’s rapporteurs were highly engaged in the 
Romanian enlargement through a different monitoring mechanisms. In turn, this impacted 
upon the Reports, enlargement process and accession negotiations and thus influenced the 
production of power relations.  
 
Within the Reports we also identify EU evaluations in which positive values were related to 
the Romanian enlargement. This includes examples such as “progress has also been made”, 
“has allowed initial steps”, “progress towards compatibility with the acquis” and “further 
steps forward continue to be made”80. In contrast to the negative vocabulary, here we identify 
indications of satisfactory progress, implicitly referring to positive values in the Romanian 
enlargement. This positive vocabulary is significant, as it is counterbalancing the negative 
vocabulary, by suggesting Romania was “doing … certain things” (Fairclough, 2001:31), viz. 
being able to fulfil the membership requirements, which were required for a successful EU 
accession.  
 
5.7. Visual aids 
In this section it is demonstrated that the choice of visual aids (see Fairclough, 2001:41) in 
the Reports produced unequal power relations, by controlling the ways in which participants 
in the Romanian enlargement were represented. Such a control was identified in the use of 
two distinctive forms of visual aids: bold style and repetitions.  
 
First, bold written words were often used in the Reports, such as the following examples: 
“the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services”, “financial services”, 
                                                          
80 These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports. 
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and “information society directives” (RR 2001:47-48). Typing these words in bold grabbed 
the attention of readers and prompted an understanding that these areas are of importance to 
the EU’s evaluation of the Romanian enlargement. It can therefore be argued that the EU 
used this visual aid as a way of controlling what aspects were identified as important and 
included, but also controlling what aspects were excluded in the Reports (see Fairclough, 
2001:42). However, the implication of such visual aids is the extent to which they impact 
upon how interpreters will interpret the Romanian enlargement.  
 
Second, repetition of words is another distinctive aspect, which can be identified as a form of 
visual aid. In particular words such as “challenge”, “instability”, “corruption”, “undermine” 
and “no improvements” were often used to describe the Romanian enlargement progress 
within the Reports and were repeated in each section of the Report. The importance of the 
consistent repetition of specific words in the EU’s evaluation of candidate countries is also 
emphasized by Raik, who claims that the first wave of enlargement was centrally governed 
by “the keywords of inevitability, speed, efficiency, and expertise”, alongside secondary but 
equally important “objectivity, conditionality, and competition”. Raik stresses that these 
keywords “came up time and again in the official documents throughout the enlargement 
process, constituting the core of the official discourse of enlargement/integration” 
(2004:574). Furthermore, Phinnemore also pays attention to “subtle and at times significant 
shifts … in the language and rhetoric of the EU” (2006c:15), but which impacted upon the 
enlargement process. Phinnemore suggests that in the newer round of accession negotiations 
with the south-eastern candidates, the EU is avoiding “the explicit use of the words 
“‘membership’”, “becoming ‘members’” or referring “to ‘accession’ in a way reminiscent of 
the Copenhagen commitment to the CEE countries and subsequent statements”. The preferred 
vocabulary includes expressions such as “‘its determination to continue the process it has 
 Page | 165  
 
engaged with the candidate countries, thus contributing to Europe’s prosperity, stability, 
security and unity’”, which implies “a weaker commitment to south-eastern enlargement 
compared to eastern enlargement” (2006c:13; see also Phinnemore, 2005). Phinnemore also 
draws attention to the Commission’s “failure” in One Europe in not referring to “any of the 
countries of the Western Balkans”, advocating that a lack of such wording mirrored the 
Commission’s “declining enthusiasm”, “less intense commitment” and “reluctance to make 
promises to” further enlargement (Phinnemore, 2006c:15; see also Phinnemore, 2005). 
 
To exemplify Raik’s argument, let us look at one of the most repeated words in the Romanian 
Reports, the word corruption. As it was discussed in Chapter 4, corruption was perceived as 
one of the long lasting key challenges of the Romanian enlargement and a major concern to 
the EU throughout the accession negotiations (as well as post-accession). Although such a 
practice posed warning signs of the deficiency of Romania regarding anti-corruption policies 
and membership conditions (Noutcheve and Becheb, 2008; Gateva 2014), the choice of this 
particular visual aid (repetition) in the Reports controlled the way in which participants were 
represented and which impacted upon power relations.   
 
The word corruption appears very early in the text of every Report (first in the contents 
page), indicating that an early introduction suggests that corruption was a significant matter 
in the EU’s assessment of Romania. Each Report included further evaluations of corruption, 
by detailing for instance negative consequences of corruption upon other enlargement issues, 
which were important for the enlargement process and the successful accession of Romania. 
Such issues included the legal system, the economy and public confidence in government” 
(p.21), civil and political rights (p.26), market economy (p.37), taxation (p.62), small and 
medium-sized enterprises (p.74), Justice and home affairs (p.84) and customs (p.90) (all these 
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examples are to be found in RR 2001). It is worth noting that even when Romania’s status 
changed in 2005, the repetition of the need to address corruption did not decrease. For 
instance, in the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report the word corruption 
appears 68 instances in a document with 52 pages81. The May 2006 Report included 48 
instances and the October 2005 Report included 74 instances. Interviewee 8, who had been 
highly involved with the Romanian enlargement process early on and had had close 
encounters with corruption as a problem in Romania, was very clear that this was a genuine 
problem, which needed to be handled, as the below suggests:  
 
“Other aspects which drew negative criticism were connected with organised 
crime and seemingly endemic corruption. These criticisms were valid ones, 
and the issues therefore needed to be addressed”. 
 
Although, as also discussed in Chapter 4, corruption was a central problem in Romania, we 
cannot deny that the implication of the repetition of the word corruption is that the EU instills 
a negative representation of the Romanian enlargement, by positioning Romania as a 
corrupted candidate. Corruption was also one of the main aspects, which a large number of 
interviewees (2, 3, 4, 5 and 7) mentioned as producing a negative evaluation of the Romanian 
enlargement, in particular interviewee 8, who called corruption “endemic”. Furthermore, 
interviewee 4 argued that although the Romanian government was reluctant, they did realize 
in the end that corruption was a “major problem” and should be dealt with. However, 
interviewee 7 maintained that corruption was not only a problem of the Romanian 
enlargement, but that the EU actually prompted corruption: 
 
“for corruption you need two persons. The one that corrupt and the one that is 
corrupted and I think that the western Europeans despite the fact that they 
                                                          
81 This document also includes assessments of Bulgaria and thus the Report sometimes does not clarify if the 
assessments refer to Romania or Bulgaria. 
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complain a lot about corruption, they were one of the main factor of 
corruption. Because they came, Romania was very poor, poor people, badly 
paid people and stubborn sometimes and hesitant people and not working with 
very clear rules and then the Western European discovered that there is a way 
out, which is much easier, corrupt and this was working. So I think it was here 
a bit of hypocrisy. Ah, you are corrupted, you are very corrupt people. But 
then I follow this method …”.  
 
Interviewee 7 seems to suggest that although corruption might have existed in Romania prior 
to its EU membership application, corruption also seems to have been triggered by the EU. 
Interviewee 7 also suggests that as the EU had a more powerful position than Romania in the 
enlargement process, the EU also seemed to have taken advantage of corruption as a way to 
perhaps facilitate their own interests, though the interviewee was not clear about what these 
interests might have been.  
 
5.8. Establishing a postcolonial relationship  
 
This section argues that although the choice of vocabulary discussed above may have been 
automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot neglect the fact that these choices may also 
have been ideological. Thus vocabulary may be identified as a place in which unequal power 
relations were produced, exercised and enacted. The below three sub-sections present 
therefore a discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of 
unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and set out how 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
 
5.8.1. Subalternity  
This sub-section argues that the choice of vocabulary reveals aspects of subalternity, 
muteness, instruments of subjugation and ventriloquized voice, which produces unequal 
power relations.  
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First, formality can be identified as an instrument of subjugation, as it facilitated the EU’s 
power behind discourse and rendered Romania mute. The analysis indicated that formality 
constrained three aspects of discourse: what was said and done (contents) and what relations 
and positions were enacted in discourse. These constraints have implications on the 
production of unequal power relations because it implies that the EU was the main producer 
of the Reports and had control over discourse, while Romania was in a subaltern position and 
its voice was excluded. Significantly, it can be argued that the aspect of formality of the 
Reports allowed the EU to produce a so called “one-way flow of knowledge”, which referred 
to the fact that the EU had sole power to control and constrain the discourses of the Reports, 
as well as distribute such a knowledge, but Romania was rendered mute.  
 
Second, as the EU had the sole power to control and constrain discourses, it can be argued 
that the EU ventriloquized the voice of Romania. This has important significance for the 
production of unequal power relations. In particular the use of negative and positive 
vocabulary can be identified as an instrument of subjugation, through which the EU 
ventriloquized the Romanian voice, as the EU spoke on behalf of Romania by producing 
representations of the Romanian enlargement, while Romania’s voice was not heard. Instead 
the Romanian enlargement was known, represented, and spoken for by the EU, which 
strongly indicates a case of the Romanian voice being ventriloquized. Thus, by remaining 
mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, Romania was positioned as a subaltern and was 
subjected to a marginalized position, which produced inequality in power relations between 
the subaltern (Romania) and the elite (the EU).  
 
Third, visual aids can also be regarded as another form through which vocabulary produced 
subalternity. It was suggested that the Reports included a number of bold written words and 
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repetition of words, which aimed to prompt an emphasis of what the EU found as important 
in the Romanian enlargement. Thus, as the EU had control to include and exclude what 
words were written in bold or were repeated, this rendered Romania mute as the EU’s voice 
articulated what the Romanian enlargement was about. We can identify that visual aids were 
used as instruments of subjugation and that by remaining mute, Romania was subjected to a 
marginalized position, which indicated unequal relations of power to the EU. 
 
Fourth, this leads to the question of whether the subaltern can be heard or whether the 
subaltern will remain mute and be spoken for by the elite? In contrast to Spivak, who 
concluded that the subaltern has “no history” and thus “cannot speak” (2006:32), but will 
remain mute, the above findings suggest that this does not have to be the case. For instance, 
the Romanian voice was heard through the use of words, which were not translated and 
fusion words. However, as the EU had the control of what was included and excluded, this 
questions the extent to which the Romanian voice, as it was controlled and constrained by the 
EU.  
 
Fifth, by including the interviewees’ perspectives on the Romanian enlargement, such 
material allows a bottom-up approach, which enables “to recover alternative ways of 
knowing and understanding” (Sharp op.cit., p.5). This is in particular achieved by including 
the voices of Romanian respondents, as part of the subaltern group, but also the inclusion of 
the non-elite interviewees, which in the enlargement process has less visibility than the elite 
ones. The interview material has therefore significant implications, as it allows new 
knowledge, representations, voices, etc. to be heard and listened to. In contrast to the 
understanding that the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, but will remain mute, the 
interviewees are facilitating Romania to write back into history and be heard.  
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Overall, the above findings are significant because they demonstrate that examining the EU 
and unequal power relations through the perspective of subalternity enables scholars to 
conceptualize new postcolonial experiences in the EU. In particular, since the existing 
literature has developed largely without references to this notion, subalternity becomes a 
paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the 
present and in expanding the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations.  
 
5.8.2. Orientalist discourse  
The central issue to be examined in this sub-section is the argument that the choice of 
vocabulary in the Reports identifies aspects of orientalist discourse, which produces unequal 
power relations.  
 
First, the findings suggest that the choice of vocabulary produced binary representations, 
which consisted of particular modes of creating alterity in the Romanian enlargement. For 
instance, the words Eastern and European worked as silent referents (Robinson, 2003:275) in 
producing unequal power relations, as they prompted alterity by indicating that Romania was 
Eastern and the EU European. Alterity was produced as the use of terms Eastern and 
European can be regarded as a continuum between the representations of an inferior non-
European Other and the superior Europeans (Asher, 2005:136). This suggests that the words 
European and Eastern are significant for an understanding of how unequal power relations 
were produced through binary representations in the Reports, as such binary representations 
created knowledge about the Romanian enlargement. The significant aspect of the terms 
Eastern and European is the fact that these binary representations created a certain 
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knowledge, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of the familiar (EU, European) and 
the strange (Romania, Eastern), which created alterity between the EU and Romania.  
 
In particular the interviewees presented two contrasting opinions. Although the first group of 
interviewees did not reflect over it, their negativity against the word Eastern as creating 
relations of distance can be related to the understanding that Eastern was used as an 
Orientalizing tool by the EU in order to represent Romania as inferior. It should perhaps be 
highlighted that the interviewees, who were against the term, belonged to either the 
Romanian negotiating team or the EU team, but who had been based or spent long periods in 
Romania. For instance, interviewee 5 maintained that “at the end of the process I obviously 
had more understanding” (for Romania). Perhaps the closeness to the Romanian society and 
thus the closer relations that were shaped prompted an understanding that the way Eastern 
was applied by the EU was not compatible with Romania or as interviewee 10 argued, that 
Romania “was not part of East”. On the other hand, the second group of interviewees did not 
show any concerns about the use of Eastern. This may indicate to the word’s commonsensical 
nature, on which people drew, but without being conscious of hidden ideologies and how 
these can impact upon power relations.  
 
Second, another form of vocabulary, which created binary representations, was through the 
use of negative and positive vocabulary. The findings supports the argument presented that 
the negative vocabulary in the Reports produced binary representations, as it related Romania 
to things that “it was … not doing” (Fairclough, 2001:31). In contrast, the positive 
vocabulary was highlighting things that Romania was doing and so counterbalanced the 
negative vocabulary. At the same time, the fifth enlargement vocabulary also implied a 
negative evaluation, as words such as benchmarking or safeguard clause prompted 
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correlations between negative representations and the Romanian enlargement. In particular, 
the negative vocabulary played a central role in producing an orientalist discourse, as such a 
vocabulary implied the production of a “register of particular perceptions, vocabularies and 
modes of representation” (Young op.cit., p.387) of the Romanian enlargement. The 
implication of binary representations upon unequal power relations took place through the 
knowledge created, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of the familiar (EU, positive) 
and the strange (Romania, negative).  
 
Third, visual aids can also be regarded as another form through which vocabulary produced 
binary representations, which impacted upon power relations. It was suggested that the 
Reports included a number of repetition of words, which aimed to prompt an emphasis of 
what the EU found important in the Romanian enlargement. The EU had the power to create 
the image of Romania as a corrupt candidate country, which was perpetuated particularly 
through repetitions of words. However, relating to interviewee 7, who suggested that the EU 
encouraged corruption to a certain extent, this questions the extent to which the EU produced 
imaginative truths about the Romanian enlargement (see Sharp, 2009:12). The implication of 
binary representations upon unequal power relations takes place through the knowledge that 
the EU created through the use of visual aids, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of 
the negative (Romania, corrupted) and the positive (the EU, which was telling Romania how 
to handle corruption). As mentioned previously, Chapter 4 revealed that corruption was 
identified as a problem that Romania needed to deal with before accessing the EU. The 
analysis however does not question such an argument, but aims to reveal how visual aids can 
be employed as another instrument through which vocabulary produces binary representation 
and thus unequal relations.  
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From a postcolonial perspective the above findings are vital to our understanding of power 
relations, as their analysis demonstrates that examining the EU and unequal power relations 
through the aspect of orientalism enables scholars to conceptualize the production of binary 
representations and how such representations produce unequal power relations. Although 
existing literature has discussed orientalist discourses in EU enlargement, this study expands 
our understanding further.   
 
5.8.3. Mimicry. 
This sub-section argues that the implication of the above findings on the research questions is 
that the choice of vocabulary identifies aspects of mimicry, which produces unequal power 
relations.  
 
First, one particular example, which may relate to mimicry is the changing status of Romania 
during the enlargement process. This relates to the fact that for instance the omission of 
referring to Romania as Eastern or Central and Eastern European after the Treaty of 
Accession was signed may reflect to the fact that as Romania was approaching its accession 
date, it also became “entirely knowable and visible” to the EU and so more familiar and 
perhaps even similar to the EU. Even instances when interviewees revealed that working 
close to Romania made one understand it better, can also be indications of how Romania 
became knowable and visible.  
 
However, findings also seem to identify a double characteristic of ambivalence as Romania 
came closer to accession, as Romania seems to have become “a subject of a difference that is 
almost the same, but not quite”. For instance, when discussing constraints upon relations, the 
findings demonstrate that the Reports maintained the same monotone and austere tone 
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throughout the enlargement process and which maintained distant relations between the EU 
and Romania, even when Romania was about to become a member state. Here we can 
perhaps identify that although Romania was very close to accession, the EU identified 
Romania as almost the same, but not quite like the EU. Romania might have become similar 
or familiar, but it was still an Other of the EU.  
 
Second, one particular interviewee raised the issue of mimicry when stating that there was a 
tendency of the Romanian negotiating team to mimic the EU in order to prove that Romania 
was European. Such an act resembles a practice through which Romania, just like the mimic 
man, becomes “entirely knowable and visible” by mimicking the traits of the EU. The 
question remains of the extent to which the EU felt threatened by Romania becoming similar 
to the EU. Perhaps the inclusion of unprecedented measures, such as benchmarking, was a 
method through which the EU “experienced” that as a future EU member state, Romania was 
“both resemble and menace at once”. Especially in statements in the Reports, which indicated 
that Romania was to transfer EU knowledge in order to take on the rights and obligations of 
EU membership, this questions the extent to which the EU regarded Romania as “almost total 
but not quite”.  
 
Third, the main question is the extent to which Romania’s mimicry can be understood as a 
strategy of power, as Romania became “both similar to and the other of” the EU. Overall, the 
enlargement process was an act through which the EU shared its knowledge with Romania 
and thus the expectation was for the latter to become as similar as possible to the EU. Such an 
act reflects that the EU had a powerful position in the enlargement, while Romania was 
marginalized and thus the encounter was unequal. At the same time, we should not forget that 
by actually accumulating EU knowledge and mimicking the EU, Romania gained power of 
 Page | 175  
 
knowledge and thus could challenge the EU. In other words, the power relations between the 
EU and Romania could be challenged. This aspect relates to power struggles, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
The above discussion is significant because it reveals that examining the EU and unequal 
power relations by applying mimicry enables us to conceptualize postcolonial experiences in 
the EU. In particular, mimicry is significant as it engages with the EU and unequal power 
relations on a different level than in particular Spivak’s subalternity, as mimicry 
acknowledges how subordinated groups can be “knowable and visible” (Bhabha, 2000:71) 
and evoke both resemblance and threat to the dominant participant. Since the existing 
literature has developed largely without references to this notion, mimicry becomes a 
paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the 
present and expands the postcolonial research on the EU.   
 
5.9. Conclusions  
This chapter has argued that unequal power relations can be identified in instances of 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operate in the vocabulary of the Reports. 
Although the choice of vocabulary discussed above may have been automatic, we cannot 
neglect the fact that this choice may also have been ideological and produced unequal power 
relations. The implication of the unequal encounter between the EU and Romania is that the 
EU held power in and behind discourse by constraining the contributions of Romania and 
controlling what was said and done, what relations were entered and what positions 
participants occupied in the discourses of the Reports. The power being exercised here is the 
power to control and constrain discourses, contributions and even participants through 
vocabulary (see Fairclough, 2001:43). The control and constraint impact upon power 
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relations, as the EU is in the position to for instance speak on behalf of Romania 
(subalternity) and create knowledge about Romania (orientalist discourse). On the other hand, 
by imitating the EU and acquiring EU knowledge, Romania gained power of knowledge and 
thus could challenge the EU. In other words, this could have challenged the unequal 
encounter (mimicry). By identifying such postcolonial elements, this analysis helps in raising 
“a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in and behind discourse, which 
may enable change of and emancipation from unequal power relations.  
 
In a wider perspective, the above findings are significant because they question the extent to 
which vocabulary may affect interpreters of the Reports, but also what elements affected 
producers of the Reports to make certain choices of vocabulary. However, the analysis does 
not tell us anything about what elements impacted upon the interpreters and in particular 
producers. Before moving to examine how discourse practices produce unequal power 
relations, the next chapter will examine how grammar in the Reports is also identified as a 
place where unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYSING THE GRAMMAR OF THE REPORTS 
 
 
Based on a similar structure as Chapter 5, this chapter argues that analyzing the grammar of 
the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports by applying the description 
dimension, will demonstrate the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, 
as, just like in the case of vocabulary, grammar is identified as a place where unequal 
relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough op.cit., p.36).  As such, the next 
section will specifically look at how the description dimension has been applied to grammar, 
followed by an extensive discussion of the findings of the critical discourse analysis, 
interview material and content analysis. The extent to which the findings help us understand 
the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the 
elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, will be debated before the concluding 
remark.  
 
6.1. Applying the description dimension 
The application of the description dimension aims to reveal the correlation between the 
grammar of the Reports and the production of unequal power relations by establishing that 
we cannot neglect the fact that the choice of grammar may also have been ideologically 
motivated. By asking a set of questions of the grammar of the Reports (see Appendix 1), the 
aim is to identify who held power in and behind discourse, by identifying through what 
choices of grammar did the EU control and constrain what is being said or done, what 
relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in and behind 
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discourse. In order to explore the extent to which an examination of grammar can reveal 
production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon five arguments, which are 
elaborated below. Accordingly, in order to provide further evidence of how grammar can 
extend our understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations, the below 
findings will be supported by the interview material. On a last note, the findings will also be 
discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to provide empirical support for 
demonstrating the extent to which grammar is a place in which unequal power relations were 
produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.  
 
First, the chapter argues how the choice of process types in the Reports may produce unequal 
power relations, by controlling and constraining the contributions of participants in how 
events in the Romanian enlargement were described and represented. Process types refer to 
sentences, which indicate to the sort of processes that take place in discourse and thus 
indicate what is being done and said. In discourse, three main process types (actions, events 
and attributions) can be identified, where each include a range of grammatical features such 
as subjects (S), verbs (V), objects (O), complements (C), adjuncts (A), etc. Depending on the 
order and format of these grammatical features, process types suggest how processes are 
described and represented in text (Fairclough, 2001:101).  
 
Second, the chapter argues that the choice of participant types in the Reports may have 
produced unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining the representations of 
participants. Participant types refer to the types of participants that are represented in 
discourse and which can be described as either animate or inanimate (obfuscation of agency) 
(Fairclough, 2001:102-103). Similarly to process types, depending on how participants are 
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represented, this suggests how for instance acts of causality or responsibility are described 
and represented in discourse.  
 
Third, the chapter argues that the choice of declarative and imperative modes in the Reports 
produced unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining relations and positions of 
participants. The declarative mode refers to how the speaker/writer is positioned as a giver of 
information and instructions, while the addressee’s position is of a receiver. The imperative 
mode refers to how the speaker/writer is positioned as asking something of the addressee, 
which is positioned as a compliant actor (Fairclough, 2001:104-105).  
 
Fourth, the chapter argues that the use and spelling of the nouns “member states/Member 
States” and “candidate countries” may have produced unequal power relations, by enacting 
relations of solidarity, exclusion and power (see Fairclough, 2001:59 and 93). Although these 
relations are usually produced through the use of pronouns, such as we, they, you, us 
(Fairclough, 2001:106; Cramer, 2010), the findings indicate that as pronouns are largely 
missing in the Reports, nouns produce the same kind of relations. The implication of nouns 
upon power relations was also raised in Chapter 5 when discussing how the vocabulary of 
Eastern/European/Central and Eastern European created relations of solidarity, difference and 
similarity. The chapter will also examine the implications of simulated personal address 
towards anonymous readers of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:106) and the 
standardization of the spelling Member States (see Fairclough, 2001:47-48) upon production 
of unequal power relations.  
 
Fifth, the chapter argues how the modality verbs of “may”, “must”, “should” and “can” (see 
Fairclough, 2001:105 and 107) may have produced unequal power relations by positioning 
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the EU as an authority (2001:151). Modality is identified as a grammatical feature, which 
expresses “the attitude of the ADDRESSER towards the factual content of what is being 
communicated, i.e. whether it is being asserted, questioned, demanded, or whished for” 
(Finch, 2000:103; Locke, 2002:82-83; Chandler, 2007b:65). By examining the above 
modality verbs, the analysis aims to reveal the extent to which such verbs helped in 
expressing the speaker’s or writer’s authority (the EU), by articulating possibility and 
obligation about assessments of the Romanian enlargement as categorical truths (see 
Fairclough, 2001:105). The chapter will also look at the implications of authenticity claims, 
which are identified as claims to knowledge and which are presented as evident and are 
indicated as categorical truths through the use of modality forms (Fairclough, 2001:107).   
 
6.2. Representing events 
This section argues that the choice of process types in the Reports produced unequal power 
relations by controlling and constraining the contributions of participants in how events in the 
Romanian enlargement were described and represented.  
 
The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that one of the most consistent process types 
was the attribution type, which follows the format of SVC. Such a process type involves only 
one participant. For example “markets for land and capital are not functioning properly” (RR 
1998:18) articulated the way the EU experienced the Romanian markets for land and capital, 
which were identified as not functioning properly. As discussed previously, the attribution 
type includes one agent (markets), in order to easily attribute the event or action to one 
particular agent. However, the producer of the Report has not included the causes to why 
markets are not functioning properly, leaving attributions of causality unclear. Furthermore, a 
noticeable aspect in this example is that through the application of the negation not (see 
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Fairclough, 2001:104), the EU is expressing a negative representation about markets. On the 
other hand, examples such as “Romania’s legislation is largely in line with” (RR 2001:51), 
which is another attribution type, identifies a positive representation, as Romania’s legislation 
is in line with assumingly what is required from a candidate country. Furthermore, as 
legislation is one of the main accession criteria (see rule of law), which needs to be satisfied 
in order to become a member state (European Commission, 2014a), this furthers the EU’s 
positive representation by pointing out that Romania’s legislation is “in line with” EU 
criteria, although the extent to which Romania’s legislation is “largely in line with” is not 
clarified. However we should not ignore the fact that “largely” points out a limitation, as 
Romania’s legislation is not completely in line with, but only “largely”.   
 
Another attribution type, “Romania should … take measures that have a significant impact on 
corruption” (RR 2004:145), acknowledges one agent (Romania), which explicitly is made 
responsible for fighting corruption. The importance of such an action (fighting corruption) is 
made clear by suggesting the type of impact Romania’s measures would have upon it 
(significant impact). Most notable, as corruption was identified as a negative feature of the 
Romanian enlargement (see Chapter 4), the role of Romania’s measures in fighting 
corruption is attributed further importance and responsibility. One striking feature of the 
above example is also the impact of the verb “should”. As it will later be discussed in the 
chapter, “should” often implies relations of obligation, which affects how participants are 
positioning themselves as an authority in discourse.  
 
Several interviewees also raised the issue regarding the EU’s and Romania’s contributions to 
the Reports, although their views differed. For instance, interviewee 7 indicated that he would 
have liked Romania to have had “a stronger implication or a view or something”, but this was 
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not possible (until Romania became a member state) as during the enlargement process, 
“Romania was more in a process of learning and adapting and willing to get in”. Interviewee 
7 suggested that Romania lacked “a voice”, as well as the ambition to be heard, but pointed 
out that Romania did get a voice after becoming a member state. On a somehow different, yet 
similar vein, interviewee 3 suggested that although the Romanian voice was heard, this was 
largely facilitated through the questionnaires that the EU required of Romania as a candidate 
state in order to prepare the monitoring Reports. So, although Romania’s voice was heard, it 
seems to that its contributions were controlled by the EU. The controlled and constrained 
contributions of Romania were made visible by interviewee 3 when stating that “we invite the 
candidate country to provide a contribution” and “we compare, we assess the information, we 
extract what we think is important in terms of” [the monitoring reports]. Such statements 
question the extent to which the EU controlled and constrained Romania’s contributions to 
the Reports and to what extent was the Romanian voice actually heard. 
 
In contrast, interviewees 6 and 9 suggested that both the EU and Romania contributed to the 
Reports during the enlargement process. Interviewee 6 explained that Romania had been 
capable to contribute by presenting their perspectives on the different accession chapters 
alongside the EU, arguing that a “continuous dialogue and exchange of information with the 
Romanian side” had taken place, whilst interviewee 9 maintained that Romania had had a 
negotiating voice with both the Commission and the individual member states. This was also 
implied by interviewee 8 in that Romania had “had the opportunity to ask and argue” through 
their negotiation teams. In particular, interviewee 9 suggested that Romania’s voice 
sometimes created “unhappiness in Brussels” due to their stronghold of their views of how 
the Romanian enlargement was represented. Interviewee 2 also indicated that Romania’s 
voice was not only heard, “but we needed their voice” as the implementation of the accession 
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criteria had to be done in collaboration with local authorities, whom the EU needed to listen 
to.  
 
6.3. Obfuscating participants   
Another interesting aspect is how the choice of participant types in the Reports produced 
unequal power relations by controlling and constraining the representations of participants.  
 
The obfuscation of participants matters in the way power relations are produced, as such a 
choice may be ideologically motivated (Fairclough, 2001:103). For instance the obfuscation 
of participants in the Reports can be identified in examples such as “illegal trafficking of 
human beings is a problem in Romania” (RR 1999:16). In this example, the agent (illegal 
trafficking) is depicted as being a problem in Romania, while excluding information about for 
instance who and/or what is/are causing illegal trafficking. In fact, it may be for instance the 
demand for prostitution or cheap labour in the EU or the geographical position of Romania at 
the crossroads of a human trafficking path, which is causing “illegal trafficking of human 
beings” and the “problem in Romania”. However, the EU has chosen not to clarify causality, 
but this information is hidden and excluded. Furthermore, pointing out this particular problem 
(illegal trafficking of human beings) brings to the attention Romania’s failure of fulfilling one 
of the main accession criteria (see human rights), which needs to be satisfied in order to 
become a member state (European Commission, 2014a) and thus furthers the negative 
representation of the Romanian enlargement. 
 
Another noticeable aspect of the obfuscation of participants throughout the Reports is the fact 
that the agent/s, who was/were running the Romanian enlargement, was/were largely 
unknown. Although the Reports seem to suggest that Romania and the EU were running the 
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enlargement process and occasionally references to individuals82 and specific departments 
were also attributed responsibility, largely the agent/s, who ran the Romanian enlargement 
is/are not identified. The absence of such participants leaves attributions of responsibility 
unclear. It should be noted that as the EU enlargement process is a complex process, which 
involves a significant high number of individuals and departments, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
it is largely likely that some participants are obfuscated in order to narrow down the size of 
the information included in the Reports (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009). This aspect was 
raised by interviewee 2, who stated that “the internal conditions of drafting and also because 
drafting documents in different languages” was a “very difficult exercise” impacted upon 
what and who was included in the Reports. However, this justification does not reduce the 
importance of understanding how the obfuscation of participants is a way through which 
unequal power relations can be produced, exercised and enacted by excluding information 
about who is responsible for the production of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:36). 
 
6.4. Producing contrasting relations and positions 
The below section argues how the choice of declarative and imperative modes produces 
unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining relations and positions of 
participants.  
 
The declarative mode can be identified by how the EU as the producer of the Reports is 
positioning itself as a giver of information and instructions, while Romania is positioned as 
the receiver of such information and instructions. For instance, throughout the Reports, the 
EU is giving information about the Romanian enlargement by assessing and reporting on for 
instance “Romania’s ability to assume the obligations of membership” (RR 1999:33) and is 
                                                          
82  Such as Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (CMR 2005:5) or Baroness Nicholson of 
Winterbourne (RR 2004:6). 
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giving instructions, particularly in the General evaluation section (3.10. in RR 1999:33), by 
clarifying the necessary alignments that Romania needs to consider. In the same vein, as we 
do not hear Romania giving information or instructions, this implicitly indicates that 
Romania is a receiver of the EU’s information and instructions.  
 
The imperative mode can be identified by how the EU as the producer of the Reports is 
positioning itself as asking something of the addressee, Romania, which is positioned as a 
compliant actor. For instance, by identifying shortcomings and lack of progress and 
highlighting the necessity of fulfilling the accession criteria can be regarded as ways in which 
the EU was asking Romania to do something. Examples can be statements such as 
“compliance with the EMU acquis is conditional on completion of the process of 
liberalisation of capital movements” (RR 1999:41) or “Romania needs to step up the pace of 
transposition and implementation in this area” (RR 1999:59). What we identify here is the 
fact that the EU was producing a range of utterances, which aimed to encourage Romania to 
fulfil different tasks, positioning the EU as asking Romania something, while Romania was 
the addressee, which needed to comply with these utterances. Although it is not clear how 
Romania is a compliant actor, it can be assumed that such a position is implicitly clarified in 
the way the EU was either praising or criticizing Romania’s progress or lack of progress in 
subsequent Reports. If progress was mentioned, this may imply that Romania had been a 
complaint actor, who listened to what the EU was asking Romania. In the same vein, as we 
do not hear Romania asking something of the EU, this implicitly indicates that Romania is a 
complaint actor. Though, based on the range of unsatisfactory assessments that the EU 
included in the Reports, this questions the extent to which Romania was actually a compliant 
actor.  
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It should be noted that the sections of each Report became vaster as the Romanian 
enlargement progressed. For example Chapter 3 in the 2001 Regular Report offers a much 
lengthier review than for instance the 1999 Report. This implies that the position of the EU as 
a giver of information and instructions, as well as being in the position of asking something 
changed in the sense that the EU offered more information and instructions and asked for 
more things as the Romanian enlargement progressed. However, the May 2006 
Comprehensive Monitoring Report indicates to a significant change in the reporting style. For 
instance, the assessments are shorter and the language has changed in that for example each 
conclusion is introducing more positive representations of the Romanian enlargement (such 
as mentioning “significant progress” or “important progress”). Such a change in language 
may suggest that the EU’s position as a giver of information has remained more or less the 
same, but its position as a giver of instructions and of asking something of the addressee has 
changed. This change also influenced Romania’s position: Romania is still positioned as a 
receiver of information, but due to the less use of declarative and imperative modes, 
Romania’s position as a receiver of instructions and as a complaint actor has been reduced.  
 
The different positions and relations in the Romanian enlargement were also raised by the 
interviewees, although they differed in their opinions. One set of interviewees maintained that 
the EU and Romania were equal partners. For instance interviewee 4 suggested that the 
relations between the two actors were of joint effort and collaboration, indicating that joining 
the EU was like “a family cooperation” and although there were standards to consider, the 
process of enlargement was not a teaching lesson, but a helpful guide by the EU. In the same 
vein, interviewee 6 mentioned “a relationship of genuine partners” between the EU and 
Romania, but neither interviewees 4 or 6 clarified in which way the relations were equal nor a 
genuine partnership. Interviewee 2 was explicitly against the argument that the interaction 
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between the EU and Romania was not an equal encounter and argued that “it was not a 
process between a teacher and a pupil”, adding a joking warning that “if you write this, I will 
be angry”. On the other hand, although interviewee 3 suggested that “I can fully understand 
and agree to the fact that sometimes if you read this document, you can have the feeling of 
being lectured”, interviewee 3 maintained that the aim behind the Reports was to “remain as 
factual as possible", not produce an image of schooling Romania in what to do:  
“We tried to be very cautious in that because we don’t want appear like 
lecturing the country because it is partnership and it is on a voluntary basis and 
equality so that is why the language of the Progress Report is very neutral, 
balanced, very boring, because it is very codified … So it is not in our interest 
to put publically lecture, it is in our interest to have a common understanding 
of where we stand, what we have achieved so far and what is the work behind 
us, before us, ahead of us and that is what is really the purpose of the Progress 
Report. This is a photo and we want to make sure that you and us, we share 
the same understanding of the challenges ahead in order to make sure that we 
can work jointly, the tools we have in order to best address this situation 
because our common aim is to have you. We are, we the Commission, we are 
working for you, but we are trying to serve your interests while being able to 
defend your interests to the member states without jeopardizing what is the EU 
about. So it is our pinpoint in order to avoid postponement clauses, 
infringement procedures, all that stuff that could happen badly and to ensure 
that the candidate country will be able to survive as a member state”.  
 
In contrast, other interviewees acknowledged that the so called teacher-pupil relation was 
very much part of the Romanian enlargement. For instance interviewee 5 indicated that the 
relation between the EU and Romania “was much closer to that of a tutor to a student. It was 
very much “if the Commission said jump, Romania’s government would ask, how high?””. 
Similarly, interviewee 1 argued that the enlargement process is unilateral as the EU is the 
club candidates want to join and therefore during negotiations, the relationship is unequal, 
suggesting that the Romanian enlargement was a period of inequality. Furthermore, 
interviewee 7 maintained that Romania’s relation with the EU was of a teacher-tutor format, 
but justified such relations as a natural aspect of “a process of learning” and “a process of 
adjustment”, which other candidates also went through, as the below shows: 
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“When you become a student your ambition is to take the place of your 
teacher and to become at least at the same level of knowledge and behavior 
with him if not above and I think it is a normal process and it is a process not 
only Romania pass through”.  
 
 
6.5. Producing relations of solidarity, exclusion and power 
Another emerging argument, which will be discussed below, is that the choice and spelling of 
member states/Member States and candidate countries in the Reports produced unequal 
power relations by shaping relations of solidarity, exclusion and power (see Fairclough, 
2001:59). This argument is related to the fact that one of the noticeable aspects in the Reports 
is the fact that EU member states are referred to as member states and the candidates, 
including Romania, as candidate countries. Another aspect is that the member states of the 
EU are spelt Member States in the Reports (capitalization), while the candidates follow the 
spelling of candidate countries, where lower cases have been used. Such aspects raises 
question of the extent to which these grammatical choices impacted upon power relations.  
 
In the case of relations of solidarity and exclusion, by applying different terms to categorize 
participants, a feeling of solidarity between those, who share the same status, may be 
produced, while producing relations of exclusion to participants not belonging to the same 
categorization (see Fairclough, 2001:59 and 79). On the one hand, a candidate country such 
as Romania may share relations of solidarity with other candidate countries, while member 
states may share relations of solidarity with other member states. On the other hand, as 
candidate countries cannot be included in the member states category (until accession) and a 
member state cannot be part of the candidate countries categorization (once accession has 
taken place), this may produce relations of exclusion. However, this raises questions of the 
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extent to which such relations of solidarity and exclusion are maintained after accession and 
thus the implications of these relations upon power relations.  
 
The production of in particular relations of solidarity may in fact be an act of simulated 
personal address towards anonymous interpreters of the Reports. Using nouns such as 
member states and candidate countries simulates personal address, as these establish potential 
addressees in interpreters. For instance, despite the fact that the interpreters’ identity is 
unknown to the producer of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:106), by stating that “Romania 
and 14 Member States have already ratified it”83 (CMR 2006a:4) or that “candidate countries 
must take all necessary measures” (RR 2002:9), the nouns Member States and candidate 
countries become a direct address on an individual basis. In this way, the interpreters’ 
relations of solidarity to either candidate countries or Member States are produced.  
 
In the case of relations of power, when referring to the member states of the EU, the Reports 
use the spelling Member States, where both nouns start with capital letters. On the other 
hand, when referring to the candidate countries such as Romania, the Reports are using lower 
cases as in candidate countries. As a rule of grammar, linguistic features that are deemed 
important are usually spelt with a first capital letter (capitalization). One pertinent example to 
this is the French spelling of tu and Vous, where both pronouns are used to state the single 
address of you. However, while tu is used to address subordinates, familiar people, less 
important people, etc., Vous addresses superiors, people who are respected, etc. Thus, the 
superiority attributed to Vous is highlighted by the use of a first capital letter, while tu is 
written with lower characters (Fairclough, 2001:59). In the same vein, it can be implied that 
the capitalization of Member States marks the superiority and powerful status of Member 
                                                          
83 The Accession Treaty.  
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States in contrast to candidate countries, producing relations of power (see Fairclough, 
2001:59). The implication of this spelling is that producers and interpreters will attach certain 
attributes, such as distinctive, respectful, authoritative, powerful, etc., to the participants 
associated with Member States, while attributing opposing characteristics to candidate 
countries. In view of the above, this questions the extent to which the attributes attached to 
Romania as a candidate country will persevere once Romania becomes a Member State. 
 
It should be noted that although the use of member states and candidate countries is 
consistently applied in the Regular Reports, this is not the case of the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports84. This is largely due to a change of status, as once Romania signed the 
Accession Treaty, its candidate country status changed to an acceding state status. The 
difference between candidate countries and acceding states is that the latter are regarded as in 
close proximity to accession, especially as they have (successfully) fulfilled the membership 
criteria and are thus entitled to more rights and freedom85 than candidate countries (see also 
European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m). This change was also mentioned by 
interviewee 2, who stated that:  
 
“Acceding countries and candidate countries. There, there is difference … The 
difference is when the Treaty is signed there are no more negotiations on the 
condition of accession. No longer a candidate, there the wording means 
something. What the candidate country had to do is achieved”. 
 
In other words, the above reflects the changes that Romania had achieved or as interviewee 8 
indicates, the Treaty of Accession signature proved that the major changes required by the 
EU had taken place in Romania. However, the capitalization of Member States continued to 
be applied in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. This questions therefore the extent to 
                                                          
84 Apart from a footnote in the CMR (2006b:4).  
85 For instance commenting on proposals and holding “an active observer status in all the relevant bodies, in 
which they have the right to speak but not to vote” (European Commission, 2013k). 
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which the relations of power (as produced by capitalization) were maintained even though the 
status of Romania had changed.   
 
The interviewees seemed to agree that the capitalization of member states does not have any 
importance. For instance, interviewees 1 and 4 claimed that the spelling of Member States is 
not relevant, as it does not articulate any aspects of “arrogance”, but the Reports were just 
“guidance” for Romania (interviewee 4). Similarly, interviewee 3 stated that there is no 
“hidden agenda” nor “rudeness or inferiority” implied in the spelling, but corrected herself by 
adding that “not that I am aware of”. Interviewee 2 mentioned that the capitalization was “a 
question of grammar, to my knowledge there was never reason for making a differentiation 
on capital letters for member states and not for candidate countries”. In contrast, interviewee 
7 seemed to suggest that the capitalization was used in order to differentiate between 
participants, as the below demonstrates:  
 
“To recognize that we are a union of sovereign member states and the basis of 
this Union is the member states, so the king of this construction is the member 
states so we recognize the member, so for the rest of the world we are even in 
the process of accession, they are start countries, so for the rest of the world 
they are different and we want to make a very clear difference between the 
membership from the Union and the rest of the world”.  
 
 
One striking aspect is the fact that the interviewees seemed to justify the capitalization of 
Member States as what interviewee 5 called “normal EU usage”, implying that capitalization 
is part of a normal or standard spelling in EU documents. For instance, interviewee 7 stated 
that he had noticed the different spellings and “always wondered myself why we write 
Member States with capital” [letter], but justified it as “I think is just for the Commission 
technocrats … it is just written as usual”. Similarly, interviewee 1 mentioned that the 
different spelling is just a formalized act, but does not indicate “any discriminatory 
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signposts”. Both interviewees 2 and 7 indicated that there was no symbolism behind such a 
choice, but the spelling was just “accepted everywhere from the beginning” (interviewee 2). 
Finally, interviewee 5 justified the capitalized spelling of Member States as originating in the 
Treaty: 
 
“That is because “Member States” is a term you find in the Treaty. Even the 
spelling with capital letters. Whereas you don’t find the term candidate 
country in the Treaty; you will find that any state - with a small letter  s - may 
apply to become a Member State or something like that. But Member State is 
a sort of a consecrated legal term. It is the standard usage in all EU documents, 
the term ”Member State”.  
  
 
 
What we identify in the justification of capitalization as “normal EU usage” or “standard 
usage” is the fact that although EU language is becoming standardized, such a process also 
embodies relations of dominance and subordination. First, standardization enables the 
dominance of EU language as the standard language (norm) against which the enlargement 
process is discussed. Second, as capitalization may become associated with powerful 
participants, institutions, etc. and emerge as the language of the powerful, while positioning 
candidate countries such as Romania in a subordinate position (see Fairclough, 2001:47-48), 
this strongly suggests to production of relations of subordination in contrast to the first point 
which suggests producing relations of dominance.  
 
6.6. Producing authority  
The argument discussed in this section identifies that the choice of modality verbs in the 
Reports produced unequal power relations, by expressing the Report assessments as 
categorical truths of possibility and obligation. The examination will focus on the verbs may, 
can, should and must, which are the most applied modality verbs in the Reports, as indicated 
in Table 8 and demonstrate how the EU constructed a position of authority for itself when 
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assessing the Romanian enlargement through the help of such modality verbs (see 
Fairclough, 2001:159).  
 
 
Modality 
verbs 
RR 
1998 
RR 
1999 
RR 
2000 
RR 
2001 
RR 
2002 
RR 
2003 
RR 
2004 
CMR 
2005 
CMR 
2006a 
CMR 
2006b 
Total  
May 4 12 11 9 17 14 23 17 2 17 126 
Must 4 23 8 4 15 28 48 65 7 4 206 
Can 17 28 61 73 53 63 77 42 16 35 465 
Should 36 72 82 158 262 220 373 207 73 34 1517 
Table 8. The number of modality verb instances in the Reports. 
 
 
The findings argue that may and can expressed possibility in the EU’s assessments of the 
Romanian enlargement, as the following instances demonstrate: “legal measures for 
restructuring the agricultural sector may result in a more stable and transparent set of rules” 
(RR 2002:72) and “Romania can be considered as a functioning market economy” (RR 
2003:44). The use of “may” and “can” expresses an evaluation that the EU makes about the 
possibility of legal measures or Romania as a functioning market economy. Such verbs place 
the EU in an authoritative position by making the EU’s claims over the truth of the impact of 
legal measures or Romania as a functioning market economy as a possibility evident (see 
Fairclough, 2001:151), especially when the Romanian voice is not heard in the Reports. 
 
The findings maintain that “should” and “must” expressed obligation  in the EU’s 
assessments of the Romanian enlargement, as the following instances demonstrate: “Romania 
should pay particular attention to the timely and effective implementation” (RR 2004:11) and 
“the Romanian authorities must subscribe to its recommendations” (RR 2002:16). The use of 
should and must expresses an evaluation that the EU makes when assessing implementation 
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and recommendations. What is noticeable in the above two examples is the fact that should 
seems to produce a less authoritative position than must, which indicates a stronger urgency 
towards obligation. For example stating that “Romania should pay particular attention to the 
timely and effective implementation” implies that Romania is obliged to achieve something, 
but the tone is optional. On the other hand, stating that “the Romanian authorities must 
subscribe to its recommendations” perpetuates obligation through the use of must, but the 
tone is not optional, but obligatory. Similarly to “may” and “can”, the verbs should and may 
help placing the EU in an authoritative position by making the EU’s claim over the truth of 
Romania paying attention and Romanian authorities subscribing recommendations as an 
obligation evident (see Fairclough, 2001:151), especially when the Romanian voice is not 
heard in the Reports.  
 
In particular the implications of should has been raised by O’Brennan, who indicates the 
importance of the modality verb should in EU enlargement discourse. For instance, 
O’Brennan highlights that while the earlier Strategy reports acknowledged that the fifth 
enlargement process “should” be concluded, the later Strategy reports had replaced the word 
“should” with “will”. O’Brennan maintains that such a change in the vocabulary indicates 
that the EU was determined to allow the candidates to become member states of the EU, 
something that was not clear when using “should” (2006:43 and 83; see also Joenniemi, 
2012:26).  
 
The authority of the EU is further solidified by observing in each Report that the EU claims 
to draw “on numerous sources of information” (see for example RR 2001:7) when assessing 
the Romanian enlargement. Such statements produce an authenticity claim (Fairclough, 
2001:107), which aims to present the Report assessments as “the truth about the applicants’ 
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present state” (Raik, 2004:579-580). The implications of the authenticity claim are several. 
First, it is not clarified what sources were used and what information belonged to what 
participant. Therefore as interpreters we do not know the extent to which participants 
exercised power in producing the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:42). Second, by positioning 
the Reports as a credible and accurate source of information and in particular by obfuscating 
the Romanian voice, locates the EU not only as a knowledgeable actor, but also as an 
authority, in contrast to Romania.  
 
The authenticity claim can also be related to the interviewees’ trust in the “credibility” of the 
Reports (interviewee 1) and regarding the assessments of the Reports as “accurate”, as they 
were based on “a thorough documentation and evaluation especially by the European 
Commission” (interviewee 6). Similarly, interviewee 8 insisted that the EU “had a 
particularly accurate and detailed knowledge of Romania's position”. In contrast, interviewee 
9 indicated that the EU asserted an authoritative power over Romania, by forcing the latter to 
mimic the EU. The interviewee stated that the negotiation relations between the EU and 
Romania were asymmetrical, but these were hidden by the fact that the negotiating teams 
were exposing the image of a win-win negotiation type. Furthermore, the interviewee also 
implied that there exited a mimicking tendency on behalf of Romania, much due to internal 
pressure. 
  
It should be noted that the academic literature has implicitly raised the issue of authority 
when discussing that the interaction between the EU and the candidate countries in the fifth 
enlargement was based on the discourse that the EU was “a modernized, safe political and 
economic heaven” (Behr, 2007:254), while the candidates were “learners or adopters of 
European norms” (Kuus, 2004:473-474). Such an argument resonates with Buden, who 
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argues that the applicants were regarded as being “in diapers” (2010a:4) and as “a landscape 
of historical ruins that is inhabited only by children, immature people unable to organize their 
lives democratically without guidance” (2010a:5), in contrast to the EU. Buden’s argument 
was identified by interviewee 4, who indicated that the Romanian enlargement was a process, 
developing from immaturity to maturity. Interviewee 8 shared a similar view, acknowledging 
the EU’s position of authority by pointing out the Romanian “deepest scars” after the fall of 
Communism and the determination of the EU to make Romania’s accession possible. On the 
other hand, interviewee 6 saw the EU’s authority over Romania as “natural” in a process of 
negotiations.  
 
In relation to the aspect of EU authority, a number of interviewees drew attention to aspects 
of colonialism and empire. For instance, interviewee 7 maintained that he had never 
considered “any similarities between this relationship and the old colonial system”, as the 
below demonstrates:  
 
“Because I thought we are in a completely different philosophy and logic, so 
Romania was seeking membership to a club of developed nations and this club 
of developed nations, they were treated equally, irrespective of the size and of 
the level of development. I thought on the contrary”.  
 
Similarly, interviewee 2 was against the idea of the EU being compared to an empire as 
“there is no emperor, and emperor gives the impression of a centralistic organization and 
even if the organization is working from Brussels, who is the European emperor … there is 
no centralistic power”. On the other hand, interviewee 3 seemed to detect elements of 
colonialism and empire for instance in the way the EU “is imposing rules”, but as she had 
been working for the EU’s negotiating team, the interviewee admitted that it was difficult for 
her to agree with such a view, though she could consider such an aspect. Similarly, 
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interviewee 5 also suggested to a colonial relationship during the Romanian enlargement, but 
stated that “to liken the EU to an empire once you have joined is something of an 
exaggeration”, as the below demonstrates:   
 
“I think there is some element of truth in that as regard to the process of 
accession … And there were certainly elements of a colonial relationship, 
particularly between the Commission and Romania at least as a candidate 
country. I can’t talk about the others to the same extent, but I suspect you will 
find that the same in most of the new member states, at least during the period 
when they were negotiating accession. That underlines the point we discussed 
about the particular role of the Commission in the process … Maybe viceroy 
is not the right word, but in British India you had the British resident in the 
princely states, and it was perhaps a little like that … In a sense the EU is a 
little bit like the Holy Roman Empire”.   
   
 
6.7. Establishing a postcolonial relationship 
Considering the argument that each grammatical property discussed above may have been a 
place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted, the below 
three sub-sections discuss how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of 
unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and setting out how 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
 
6.7.1. Subalternity  
To start with, the significance of the above findings suggests that the choice of grammar 
reveals aspects of subalternity, muteness, instruments of subjugation and ventriloquized 
voice, which produced unequal power relations.  
 
First, by identifying how modality verbs positioned the EU as an authority and exposed its 
assessments as categorical truths about possibility and obligation in the Romanian 
enlargement seems to suggest that the EU produced a position as the elite in contrast to 
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Romania as the subaltern. For instance, when the EU spoke for Romania with respect to what 
should be done, the use of should conveyed the EU’s authority over Romania, while Romania 
was positioned as a receiver, creating obligation for what Romania needed to do. Thus we 
identify that the EU had the authority to speak for Romania by creating values of obligation 
and probability, while Romania was rendered mute.   
 
Second, the findings suggest that the choice of attribution processes can be identified as 
instruments of subjugation, which rendered Romania mute as the EU spoke on behalf of 
Romania. The choice of attribution process types implies that the EU had the control over 
causality and responsibility regarding representations of events in the Romanian enlargement, 
while Romania’s voice was not heard. Instead the Romanian enlargement was known, 
represented, and spoken for by the EU, which strongly indicates to a case of the Romanian 
voice being ventriloquized. Similarly, a number of interviewees seemed to suggest to an EU 
control of what and whose contributions were included in the Reports. Thus, by remaining 
mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, Romania was positioned as a subaltern and was 
subjected to a marginalised position, which produced inequality in power relations between 
the subaltern (Romania) and the elite (the EU).  
 
Third, although some interviewees indicated that both the EU and Romania contributed to the 
Reports, the findings question whether Romania was “understood with accuracy” and 
whether it had been listened to. Especially the obfuscation of participants draws attention to 
the way the EU controlled what and how participants were made visible and responsible in 
the Reports. Can it then be assumed that the muteness of Romania as a subaltern was a result 
of “a failure of interpretation and not a failure of articulation”?   
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Fourth, a number of interviewees agreed that the Romanian voice had not been heard, but that 
the EU controlled what was said in the Reports. This suggests to an aspect of subalternity, 
which means that Romania was rendered mute by the EU. On the other hand, other 
interviewees suggested that Romania’s voice was heard. Such a contrasting view may relate 
to the aspect of mimicry and thus will be discussed later in the chapter. It should also be 
noted that as the findings indicated that as the Reports became lengthier and even shorter 
during the Romanian enlargement, the Romanian voice was still not included and heard, 
while the EU as the producer of the Reports spoke on behalf of and for Romania. This 
supports further the evidence that Romania was rendered mute (subalternity).  
 
Fifth, it is against the above background that we question whether the subaltern (Romania) 
can be heard, listened to and have one’s experiences considered or whether it will always be 
spoken for. In contrast to Spivak, who concluded that the subaltern has “no history” and thus 
“cannot speak” (2006:32), but will remain mute, the above findings suggest that this does not 
have to be the case. As long as we can raise a critical consciousness of the ideological power 
hiding in and behind discourse and aim to change these instruments of subjugation, 
emancipation is possible. Furthermore, by including the interviewees’ perspectives on the 
production of unequal power relations, this will allow overlooked voices to be heard, listened 
to and have one’s experiences considered. In particular, the interviewees’ claim that the 
Romanian voice was heard also indicates that Romania did not remain totally mute.  
 
6.7.2. Orientalist discourse  
What can the findings tell us about the production of unequal power relations in relation to 
orientalism? The below discussion will in particular look at how the choice of vocabulary 
identifies aspects of orientalist discourse, which produced unequal power relations.  
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First, the findings suggest that different grammatical features produced an orientalist 
discourse, which consisted of particular modes of representing the Romanian enlargement. 
For instance, the use of process types and obfuscation of participants tended to create both 
negative and positive representations of the Romanian enlargement, which implied 
knowledge that the EU produced about the Romanian enlargement. Furthermore, this 
knowledge was made authentic through the use of modality verbs, which as discussed earlier, 
helped in sustaining the authority position of the EU and especially in making its claims 
authentic and in positioning its knowledge as categorical truths. This questions the extent to 
which ideological interests the EU had in making its claims authentic. It can be assumed that 
the EU aimed to held power in discourse in order to control and constrain what knowledge, 
relations and positions were produced in the Reports. In other words, the EU controlled how 
the Romanian enlargement was represented. In orientalist terms, the power being exercised 
here is the power to create knowledge. However, such an argument raises questions as to 
whether the knowledge about the Romanian enlargement was accurate or whether it was 
imaginative.  
 
Second, one noticeable aspect in the findings is the role that different grammatical features 
played in producing binary representations. For instance, this was obvious in the case of the 
use of declarative and imperative modes, which produced contrasting relations and positions. 
Such elements were grounded in the discourse of producing the image of the EU as a giver of 
information/instructions and of asking something and of Romania as the receiver of 
information/instructions and as a compliant actor (see Said, 1993:44). By positioning the EU 
and Romania in contrasting positions, which also implicitly indicated that their relations were 
contrasting, anticipates that the two actors were opposing each other. As it will later be 
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discussed in Chapter 7, such contrasting positions and relations were shaped by what 
conventions were produced in the discourse types of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:49). 
 
Another example of binary representations produced through grammar is the choice and 
spelling of the nouns member states/Member States and candidate countries, as such elements 
categorize the different participants in opposing groups. Furthermore, the application of the 
simulation of personal address also consolidated the production of opposing groups. A 
striking aspect was also the capitalization of Member States, which as discussed above, 
provides support for the argument that such a spelling, in contrast to candidate countries, 
points to different attributes and produces opposing representations. In other words, these 
grammatical choices can be regarded as additional ways in which the EU produced binary 
representations between the EU and Romania and thus shaped alterity in the Romanian 
enlargement.  
 
More importantly, the interviewees also addressed contrasting positions and relations as 
produced, enacted and exercised in the Reports. A number of the interviewees suggested that 
the relations and positions that were produced in the Romanian enlargement reminded of a 
tutor-pupil kind, while a range of interviewees insisted of an equal encounter. However, it 
should be mentioned that the interviewees categorically disregarded the capitalization of 
Member States as something of importance, justifying such a spelling down to “normal” EU 
language. The implication of such a justification is the standardization of the spelling, which 
may become the norm against which enlargements are discussed. However, this is exactly the 
point that CDA tries to make. It is exactly such a grammar that people find “normal” and do 
not question that produces unequal power relations by prompting binary representations and 
producing alterity.  
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6.7.3. Mimicry 
In addition to the above presented findings, the below discussion argues that the significance 
of the findings on the research questions is that the choice of vocabulary identifies aspects of 
mimicry.  
 
First, one particular aspect, which can be related to mimicry, is the change that took place in 
the choice of grammatical features in the Reports. The findings identified for instance that the 
May 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report introduced a different way of representing the 
Romanian enlargement, which included a larger number of positive representations in 
contrast to previous negative representations. Such a change became obvious in the use of 
less declarative and imperative modes, which indicate that the EU’s position as a giver of 
instructions and of asking something of Romania, as well as Romania’s position as a receiver 
of instructions and as a compliant actor had changed. Such an aspect can be related to the fact 
that as the Romanian enlargement progressed, Romania fulfilled the EU’s request of 
becoming a member state and thus became “entirely knowable and visible” by becoming 
similar to the EU. In the same vein, the findings demonstrate that once the status of Romania 
changed to an acceding state when the Treaty was signed, a change in the discourses of the 
Reports also took place. For instance, one noticeable aspect is the fact that the use of the term 
candidate countries was eliminated. It thus can be argued that mimicking the EU became a 
strategy of power of Romania by becoming similar to the EU, as Romania learned EU 
knowledge, which led to its accession. 
 
Second, a number of interviewees argued that the Romanian voice was heard and even, as 
one interviewee in particular suggested, created “unhappiness in Brussels”. Such an aspect 
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can be related to the argument that by mimicking the EU, Romania could have been seen as a 
threat. In particular interviewee 7 raised the issue that in a progress of learning it was the 
ambition of Romania to “take the place” of the EU’s knowledge and behavior. This questions 
therefore the extent to which the EU felt the appropriation of Romania as a threat. Perhaps 
the EU’s choice of modality verbs, which produced the position of the EU as an authority, 
may be regarded as a way through which the EU maintained control as an authoritative 
participant due to the threat that the Romanian enlargement produced. The question is 
whether the EU experienced such a threat and if so, to what extent did the EU feel threated by 
Romania.  
 
Third, a number of interviewees mentioned that Romania was forced by the EU to mimic the 
Union, while other interviewees noted that Romania had a mimicking tendency. This kind of 
findings raise questions of the extent to which mimicry was a voluntary act on behalf of 
Romania to become similar to the EU or whether Romania was forced into mimicking the 
EU. This relates to findings, which suggest that at different occasions the EU may have 
encouraged Romania to mimic the EU. For instance, the choice of declarative and imperative 
modes can be identified as an act through which the Union encouraged mimicry, by either 
giving information or instructions or asking something of Romania in order to become 
similar to the EU. What is striking here is the fact that mimicry is not only voluntarily, but 
also encouraged by the dominant participant. As such, these findings may suggest a changing 
character in the nature of how mimicry works. The bottom line is that even though the EU 
may have forced or encouraged Romania to mimic the EU, such a strategy allowed Romania 
to gain power of knowledge in an unequal encounter and thus be able to change unequal 
power relations by becoming “equal” to the EU.  
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6.8. Conclusions  
In particular, this chapter raised the question in which ways does the choice of grammar 
produce unequal power relations, revealing that the unequal encounter between the EU and 
Romania enabled the EU to hold power in and behind discourse by constraining the 
contributions of Romania and controlling what was said and done, what relations were 
entered and what positions participants occupied in discourses through grammar (see 
Fairclough, 2001:43). Such a linguistic strategy helped the EU to control and constrain the 
production of power relations, as the EU was in the position for example to speak on behalf 
of Romania (subalternity) and create knowledge about Romania (orientalist discourse). 
However it is vital to notice that, by imitating the EU and acquiring EU knowledge 
(mimicry), Romania gained power of knowledge and thus could challenge the unequal 
encounter.  
 
Although the analysis above reveals the extent to which grammar produces unequal power 
relations, it does not tell us anything about what elements impacted upon such choices. This 
aspect is important as it draws attention to the significance of how interpreters are influenced 
by their MRs and producers’ choices, but also how the Reports are an indication of the 
producers’ MRs. By acknowledging these implications, CDA takes the assessment of 
discourse to a different level, by highlighting how the formal properties of the Reports are 
shaped by the discourse practices of interpretation and production. The next chapter will 
therefore engage with the production and interpretation practices in order to identify how 
these impacted upon the formal properties of the Reports during production and how the 
formal properties of the Reports may have affected interpretations.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
ANALYSING THE DISCOURSE PRACTICES OF THE 
REPORTS 
 
 
 
This chapter argues that analyzing the discourse practices of the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, by applying the interpretation dimension, will 
demonstrate the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, as discourse 
practices are identified as processes through which ideologies and ideological power are 
reproduced.  
 
The chapter follows a four-step structure. First, the chapter will briefly outline the 
interpretation dimension of the discourse practices, establishing what this particular CDA 
stage entails. Second, the chapter discusses how the interpretation dimension has been 
applied to the two discourse practices, the production process and the interpretation process, 
of the Reports. Third, this section includes the findings of the analysis of the discourse 
practices and the interview material. Fourth, in this section the emphasis will be focused on 
establishing a postcolonial relationship between the findings and the elements of subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry. The chapter summarizes in which ways the application of the 
interpretation dimension can extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and 
set out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
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7.1. Outline of the interpretation dimension 
This section briefly summarizes what the interpretation dimension entails (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) and the importance of this dimension in analyzing the extent to which discourse 
practices can facilitate the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse. 
The section will also discuss the correlation between the interpretation and description 
dimensions.  
 
The interpretation dimension entails an analysis of two discourse practices, the production of 
text and interpretation of text, in order to reveal how such processes reproduce ideologies and 
ideological power, which impact upon power relations (Fairclough, 1989:26; 2001:21 and 
118). The importance of these two practices is based on the argument that the way 
participants produce and interpret texts is based on their “knowledge of language, 
representations of the natural and social world they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions” etc., 
known as members’ resources (MR) (Fairclough, 2001:20-21 and 74).  
 
In terms of the process of production, the MR of the producer will be employed when 
producing a text and thus will influence text production (2001:118). Therefore, in the 
production process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “traces of the productive 
process” (Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:20), as traces may indicate what MR have influenced 
the text producer. However, it is when the producer’s MR are used in text production that 
ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations. In terms of the 
process of interpretation, the MR of the interpreter will influence how the interpreter will 
understand a text, but the text itself will also influence and shape the MR of the interpreter 
(see Fairclough, 2001:118; Titsche et al., 2003:150). Thus, in the interpretation process, the 
formal properties of text are regarded as “cues in the process of interpretation” (2001:20), as 
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cues prompt the interpreter to use certain MR and interpret a text in a certain way. In the 
same vein as the process of production, it is when the MR are used as interpretative 
procedures that ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations 
(2001:118). However, producers and interpreters are often not aware of how reproduction of 
ideologies occurs and how it may contribute to inequality in power relations (2001:2-3 and 
118). Thus, by identifying the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in 
discourse practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological 
power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such 
unequal relations.  
 
The correlation between the description dimension and the interpretation dimension is based 
on the fact that the latter dimension facilitates the reproduction of ideologies, which are then 
projected upon language and thus impact upon how language is produced and interpreted. As 
mentioned earlier, ideologies are practices, which appear commonsensical and which people 
often draw upon, but without considering that the ideological power may in fact shape how 
people perceive reality, events, etc. and thus can impact on power relations. More 
importantly, ideological power is held in discourse by powerful participants, who control and 
constrain discourses and contributions of non-powerful participants through what is being 
said or done, what relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in 
discourse.  
 
7.2. Applying the interpretation dimension 
This section discusses how the interpretation dimension has been applied to the discourse 
practices of the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between discourse 
practices and unequal power relations by establishing that such practices reproduce 
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ideologies, which impact upon power relations. The interpretation dimension targets therefore 
to reveal how producers and interpreters produce and interpret discourses of the Reports 
based on a situational context and a intertextual context and how the choices made impact 
upon the production and interpretation of formal properties of language of the Reports (see 
Fairclough, 2001:119). In other words, the interpretation dimension identifies how by 
regarding the Reports as a product of a process of production and as a resource in the process 
of interpretation enables an understanding of how unequal power relations are produced 
(Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:21 and 118, 2010:132). Furthermore, the findings will be 
discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to provide empirical support in 
demonstrating the extent to which discourse practices are a place in which unequal power 
relations are produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and 
orientalism. The interpretation dimension aims therefore to answer the question why the 
Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular way by the 
EU and what does this mean in connection to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and 
Koller op.cit., p.181). 
 
First, in order to apply the interpretation dimension, each Report has been analyzed by asking 
a set of three questions (see Table 9) in order to interpret how producers and interpreters 
made sense of the situational context (2001:122). The questions help identify in which way 
the producers determined the discourse type, which shaped the production of the Reports (see 
Fairclough, 2001:122), but also how the interpreters of the Reports were influenced by the 
discourse types and acted upon these when interpreting. Second, each Report has been 
analyzed by looking at how producers and interpreters made sense of the intertextual context 
(intertextuality), which relates to the fact that producers and interpreters rely on assumptions, 
which impact on how the Reports are produced and interpreted (see Fairclough, 2001:121). 
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Question 
What is going on? 
Who is involved? 
In what relations? 
Table 9. The production and interpretation of the situational context. 
 
 
In order to explore the extent to which an examination of discourse practices can reveal the 
extent of the production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon three arguments, 
which are elaborated below. 
 
First, the chapter argues that the production of the Reports based on the situational context 
was held by the EU, who was the powerful participant in the Romanian enlargement. The 
significance of this is that the EU was in the position to produce a certain discourse type, 
which influenced the conventions within which the Reports were produced and later 
interpreted. Such a position has implications upon power relations, as the EU was able to 
reproduce ideologies and employ MR (see Fairclough, 2001:118), which impact upon power 
relations by sustaining elements of subalternity orientalist discourses and mimicry. Moreover, 
as the producer’s dependency on the MR when producing a text is often not obvious to the 
producer, this suggests that the process of production may function ideologically (2001:118).  
 
Second, the chapter argues that the interpretation of the Reports based on the situational 
context was formulated on the discourse types produced by the EU, as interpreters relied on 
what is in the Reports and in the formal properties of the Reports in order to interpret these. 
At the same time, the discourse type activated certain MR of the interpreter (see Fairclough, 
2001:118). As such, especially when the MR of the producers are used in the interpretation of 
text, ideologies of the producers are reproduced (2001:199). Such a position has implications 
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upon power relations, as interpreters reproduce ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:118), which 
impact upon power relations by sustaining elements of subalternity orientalist discourses and 
mimicry. Moreover, as the interpreter’s dependency on the MR is not obvious to the 
interpreter, this suggests that the process of interpretation may function ideologically 
(2001:118).  
 
Third, the chapter argues that the producers and interpreters of the Reports were influenced 
by a background of intertextuality and what it is in the text, which shaped a specific 
intertextual context (2001:39). The production and interpretation of the intertextual context 
refers to how participants acted upon assumptions of where a text (the Reports) belonged to. 
Once these assumptions have been decided, the participants determine what can be taken for 
given, what is common knowledge by other participants, what can be excluded, etc. or what 
can be presupposed (Fairclough, 2001:121and 127).  
 
Furthermore, the chapter argues in particular that presuppositions played an important role in 
the production and interpretation of the Reports. Presuppositions can be sincere and 
manipulative, in the sense that the producer believes the readers sincerely share the same 
information, but manipulative that the information is hidden as to not include all aspects 
(2001:128). The importance of presuppositions lays in the fact that they are regarded as 
ideological assumptions (Hakam, 2009:38), as presuppositions are a resource in the 
production of texts and a cue in the interpretation of texts (Fairclough, 2001:121). Since 
presuppositions are taken-for-granted assumptions which are embedded in language, such 
presumptions function ideologically as the EU may try to “create a basis” for their Reports 
assessments (see Machin and Mayer, 2012:222). It should be noted that presuppositions are 
based on the assumption of intertextuality, which suggests that texts “exist in intertextual 
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relations with other texts” (Fairclough, 2001:129). Intertextuality refers to how the producer 
produces a text or the interpreter interprets a text with references to other texts and 
presupposes of the other participants what they know about a certain situation (Fairclough, 
1995:134, 2001:127).  
 
7.3. Producing discourse types 
This section argues that the producer of the Reports, the EU, produced a certain discourse 
type, by making sense of the situational context. However, the chapter also argues that as the 
production practice was one-sided, the EU controlled and constrained contents, positions and 
relations of the Reports (Fairclough, 2001:39). The identification of discourse types is an 
important part of the production of the situational context, as once the discourse type is 
determined, the conventions of how to behave in such a discourse type have been established 
(2001:39).  
 
7.3.1. What is going on? 
This section argues that the EU as the producer of the Reports produced a certain activity 
type, included certain contents (topics) and a certain purpose of the activity type in order to 
describe what is going on in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:123). However such a choice 
not only creates an overall picture of what is going on in the Romanian enlargement, but also 
impacts upon which discourse type is being determined and what conventions will be applied 
between the participants of the discourse.  
 
To start with, the activity type of each Report is to assess “Romania’s preparations for 
membership” (CMR 2005:6). The contents included are constrained to assessments of the 
political and economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis chapters. The purpose of 
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the inclusion of such contents is to identify progress, gaps and future steps towards the 
successful accession of Romania (CMR 2005:6). The discourse type produced is therefore an 
EU assessment report of Romania. Such a discourse type introduces therefore certain 
“conventions, norms, codes of practice”, which are underlying the discourses of the Reports 
(see Fairclough, 2001:75) 
 
Although the above might sound arbitrary and perhaps commonsensical, an analysis of the 
production process says much more than what meets the eye. Two themes, which impact 
upon power relations, are identified. First as mentioned earlier, the Romanian enlargement 
was an “unequal encounter” (Fairclough, 2001:36) between the EU and Romania. This 
originates in the fact that the EU was the powerful participant in the Romanian enlargement 
and thus such a position enabled the EU sole power over the production of the Reports. In 
this way the EU determines the activity type, the contents and the purpose of the Reports, as 
well as controls and constrains the “contributions of non-powerful participants” (2001:38-
39), which in this case is Romania. Such a practice has been discussed in Chapter 4, 
maintaining that the production of the enlargement documents was a one-way process, 
monopolised by a small group of Commission officials (Bellier, 2004:145) and that the EU 
had power to decide what was included and excluded in such reports (Pridham, 2007c:531). 
In particular Grabbe argues that the EU had the power to decide the information of the 
Regular Reports (2002:266).  
 
As interviewee 9 argued, the production of the Reports “was scattered with manipulation by 
the EU and asymmetry in reporting”, as the EU had “ultimate power in assessing us”. 
Interviewee 9 highlighted that “the Reports were the property of the Commission and they 
decided what the final draft was going to include, although officially this was never 
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recognized”. Such a view emphasizes therefore the fact that the EU had sole power to decide 
what was going on in the Reports and thus was able to produce a certain discourse type, 
which implied certain conventions, which in turn embodied particular power relations 
(2001:49). 
 
Furthermore, although officially, it is argued that each “Report draws on numerous sources of 
information” such as Romania, the Council, the Parliament, various international 
organizations, as well as NGOs (see for instance RR 2001:7), the Reports are not clear of 
what information has been provided and by whom. What we identify here is an obfuscation 
of agency, which is decided by the producer of the Reports. Interviewee 5 noted for instance 
that “ultimately the Reports were … done by the Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement”, but 
the Reports are still not clear about agency, causality and responsibility of what is going on 
the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:103).  
 
Second, as the above implied a one-sided act of the EU in the production process (see 
Fairclough, 2001:41), this raises concerns about who is actually the producer of the Reports. 
The implication of the production of the Reports was raised in Chapter 4, which 
acknowledged the different entities involved and revealed that detecting the producer is not 
an easy task. Initially, the Reports may be identified as the product of the European 
Commission, as each Report is labelled “From the Commission on Romania’s progress 
towards accession” (RR 1998 to RR 2000) or it is indicated on the title page that the Report 
has been produced by the “Commission of the European Communities”86 (RR 2001 to RR 
2006). But is the European Commission the sole power-holder in producing these Reports 
(see Fairclough, 2001:43)? As Chapter 4 shows, the Directorate- General Enlargement (DG 
                                                          
86 It should be noted that on the title page of the CMR 2005 only the name of “European Commission” appears. 
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ENLARG), which is one of the departments within the Commission, seems to be the central 
entity responsible for enlargement and thus the monitoring Reports (Lass-Lennecke and 
Werner, 2009). Nevertheless, we did learn that within this DG, different officials and units 
are involved with the production of the Reports, in particular the Coordination Unit, which 
has an important role in revising the different Report drafts (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 
2009:279; see also Appendix 4). However, none of these producers are clearly identified (see 
Fairclough, 2001:42), although as Appendix 4 shows, there is an obvious presence of several 
entities with a clear division of labor in the production of the Reports. The absence of clarity 
of who the producer is has implications upon production, as we do not know whose MR and 
ideologies shaped the production of the Reports. It can perhaps be argued that the producer of 
the Reports is an “identifiable unknown agent”, which relates to the idea of the obfuscation of 
agency. What this means is that we can identify the institutional entity, which has produced 
the Reports (the EU or the Directorate- General Enlargement), but since different agents are 
embedded within this institutional entity, the ownership of the production of the Reports is 
dispersed amongst a variety of identifiable unknown agents (see Fairclough, 2001:133).  
 
The obfuscation of the producer of the Reports was also raised by interviewee 3, who argued 
that although she had been part of the EU’s negotiating team, it was not possible to know all 
the involved actors in the production of the Reports: 
 
“I do not know who for instance wrote section B or this paragraph in this 
report. I could assume, but I cannot tell for sure who the producer was. I can 
only say it was the EU”.  
 
 
The interviewee also considered how such an obfuscation of the producer may have impacted 
upon the Reports:  
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“If anyone from the public would have asked who wrote this precise paragraph 
or sentence, we would not know. And it is important to know as the person 
who wrote that particular sentence may have had a view different from the 
person who read it. Now that you are asking it becomes interesting to know 
who wrote what and why … to know their background”.  
 
 
What we see above is a reflection over the fact that producers rely on certain MR in order to 
produce the Reports. However, as mentioned before, participants, either producers or 
interpreters, are often not aware that such MR produce a certain discourse type, by for 
instance shaping what is going on in the Reports. Depending on what MR the situational 
context triggers with the producer, the discourses of the Reports will be shaped in a certain 
way. The above statement by interviewee 3 is in particular pivotal as it shows how the 
interviewee becomes aware of the fact that the producer of the Report is not only obfuscated, 
but that the producer may also have relied on certain background information to produce the 
Report. In this way, interviewee 3 is questioning the influence of the producer over the 
Report.  
 
7.3.2. Who is involved?  
This section argues that the EU, as the producer of the Reports, produced who was involved 
in the Reports by identifying the positions of participants, in order to give an understanding 
of what participants are involved in the Romanian enlargement (see Fairclough, 2001:123). 
Such a choice not only creates an overall picture of who is involved in the Romanian 
enlargement, but also impacts upon which discourse type is being determined and what 
conventions will be applied by the participants of the discourse. Although positions can be 
multi-dimensional in the production process (2001:123), this section argues that this is not the 
case in the production of the Reports due to the one-sided production practice of the Reports.  
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First, throughout the Romanian enlargement, the EU is largely producing the position of 
Romania as a negotiating candidate country and of the EU as the rapporteur of the progress, 
although as Chapter 4 indicated, the image of Romania as a laggard was a regular feature of 
the Reports. This can be related to interviewee 9, who maintained that in particular Romania 
had a “stricter negotiation pattern, which differed significantly from previous candidates”. 
The interviewee argued that the EU was “harsher” on the position that Romania had in 
negotiations due to “the level of dissatisfaction and non-progress”. Interviewee 1 supported 
such a view by adding that Romania was seen as a laggard and that “if it was not for less 
successful applicants, Romania would have still maintained its laggardness” (here 
interviewee 1 refers to the challenges encountered by the EU for instance with the applicants 
from the Western Balkans).  
 
The power of the EU to decide who is involved in the Reports has implications upon 
production. For instance, as the production of the Reports is a one-sided act, the participants 
cannot easily alternate in their positions. It should be noted however that the EU as the 
powerful participant does have the power to produce different positions, but in the case of 
Romania this is not an option. We can contrast the one-sided aspect of the Reports to for 
instance face to face interactions, where participants may alternate in their positions. 
However in the case of the Reports, the production belongs to one producer. Also in 
comparison to a face-to-face interaction, the one-sided interaction is mostly produced “to 
address an ideal subject”, while in face-to-face interactions the production is formed to match 
the participants involved (2001:41). This can be related to the interview material. For 
instance, interviewee 6 argued that in accession negotiations Romania “was vocal and did put 
her interests across”. As a consequence, the EU was listening to Romania “by balancing 
tensions that occurred at the negotiation table and finding an answer to show Romania that 
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they were on our side”. On the other hand, interviewee 6 indicated that outside such 
negotiations, when perhaps Romania was absent from discussions, the EU produced an ideal 
subject:  
 
“Even though the Romanian team did their best, the Commission had final and 
ultimate power in order to match their interests…. But you have to bear in 
mind that they did not treat us as unequal …” 
 
 
Second, on the other hand, identifying the position of Romania as a negotiating participant 
can be seen as an “advantage” to Romania, as the EU to a large extent adopted the language 
of each Report to the situation of Romania and did not treat Romania as an unknown subject, 
as in the case of mass media, when the language is adopted to fit an ideal subject (see 
Fairclough, 2001:41). As such Romania is considered an entity with its own features and 
characteristics. Interviewee 4 for example argued that the EU “aimed to understand its 
peculiarities”. At a later stage in the interview, interviewee 4 also argued that any signs of 
discrimination or subordination of Romania “were eliminated”, an aspect which may suggest 
that Romania was not treated an unknown subject.  
 
In contrast, interviewee 7 had a different view of the position of Romania in the enlargement, 
by claiming that: 
 
“During the enlargement process I detected a tendency to portray Romania as 
a laggard who aims to demonstrate that it has come a long way from its 
Communist past. It is true that there was a level of desire to show the EU that 
Romania was making progress, but at the same time, the EU seemed to insist 
on maintaining the same laggard image of Romania, even after Romania 
became a member state. And we can clearly see that in the enlargement 
documents that have been produced, you mentioned the Regular Reports for 
example”.  
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In contrast to the above respondents, interviewee 2 raised the issue that as Romania had 
applied to become a member state of the EU, it was in the power of the EU to decide what 
representations the EU shaped, by arguing that “it is normal practice when you join a society 
that the leader decides what the applicant should do” to fulfill the entry requirements. The 
interviewee seems to suggest that both the EU and Romania were aware of the positions they 
both were to take, due to the conventions that are associated to an act of membership 
application.  
 
However, the important aspect in this particular situation is the fact that as the EU was the 
powerful participant, who controlled the positions of the EU and Romania, this raises 
questions of implications upon power relations. What is important to consider is the fact that 
the producer of the Reports employed certain MR, which reproduced ideologies and which in 
turn impacted upon power relations. However, as we do not know who the producer of the 
Reports are (obfuscated as discussed previously), it is difficult to acknowledge what MRs 
have been employed. Nevertheless, by being aware of such an implication raises 
consciousness of the impact upon power relations.  
 
7.3.3. In what relations? 
This section argues that the EU, as the producer of the Reports, produced what relations were 
enacted between the EU and Romania during the enlargement process (see Fairclough, 
2001:124). The importance of such a choice is that not only does it create an overall picture 
of the relations in the Romanian enlargement, but it also impacts upon which discourse type 
is being determined and what conventions will be applied.  
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The findings suggest that the EU produced a variety of relations in the Reports. For instance, 
the latter Reports witnessed of relations of solidarity, which were noticed through the EU’s 
representations of Romania as an inevitable member state. Such an aspect is exemplified by 
interviewees 1 and 5, who maintained that the relationship between the EU and Romania was 
characterized by “collaboration” and “friendship”. On the other hand in the earlier Reports, 
the EU produced relations of distance through the emphasis of Romania’s shortcomings. This 
can perhaps be related to interviewee 9 who argued that the EU “seemed to have a need of 
portraying Romania as different, even after Romania became a member state”. Later in the 
interview, the respondent made a comment that although he was familiar with the practices of 
the EU in an enlargement process, he could not identify “the reasons behind many of the 
EU’s decisions”.  
 
Furthermore the production of relations was also visible in each Regular Report, which 
included one section in which the relations between the EU and Romania were discussed, 
something that was missing from the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. This is an 
interesting aspect of the production practice as it questions why this specific section was 
excluded from the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. It can be argued that such a change 
occurred when the Treaty of Accession was signed in 2005 and Romania changed position 
from a candidate country to an acceding state. In this case, it can be suggested that due to 
changes in relations between the EU and Romania, the EU also produced a different kind of 
discourse in which such a section was not relevant.  
 
7.4. Interpretation of the situational context 
This section argues that based on the discourse type and conventions produced by the EU, 
interpreters of the Reports made sense of the situational context (see Fairclough, 2001:39). 
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However the interpreters were influenced by the discourse type and ideologies within the 
discourse type, which triggered certain MR and which in turn shaped a certain interpretation 
and impacted upon the interpreters’ MR (see Fairclough, 2001:39). The identification of the 
discourse type is an important part of the interpretation of the situational context, as once the 
discourse type is determined, the conventions of how to interpret a discourse type have been 
established (2001:39).  
 
7.4.1. What is going on?  
This section argues that when answering the question what is going on in the Reports, the 
interpreter makes an interpretation regarding the activity type, the contents (topics) and the 
purpose of the activity type, which helps interpreting the situational context and determines 
what discourse type to draw upon (Fairclough, 2001:123). The importance of such an aspect 
is the way through which the MR and the discourse type impact upon interpretation.  
 
In terms of the activity type of the Reports, we can argue that the activity type identified by 
the interpreter is an evaluation of the Romanian enlargement by the EU. However, especially 
the Regular Reports and the first two Comprehensive Monitoring Reports also identify other 
activity types, such as describing the Romanian and the EU relations, analyzing and assessing 
the political and economic criteria and addressing the acquis capacity (see for instance RR 
2003:4-5). Depending on who the interpreter is, the activity type which is identified can be an 
evaluation, a description or an address. Therefore depending on whom the interpreter is and 
the MR of the interpreters, the activity type may be interpreted differently. For instance, if the 
interpreter of the Reports is the Romanian negotiating team, the latter could have interpreted 
the Reports as the EU evaluating Romania unfairly. Interviewee 9 for instance argued that 
Romania was positioned in the Reports as an experiment for the future enlargements with 
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Turkey and Croatia and that Romanian officials were frustrated with the negative aspects that 
the EU detailed in the Reports about Romania. Furthermore, interviewee 10 maintained that 
the Reports did not seem to include the reality of what was going on, even though the 
interviewee maintained that the EU’s aim with producing the Reports was to successfully 
help Romania to become a member state. However what we see in the interviewees’ 
statements is the fact that as part of the Romanian negotiating team, the respondents 
interpreted the Reports in a negative way, which may be different from the interpretation of 
another participant.  
 
What is important to remember is that interpretation depends on who the interpreter is and 
what MRs are being employed. For instance, someone who had worked alongside Romania 
during the enlargement process, such as an EU official, would have had a different 
interpretation of the Romanian enlargement as described in the Reports than someone, such 
as a non EU citizen, who was not involved in the Romanian enlargement to the same level. 
For instance interviewee 5, who had worked for the EU, but in Romania and very closely 
with the Romanian negotiation team, argued that:  
 
“at the end of the process I obviously had more understanding. If you Google 
me somewhere you will find that I did once say in a press conference,  
  
 
 
This indicates that the position of the interpreter affects the interpretation of the Reports as it 
activates MR which are related to the knowledge, experiences, opinion, etc. that someone has 
about Romania. The interpretation may therefore be different for someone who does not have 
the same relation or knowledge about Romania.  
 
 Page | 222  
 
What is however of great importance is the fact that the producer’s MRs and ideologies, 
which have been reproduced in the Reports will be imposed on the interpreters by activating 
certain MR and thus influencing the way interpreters interpret the discourses (see Fairclough, 
2001:134). Such a practice functions ideologically, as participants are not aware of the 
elements of reproduction and ideological power that are sustained in the production of the 
situational context.  
 
7.4.2. Who is involved? 
This section argues that when answering the question who is involved in the Reports, the 
interpreter makes an interpretation regarding what positions the involved participants have, 
by relying on their MR (Fairclough, 2001:123).  
 
As the main participants of the Reports are the EU and Romania, interpreters may create 
multi-dimensional positions of these two actors (Fairclough, 2001:123), depending on whom 
the audience is and what MR are activated. For instance, the European Council, which was 
consulting the Reports prior to each December Council and took decisions regarding the 
Romanian enlargement, often seemed to reproduce the same image as the producer of the 
Reports. As discussed in Chapter 4, this relates to the fact that the decisions taken by the 
Councils with regards to the Romanian enlargement, seemed to follow the recommendation 
produced by the Commission (see Pridham, 2007c:527). We can therefore argue that the 
European Council in its position as the interpreter of the Reports was influenced by the 
producer. Such an influence activated certain MR upon which the European Council formed 
an image of the Romanian enlargement and the progress of Romania. However, as Chapter 4 
revealed, this was not always the case. For instance, the European Parliament was critical of 
the 1999 Report and disagreed with the assessments, arguing that the Commission had to re-
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evaluate their evaluations of Romania’s fulfillment of the political criteria. This indicates that 
as an interpreter, the Parliament did not reproduce the same representation as the 
Commission, but was critical about both the producer (the Commission) and Romania. 
Although, it must be noted that such a critique was primarily raised by the Parliament’s 
rapporteur Nicholson and thus reveals that depending on whom the interpreter is and what 
MR are activated by the discourse, the outcome may be different.  
 
Some of the interviewees drew attention to the fact that the way Romania’s position was 
discussed in the Reports had an impact on how it was to be understood by the public. For 
instance interviewee 10 commented that Romania was represented as a non-European 
country, an aspect also shared by interviewee 5. Although both respondents worked for 
different negotiation teams, their understanding of how Romania was positioned in the 
enlargement documents was similar. In particular interviewee 10 indicated that such an image 
“did us no good”, as interpreters of the Reports “would consider us as non-Europeans”. 
Furthermore, interviewee 5 supported such a view by adding that: 
 
“the way Romania was portrayed in the Regular Reports was not in its benefit. 
It created a distance to Europe and for someone who did not know anything 
about Romania, such a perception can be damaging for Romania” 
 
 
What is again pivotal in the interpretation practice of the situational context is the fact that the 
producer’s MRs and ideologies, which have been reproduced in the Reports will be imposed 
on the interpreters by activating certain MR and thus influencing the way interpreters 
interpret the discourses (see Fairclough, 2001:134). Such a practice functions ideologically, 
as participants are not aware of the elements of reproduction and ideological power that are 
sustained in the production of the situational context.  
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7.4.3. In what relations? 
This section argues that based on how the EU produced what relations were enacted between 
the EU and Romania during the enlargement process (see Fairclough, 2001:124), this 
influenced the way interpreters interpreted relations in the Romanian enlargement.  
 
To start with, depending on who the interpreters of the Reports are, they are likely to interpret 
the relations between the participants differently. First, one possible interpretation may be of 
a relationship of difference between the EU and Romania. Such an interpretation can be 
enacted in the language of the Reports through the use of the word “corruption”, which was 
repeated throughout the Reports. As discussed in the analysis of formal properties of 
language, such repetitions impact upon how interpreters understand the relations of Romania 
and the EU in the Romanian enlargement. For instance interpreters can formulate the image 
of Romania as a corrupted country, while of the EU as “policing” Romania and aiming to 
erase corruption before the country becomes member of the EU.  
 
The interviewees agreed that the relations between the EU and Romania were shaped by how 
people understood the EU assessments and reports. For instance interviewee 8 claimed that 
through her work during the Romanian enlargement (as part of the EU negotiating team), she 
tried to expose “a good and progressive image of Romania”:  
 
“for someone like me working for that long with Romania, I had a clear view 
of their prospective success and so I had the power to express such a view and 
let other EU departments and the general public of where Romania stood in 
relation to its accession”.  
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The striking aspect of the above comment is that the interviewee seemed to acknowledge that 
she had power in actually influencing how different audiences interpreted Romania. In her 
case, she seemed to project a positive image, though the interviewee does not reflect over 
whether her representations included ideologies, which in turn impacted upon the 
interpreters.  
 
In contrast, interviewee 10, who had worked as part of the Romanian negotiation team 
(unlike interviewee 8), had a different interpretation of how the relations between the EU and 
Romania were described in the Reports and the impact of these. Interviewee 10 used words 
such as “shocked”, “frustrated” and “manipulative” in explaining how the EU was exposing 
the relations with Romania:  
 
“First of all, we were shocked to understand that the EU viewed us as the 
Eastern Other and not as European. Our relation with Europe has always been 
strong, so it frustrated the negotiating team to accept … Such an image is 
manipulative. As these documents are historical documents, what will future 
generations think of us?”.  
 
 
What we identify above is the extent to which interviewee 10 is questioning not only how the 
EU produced relations between Romania and the EU, but also raised fears of how such 
productions are to be interpreted by for instance the public (future generations). What is 
actually distinctive is the fact that although interviewee 10 shows concerns of the aspects of 
production and interpretation, it is doubtful that he is aware of the ideological power and 
reproduction of ideologies, which impact upon power relations.  
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A third example, interviewee 7, who had been part of the negotiating team of both Romania 
and later of the EU, maintained a different position on the relations depicted in the (Regular) 
Reports. Interviewee 7 claimed that:  
 
“for me it was easy to understand the position of the EU in the Reports, once I 
had joined the EU team. However, prior to that, as part of the Romanian 
negotiating team, I felt the EU was creating distance between us and them. 
Once I joined the EU team, I understood that this was a matter of official 
wording and nothing personal … although I am not sure whether the public 
understands that, as the wording is so constrained by EU bureaucracy”.  
 
In contrast to the other two interviewees, interviewee 7 seemed to have a different 
understanding of the relations enacted in the Reports. This is shaped by the MR of the 
interviewee who has different experiences, knowledge, etc., due to the involvement with both 
the Romanian and the EU negotiating teams.  
 
7.5. Production and interpretation of the intertextual context 
This section argues that producers and interpreters of the Reports produce and interpret the 
Reports according to an intertextual context. In order to set out such an argument, the section 
will examine the extent to which presuppositions played role in the production and 
interpretation of the Reports. As mentioned earlier, the importance of presuppositions lays in 
the fact that they are a resource in the production of texts and a cue in the interpretation of 
texts (2001:121). Their implication upon power relations is related to the fact that 
presuppositions are taken-for-granted assumptions, which are embedded in language (Machin 
and Mayer, 2012:222).  
 
This section also argues that the Reports were produced and interpreted based on the 
assumption of intertextuality, which suggests that texts “exist in intertextual relations with 
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other texts” (2001:129). In other words, intertextuality refers to how the EU produced the 
Reports or the interpreter interpreted the Reports with references to other texts and 
presupposed other participants knew about the Romanian enlargement (Fairclough, 1995:134, 
2001:127). The section also discusses how presuppositions can be sincere and manipulative, 
in the sense that the producer believes the readers sincerely share the same information, but 
manipulative that the information is hidden as to not include all aspects (2001:128). 
 
7.5.1. Presuppositions  
To start with, presuppositions are embedded in the production of each Report. For instance 
the first paragraph of each Regular Reports outlines the following: 
 
“In Agenda 2000 the EU said it would report regularly to the European 
Council on progress made by each of the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in preparations for membership and that it would submit its 
first report at the end of 1998. The European Council in Luxembourg decided 
that … ” (RR 1998:4). 
 
Such a paragraph includes a variety of presuppositions, such as Agenda 2000, report 
regularly, European Council, progress, candidate countries, Central and Eastern Europe, 
membership, first report and European Council in Luxembourg. These presuppositions are 
the EU’s interpretations of what they assume the audience might know about the enlargement 
process and does not need to explain in detail what each of the above terminology means. 
The EU has to assess the intertextual experience of the audience in order to determine what 
can be left unwritten, what can be included and what can be alluded to. In this case, the EU 
produces a text which is based on the assumption that the readers of the Reports will be 
familiar with the above presuppositions. The EU’s assessment of the audience is therefore 
limited as only someone with certain background knowledge will be able to understand the 
Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:123).  
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These presuppositions involve a dilemma. We do not know whether the EU produced such a 
paragraph, presupposing that the Romanian enlargement has attracted enough interest and 
therefore audiences share the same knowledge of the Romanian enlargement as the EU and 
do not need a more detailed explanation of what for instance Agenda 2000 is and who the 
candidate countries are. We can then assume that the presuppositions were sincere. However, 
even though the presuppositions may not be manipulative in this case, they can still be 
ideological, because by including certain words, for instance Central and Eastern Europe, 
such a vocabulary would activate certain MR with the interpreters which may create images 
of alterity and otherness. In other words, presuppositions can have a significant impact on 
interpreters.   
 
The Comprehensive Monitoring Reports have a somehow different introductory paragraph, 
but which however also captures a number of presuppositions as the below example 
demonstrates:  
 
“The accession negotiations with Romania were successfully concluded in 
December 2004. The Accession Treaty was signed in April 2005. Romania 
and 14 Member States have already ratified it. The Treaty envisages accession 
on 1 January 2007 unless the Council decides, upon a EU recommendation, to 
postpone it until 1 January 2008. Following the conclusion of the negotiations, 
the European Union decided that it would continue closely to monitor 
Romania's preparations and achievements and that, to this end, the EU would 
continue to submit annual reports on Romania's progress towards accession, 
together with recommendations, if appropriate. The EU presented its first such 
a report in October 2005. This report showed that Romania was already well 
advanced in preparing for accession. It also identified a number of areas where 
further efforts were needed to complete preparations. The EU decided to step 
up its monitoring activities and report again in spring 2006” (CMR 2006a:4).  
 
In the above we also identify sincere presuppositions. The sincere presuppositions are for 
instance references to the different key dates that have taken place since December 2004. 
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Such facts can be presupposed to be known by the audience, but the EU does not know to 
what extent the audience is familiar with this information. Again, this may be based on the 
presupposition that the Romanian enlargement has attracted enough interest from the 
audience, who is familiar with for instance the Accession Treaty and the postponement 
clause. The ideological presuppositions come in references such as “continue closely to 
monitor Romania's preparations and achievements”. This implies a level of intertextuality as 
participants are presupposed to know the level of preparedness of Romania and its 
shortcomings.  
 
On the other hand we can also identify a combination of sincere and manipulative 
presuppositions in the Reports. For instance, the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report is a 
good example of how the EU used a number of presuppositions during a phase when 
Romania was officially recognized as becoming a member state of the EU in January 2007:  
 
“Romania, in light of its geopolitical situation in Europe and with its 22 
million inhabitants, plays the role of an interface between the European Union 
(EU) and the Balkans as well as Black Sea regions. After the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the emergence of a democratic regime, Romania very soon 
established in 1990 diplomatic relations with the EU. The same year, Romania 
signed a Trade and Co-operation Agreement with it. In 1993, a far-reaching 
Association Agreement called “Europe Agreement” which already recognised 
Romania' goal of becoming a member of the EU. This agreement, which 
created a free trade zone between Romania and the Member States, was 
already part of the strategy of the EU to prepare Romania for accession, which 
also included substantial financial and technical assistance” (CMR 2005:3). 
 
The sincere presuppositions are for instance the aspect of Romania’s historical relationship 
with the EU and its post-communist transition. Such facts can be presupposed to be known by 
the participants, but the EU does not know to what extent the participants are familiar with 
this information. Again, this may be based on the presupposition that the fifth enlargement 
and the Romanian enlargement have attracted interest from the audience, who is familiar with 
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for instance the Europe Agreement and the free trade zone. The manipulative presuppositions 
are included in wording such as “the role of an interface and its geopolitical situation in 
Europe”. Such references can be regarded as manipulative in the sense that they presuppose 
background knowledge shared by the audience (see Fairclough, 2001:128). The ideological 
presuppositions can be identified in references such as “the strategy of the EU to prepare 
Romania for accession”. This implies a level of intertextuality as participants are 
presupposed to know the level of preparedness of Romania and its shortcomings. In particular 
presuppositions, which are made in the Reports, seem to indicate towards a level of 
intertextuality. For the producer, the EU, it is a matter of producing the Reports based on 
previous Reports and other documents, but which the EU presupposes other participants are 
also familiar with. In the case of the interpreters, the interpreter may interpret the Report with 
references to other texts and may presuppose of the other participants what they know about a 
certain situation (see Fairclough op.cit., 1995:134) 
 
The findings suggest that producers and interpreters of the Reports produced and interpreted 
the Reports according to an intertextual context in which presuppositions played role. The 
importance of presuppositions lays in the fact that they are a resource in the production of 
texts and a cue in the interpretation of the Reports, but that presuppositions are also taken-for-
granted assumptions, which are based on assumption of intertextuality (see Fairclough, 
2001:129).  
 
7.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship 
The below three sub-sections present a discussion of how the findings help us understand the 
extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship 
and setting out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports. The 
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main argument is that examining the two discourse practices can reveal the extent to which 
the production and interpretation of the Reports may be identified as places in which unequal 
power relations were produced, exercised and enacted.  
 
7.6.1. Subalternity 
This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the 
Reports produced unequal power relations by allowing elements of subalternity.   
 
First, the findings demonstrate that the EU had sole power over the production process of the 
Reports and thus had power to control and constrain Romania’s access to discourse, in 
particular as Romania was not part of the production process. Such a constraint to access to 
discourse implies that the EU had authority in producing discourse, while Romania was 
excluded (see Fairclough, 2001:53). In subalternity terms, this implies that the EU was the 
elite, which rendered Romania mute. Romania was being spoken for by the EU and its voice 
was not heard. However, this leads to questions of the extent to which what ideologies the EU 
could have included in the production practice and how these may have impacted upon power 
relations.  
 
Second, in line with the main concern of subalternity, of whether the subaltern can be 
“retrieved and restored to history” (McLeod op.cit., p.221), whether the subaltern is able to 
be heard, to be listened to and to have one’s experiences considered or whether the subaltern 
will always be spoken for by colonial representational systems, looking at the production 
practice does not seem to allow Romania to be heard. In other words, it can be argued that the 
production practice does not allow Romania’s voice to be heard and thus Romania remains 
mute. Instead, Romania’s voice is ventriloquized as the EU is facilitating how Romania is 
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“known, represented, and spoken for” (Moore-Gilbert op.cit., p.452). Romania’s position as a 
subaltern in the Romanian enlargement is facilitated therefore by the production practice.  
 
Third, due to the power of the EU as the main producer of the Reports, such a one-sided 
process affects the interpreter. In other words, the EU as the producer of a text exercises 
power over interpreters as the EU decides what should be “included and excluded, how 
events are presented, and … the subject positions of their audiences” (Fairclough, 2001:42). 
Elements of subalternity, which for instance recognizes the EU as the powerful participant 
(elite) and Romania as the non-powerful participant (the subaltern), are being reproduced not 
only through the production practice, but also through the interpretation practice. 
 
7.6.2. Orientalist discourse 
This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the 
Reports produced unequal power relations by allowing elements of orientalism.   
 
First, the implication of the production of the Reports is that the EU has power to produce a 
certain discursive register of particular perceptions and representation about the Romanian 
enlargement. In particular the EU has the sole power over the production of what is going on 
in the Reports, it controls and constrains the contents that will be included and can create 
certain knowledge about Romania, which will be later distributed to interpreters. This 
knowledge may for instance include negative and positive representations about Romania, as 
we identified in Chapter 5 through negative and positive vocabulary. However just like in the 
case of orientalist discourses, the discourses in the Reports may be manipulative and so can 
create imaginative truths about the Romanian enlargement. Thus the production practice 
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inscribed unequal power relations by enabling the EU to create knowledge about the 
Romanian enlargement, but this knowledge may create alterity.  
 
Second, the implication of orientalist discourses upon the practice of interpretation is that this 
EU acquired knowledge influences the way interpreters understands the Romanian 
enlargement. This relates to the fact that the EU as the producer exercises power over 
interpreters as the producer decides what should be “included and excluded, how events are 
presented, and … the subject positions of their audiences” (Fairclough op.cit., p.42). What 
this means is that the discourses of the Reports activate certain MR with the interpreters and 
produce a certain image of Romania. As it has been revealed in previous chapters, the 
language of the Reports influenced for instance the decisions taken by the European Councils 
regarding the Romanian enlargement process. What this indicates is the fact that the EU (the 
Commission) produced knowledge about the Romanian enlargement based on interpretations 
of the Commission’s assessments. The implication upon the production of unequal power 
relations is related to the fact that the producer of the Reports reproduces ideologies and MR, 
which may influence the interpretations of the Reports. As for instance in the case of the 
European Councils, who were influenced by the same interpretations as the Commission’s 
when deciding the path of the Romanian enlargement, the assessments of the Commission 
may have created images of alterity about Romania as a candidate country, which influenced 
how the Romanian enlargement was controlled.  
 
7.6.3. Mimicry 
This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the 
Reports produced unequal power relations by enabling elements of mimicry. 
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First, although the EU was the producer of the Reports, the production practice actually 
emancipated Romania to a certain extent by enabling Romania the power of knowledge. 
What this means is that while the EU produced the Reports in which for instance Romania’s 
shortcomings were assessed, this can also be seen as an encouragement for Romania to 
become similar to the EU and acquire the EU’s knowledge by overcoming the shortcomings. 
In this sense, the practice of production can be identified as a tool through which Romania 
became entirely knowable and visible. It was however not identifiable in the findings to what 
extent Romania challenged the EU by essentially mimicking it and furthermore, to what 
extent the EU felt threatened by Romania.  
 
Second, as the EU adopted the language of each Report to the situation of Romania and did 
not treat Romania as an unknown subject, this again indicates that Romania was knowable 
and visible during the production practice. Furthermore, the way the EU produced positions 
of Romania as a laggard, but also as a future member state indicates that Romania was 
identified as almost the same, but not quite, which relates to the practice of double framing, 
discussed in a previous chapter.  
 
Overall, what is intriguing about the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry 
discussed above is that producers and interpreters are often not aware of how reproduction of 
ideologies occurs and how it may contribute to the three aspects, which in turn impact upon 
power relations (2001:2-3 and 118). However, by identifying the extent to which subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry impacts upon unequal power relations through the two discourse 
practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in 
and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such unequal 
relations.  
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7.7. Conclusions  
This chapter has argued that the production of unequal power relations can be identified in 
instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operate in the discourse practices of 
the Reports. Although discourse practices may be automatic processes when producing and 
interpreting language, we cannot neglect the fact that they may also be ideological and thus 
produce unequal power relations. Furthermore, interpreters are exposed to the ideologies of 
the producers of the Reports and such influences activate different MR in the interpreters and 
shape the interpretation about what is going on in the Reports and what positions and 
relations are depicted. If the Reports activate the type of MR that the EU have produced, then 
we can conclude that the Reports had had ideological power by reproducing the EU’s 
ideologies. For instance, if the formal properties of the Reports activate a negative image of 
Romania linked to the inferiority of Eastern Europe, then we can say that such ideologies 
have been reproduced (see Fairclough, 2001:199).  
 
The findings also suggest that the intertextual context plays an important role in the 
production and interpretation of the Reports, as presuppositions are a mechanism through 
which ideologies are being reproduced. This is especially produced when manipulative 
presuppositions are applied, as the producers (the EU) will consciously choose to hide certain 
information, which will impact upon how interpreters will interpret the discourses of the 
Reports. What is striking is the fact that neither the producers nor the interpreters are aware 
of the ideological functions of presuppositions upon power relations.  
 
The above findings are significant because they question the extent to which discourse 
practices may affect the production and interpretation of the Reports. Although the analysis 
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above reveals how discourse practices produce unequal power relations, it does not tell us 
anything about what elements impacted upon such practices. In particular, this chapter has 
discussed reproduction of ideologies and how they impact upon power relations. However, as 
power relations are not static, but change, the next chapter will engage with the examination 
of the social conditions, sociocultural practices, that impact upon discourse practices, in order 
to identify the extent to which such conditions change unequal power relations and 
emancipate subordinated groups.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
ANALYSING THE SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF THE 
REPORTS 
 
 
 
 
This chapter argues that analyzing the sociocultural practices of the Regular Reports and the 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, by applying the explanation dimension, will 
demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, as sociocultural 
practices are identified as processes through which ideologies are reproduced, but also where 
ideologies can be changed through social struggles. To explore this argument, the chapter 
will first outline the explanation dimension of sociocultural practices. Second, the chapter 
discusses how the explanation dimension has been applied to the sociocultural practices of 
the Reports, followed by a third section, which includes the findings of the analysis of 
sociocultural practices. Fourth, the section introduces a discussion of how the findings help 
us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a 
postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. Similarly 
to the previous dimensions, the chapter concludes in which ways the explanation dimension 
can be applied to extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and set out how 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are functioning in the Reports.  
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8.1. Outline of the explanation dimension 
Following the discussion in Chapter 3, this section summarizes what the explanation 
dimension involves and the significance of this dimension in analyzing how sociocultural 
practices enable the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse, as well as 
facilitate change and emancipation. The section will also discuss the correlation between the 
explanation and interpretation dimensions.  
 
The explanation dimension engages with the extent to which social structures (power 
relations) at the situational (the immediate social environment in which discourse occurs), 
institutional (such as court room, family, etc.) and societal (society as a whole) levels are 
reciprocally shaping and influencing discourse practices. The correlation between the 
explanation dimension and the interpretation dimension rests upon the fact that social 
structures impact upon MR, which in turn shape discourses, which in turn sustain or change 
MR and which in turn sustain or change social structures. Such an examination allows 
researchers to engage with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, taking 
into consideration how power relations are influencing and are being influenced (Fairclough, 
2001:135, 2010:132-33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357).  
 
While it is during the explanation dimension that ideologies are reproduced or discontinued 
(Fairclough, 2001:71), this reproduction or change occurs through social struggles. As 
discourse is identified as “the site of power struggles“ and “the stake in power struggles” 
(2001:61), power struggles are won by controlling formal properties and constraining 
contents, relations and positions in discourse. In other words, participants are struggling for 
controlling and constraining discourse as by doing so, they can win the site of power 
struggles, i.e. by controlling discourse and by winning such a control, they have won the 
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discourse, which is the stake in power struggles. Thus, the participant, who has won control 
over discourse, is regarded as having “power in discourse and power behind discourse” 
(2001:36). Power in discourse refers to “controlling and constraining contributions of non-
powerful participants” (2001:38-39), while power behind discourse is concerned with 
questions of “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and 
enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Any participant will attempt to impose 
its ideologies on power relations in order to win or maintain power in and behind discourse at 
the situational, institutional and societal levels (2001:59 and 71). 
 
It should be noted that the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in social 
struggles with non-powerful participants (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as the latter also engages 
to win power (2001:59) and thus power in and behind discourse can be lost in social struggles 
(2001:61). It is essential to mention that by having power in and behind discourse, the 
dominant bloc also has power to decide the discourse type (2001:39), which controls and 
constrains discourse (2001:25) and which influences the production and interpretation of text 
and what MR will be used in these practices (2001:124). A discourse type is defined as the 
type of discourse within which participants interact87. 
 
8.2. Applying the explanation dimension 
This section discusses how the explanation dimension has been applied to the sociocultural 
practices of the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between 
sociocultural practices and unequal power relations by establishing that such practices 
reproduce and change ideologies, which impact upon power relations. By doing so, the thesis 
aims to reveal whether the EU restated its power by enforcing ideologies in social struggles, 
                                                          
87 See footnote 43.  
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what forms these ideologies took and whether Romania engaged in social struggles and if so, 
at which levels could these social struggles be identified. In other words, the explanation 
dimension aims to answer the question why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why 
it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to 
unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181). Such an examination 
allows researchers to engage with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, 
taking into consideration how power relations are influencing and are being influenced 
(Fairclough, 2001:135, 2010:132-33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357). Just as in the case of the 
description and interpretation dimensions, the findings of the analysis will be discussed in 
relation to postcolonial theory in order to indicate the extent to which sociocultural practices 
are a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted through 
elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.  
 
The explanation of the Reports will be applied as indicated in Figure 1, which shows that 
social structures (power relations) affect MR or producers and interpreters of the Reports and 
thus reproduce ideologies, which in turn shape discourses, which in turn sustain or change 
(social struggles) MR and which in turn sustain or change social structures (2001:135). In this 
interplay, ideologies can be reproduced or changed in social struggles (2001:31). The 
explanation dimension engages therefore with how discourses in the Reports are affected by 
and affects power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels (Fairclough, 
2001:30). Thus, in contrast to the interpretation dimension, which is concerned with how MR 
reproduce ideologies, the explanation dimension is concerned with both reproduction and 
change of ideologies (2001:135). 
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Figure 1. The explanation dimension.  
 
It should be noted that the EU as the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in 
social struggles with Romania as the non-powerful participant (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as 
the latter also engages to win power (2001:59). As discussed previously, power in and behind 
discourse can be lost in social struggles (2001:61), but by retaining such power, the dominant 
bloc is able to decide the discourse type, which in turn controls and constrains discourse and 
which influences the production and interpretation of text and what MR will be used in these 
practices (2001:25, 39 and 124).   
 
When applying the explanation dimension, researchers can ask three questions of a discourse 
in relations to the institutional, situational and societal levels (Fairclough, 2001:138). The 
three questions are indicated in Table 10.   
 
 How is discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional 
and societal levels?  
 Are these struggles overt or covert?  
 Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations, or transforming them? 
Table 10. What power relations at the situational, institutional and societal levels shape discourse? 
(Source: Fairclough, 2001:138).  
 
 
Social 
structures
•power 
relations
MR
•ideologies
Discourse
• social 
struggles
MR
•ideologies
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In order to explore the extent to which an examination of sociocultural practices can reveal 
the extent of the production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon one main 
argument, which maintains that power relations at the institutional, societal and situational 
levels supported an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania and which in turn 
impacted upon how the discourses of the Reports were produced and interpreted. The below 
findings claim that attempts to change social struggles did occur, in which the EU’s power 
was challenged by Romania, but that such social struggles were not won by the latter. As the 
EU won the social struggles, it therefore continued to impose its ideologies in and behind 
discourse at the situational, institutional and societal levels (see Fairclough, 2001:59). 
 
8.3. Power relations at institutional level 
This section argues that the analysis of power relations at the institutional level will 
demonstrate the extent to which power relations and power struggles shaped and were shaped 
by the discourses of the Reports.  
 
The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of 
institutional level that the Reports’ discourses belong to. By identifying this discourse type, 
the explanation dimension will be able to identify what power relations, power struggles, MR 
and ideologies determined the language of the Reports, but also how language later shaped 
power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:158).  
 
This is a rather complex question as the Romanian enlargement relates to a variety of 
institutions. So far we have identified the EU and the Romanian government as agencies in 
the enlargement process, but other actors can also be recognized. For instance, within the EU, 
we have at one point argued that it was the Commission, who dealt with the enlargement 
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process, but more specifically, within the Commission, the DG ENLARG was the main actor 
running the enlargement process. Further, within the DG ENLARG, there was one unit of 
Commission officials set up as Romania country desk, which “monitored the development of 
all chapters … and was in direct contact with national actors” (Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 
2009:277-278). From time to time we have seen how the European Councils influenced the 
enlargement process. In particular Chapter 4 revealed what one can identify as “the tip of the 
iceberg” (see Lewis, 2010:144) with regards to the many entities and layers involved at the 
institutional level. In addition to this, we can also add that there were other institutions, at 
both regional and national levels, involved with the enlargement, which also played a role in 
the Romanian enlargement. On the other hand, within the Romanian government, we have a 
range of ministries, departments and bureaus and within each one, a variety of smaller units, 
which were supporting the negotiation team and/or was part of this and thus was associated 
with the enlargement process. Moreover, lobby groups, resistance groups, oppositions 
groups, citizens, media, etc. were also part of this apparatus of actors. Although we can name 
other institutions within both the EU and the Romanian government, the above examples 
should demonstrate the complex dynamics that existed when it comes to the institutional 
level and deciding what institutional processes did the discourses of the Reports belong to 
(see Fairclough, 2001:158-159).  
 
It can be argued that the discourses of the Reports belong primarily to the institutional level 
of the EU. Here is it necessary to recall that the Romanian enlargement discourses are 
primarily determined by the EU’s accession politics. Therefore we recognise a power 
struggle between the EU and Romania in who is controlling and constraining the discourses. 
As it was mentioned earlier, power struggles are identified as the ability to control and 
constrain contents, relations and positions within a discourse. Recalling the enlargement 
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phases in Chapter 4, it was acknowledged that Romania applied for membership to the EU, 
but that the EU was in the position to take decisions upon the Romanian membership 
application and the enlargement process. This suggests that not only was the EU the 
dominant bloc, but also that the EU determined the contents, relations and positions of the 
discourses produced. This strongly suggests that the EU’s MR had a determinative influence 
over the Reports discourses. This supports the argument that the power relations at this point 
in the Romanian enlargement were unequal, as the EU, as the dominant bloc, controlled and 
constrained discourses.  
 
The next step is to identify what MR and ideologies did the EU use when determining 
discourses in the Reports. It should be argued that the Reports covered a great number of 
discourses, but one that was noticeable was the discourse of the second wave of the fifth 
enlargement. As already discussed, it was noted that the first wave differenced greatly from 
the second wave and thus we cannot speak of a fifth enlargement discourse, but a second 
wave of the fifth enlargement discourse. Although the discourse aimed for the successful 
integration of Romania within the EU, the discourse also identifies a power struggle that 
ideologically determined the EU’s MR and activated certain MR. For instance, a central part 
of the Romanian enlargement was driven by the conditionality principle, as described in 
Chapter 4. Romania had to fulfil certain accession criteria in order to access the EU and it 
was according to these criteria that the EU was producing the Reports. Thus, the EU’s MR 
and ideologies were activated according to the accession politics and thus were shaping the 
discourses of the Reports. As it was noted in the Reports, the EU already had a precise image 
of what a successful member state should achieve. This suggests that the position of Romania 
was determined according to the EU’s view of the conditionality principle. Furthermore, 
relations between the EU and Romania were also decided according to how Romania 
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performed according to the conditionality principle. In this way the EU’s MR were activated, 
which in turn determined how discourses were produced. These have implications for power 
relations, as so far, the EU was the dominant bloc, while Romania was in a subaltern position.  
 
Once the discourses were produced in the form of the Reports, these were published and 
distributed to the European Council, as well as made available to the general public (see 
Fairclough, 2001:160). At the European Council, decisions were taken regarding the 
Romanian enlargement progress. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the discourses of the Reports 
were influencing the decisions taken at the European Councils regarding the progress of the 
Romanian enlargement. It can be argued that the discourses activated certain MR in the 
officials working in the European Councils and thus had an impact upon the Romanian 
enlargement process. Such MR also impacted upon how social struggles and power relations 
were produced. In the case of the Romanian enlargement, the EU was in the position to 
maintain its dominant bloc position, while Romania continued to be subjugated to the 
subaltern position. In this way, unequal power relations were maintained.  
 
On the other hand, we have the Romanian negotiation team, who sometimes showed 
concerns over decisions taken at the EU level, as indicated in Chapter 4. Here we can argue 
that Romania challenged the power struggle and attempted to win power over discourse by 
changing the discourse itself. For instance, the 1997 decision to leave Romania out of 
negotiations infuriated Romanian Prime Minister Ciorbea, who raised fears about 
discrimination and unequal treatment by the EU (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, op.cit. 
p.38). Here we identify a challenge to power struggle, but due to the less powerful position of 
Romania in the accession negotiations, changes were not sustained.  
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However, there were instances in the Romanian enlargement, when the discourses of the 
Reports changed and impacted upon power relations and power struggles. Two such 
instances have been mentioned in Chapter 4. The first instance is related to the 1999 Regular 
Report, which indicated a level of progress in Romania. Such a discourse satisfied the 
Helsinki European Council to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences and to begin 
negotiations with Romania. This meant that the discourse of the Report activated certain MR 
in the officials that worked at the European Council and which changed the way Romania 
was dealt with. The question is what triggered the EU to change its discourse about the 
Romanian enlargement. Was it a change in the practices of the Romanian enlargement or was 
it a change sustained by another factor? After all, it should be noted that Chapter 4 
acknowledged that the Commission proposed opening accession negotiations with Romania 
as a solution towards the increasingly unstable situation due to the Kosovo conflict 
(Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:43) and the 1999 Report itself addressed how 
Romania joined the EU’s position on Kosovo and showed cohesion with both the EU’s and 
NATO’s actions and demands (RR 1999:58). Could this then have been a factor, which 
influenced the EU’s discourse regarding Romania?  
 
The second instance is related to the 2004 Regular Report’ discourse, which indicated that 
Romania was ready for the next level in the enlargement process and implied the signing of 
the Treaty of Accession. The change in the discourse of the Report activated certain MR in 
the officials of the EU and changed the negotiations with Romania. It can be argued that once 
the discourse changed, different MR and ideologies were reproduced, which caused a change 
in the enlargement process. Again, the main question is what caused such change in the EU’s 
discourse production. One possible answer may be that the discourse or/and practices of 
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Romania changed, which in turn had an impact upon what MR were activated in the EU 
when assessing the enlargement.   
 
However, the examination of the institutional level identifies an implication, which suggests 
that the discourses of the Reports did not change the power relations to a considerate level, 
but that the power relations continued to determine the discourses, by sustaining the same 
MR and ideologies. Despite the fact that we see a change in Romania’s accession politics, by 
becoming a candidate country and an acceding state, the September 2006 Report introduced 
continued monitoring activity of Romania post accession. Especially in the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports, the discourses introduced a vocabulary, which was unprecedented, such 
as benchmarking and safeguard clauses, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Such a wording not 
only activated certain MR, but also constrained contents, relations and positions. For 
instance, by establishing the need of continued monitoring of Romania, such a decision 
activated the knowledge (MR) that Romania had not joined the EU on equal terms, but that it 
was still a laggard. The relations between Romania and the other member states were 
therefore not equal.   
 
It is also worth discussing whether the interplay between power relations and discourses had 
the same effect and determination on both the production and interpretation processes. This is 
another complex question. For instance, the discourses of the Reports are important in the 
interpretation process of for instance citizens. In the case of the referendum that takes place 
when an acceding state is joining the EU, the national vote of the citizens is important for 
such a phase. The citizens’ decisions are however based on how the Reports’ discourses 
shape the citizens’ MR about the Romanian enlargement. For instance, in the case of the 
Romanian ratification, a high number of officials in the Flemish and Dutch Parliaments voted 
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against ratification (Phinnemore, 2011:99). Although this was not seen as a threat to the 
ratification, we cannot neglect the fact that this may indicate that the discourses of the 
Reports impacted upon the officials’ image of Romania as a member state, shaping and 
activating their MR in a certain way and influencing their decisions.  
 
According to CDA, the dominant bloc “constantly reasserts their power” in order to keep the 
power, while the less powerful agents are making a bid for power (Fairclough, 2001:57). This 
was identified in Chapter 4, when for instance the Romanian officials were infuriated with 
some of the decisions of the EU regarding the Romanian enlargement and how the EU 
maintained its power by either making demands or ensuring Romania of a later accession. 
The Reports can be regarded as an important element in this power struggle, as the discourses 
in the Reports maintained the power struggle at the institutional level. What this means is that 
the power struggle was enabled by the dominant position of the EU in the production process 
and who used the Reports to include ideologies of how Romania belonged to a certain 
category of applicants (laggard) and thus created knowledge about Romania. Such discourses 
imply that certain ideologies, which can be identified as common-sense assumptions about 
the Romanian enlargement, were actually functioning ideologically.  
 
The findings reported above suggest that the Reports’ discourses were ideologically 
determined and ideologically determinative of power relations and power struggles. First, it 
was highlighted that due to the process of enlargement, the EU was the dominant bloc, which 
had control and constraint over the discourses of the Reports. This provides support for the 
suggestion that as the EU controlled what contents, relations and position were produced in 
the Reports, such a practice impacted upon power relations. Such findings help to explain the 
correlation between the institutional level, discourses and power relations. Second, it appears 
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that the institutional level supported a second wave discourse, which sustained the EU as the 
dominant bloc and Romania as the non-powerful participant. In this way, unequal power 
relations were produced. 
 
For example when the EU engaged with Romania in for example negotiation meetings, these 
meetings created certain conventions for how these get-togethers would happen. The EU had 
the knowledge about how enlargement should take places, was seen as asking the right 
questions to establish Romania’s situation as an applicant, candidate and accession state, had 
experience from previous enlargements (even if these differ from the fifth enlargement) and 
had solutions and information of how enlargements could be processed, all of which Romania 
needed. Romania had no knowledge or had limited knowledge and experience of what 
enlargement entitled, what to question or negotiate about (especially perhaps during the early 
stages), what needed to be done and so on. This put the EU in a dominant position and 
Romania in a subaltern one, as EU enlargement was not Romania’s place of expertise88. In 
this circumstance, language was the instrument through which ideologies about positions, 
relations, etc. were shaped. This relates to the argument that power can be “won, held and 
lost” through language and that language is “the site of power struggles“ and “the stake in 
power struggles” (Fairclough, 2001:61).  
 
8.4. Power relations at societal level 
 
The analysis of the determinations and effects at the societal level will highlight how the 
social structures shaped and were shaped by the discourses of the Reports.  
 
                                                          
88 This discussion was based on Fairclough’s example of a doctor - patient appointment (2001:2).  
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The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of 
societal level that the discourses belong to. By identifying this discourse type, the explanation 
dimension will be able to identify what power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies 
determined the language of the Reports, but also how language later shaped power relations, 
power struggles, MR and ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:158). This is again a complex 
question to answer, as the Romanian enlargement relates to a variety of societal levels. For 
instance, we can identify a Western and Eastern society, Europe and Europe’s Other, two 
European societies that are aiming for integration, a capitalist society and a post-communist 
society, etc. Although we can illustrate other agencies, the above examples should 
demonstrate the complex dynamics that exists when it comes to the societal level and 
deciding what societal processes did the discourses of the Reports belong to (see Fairclough, 
2001:158-159). However, in order to clarify in which ways discourses are ideologically 
determined of and ideologically determinative by power relations and power struggles at the 
societal level (see Fairclough, 2001:2), this section will look at the power relations and 
struggles determined by the image of the non-European Eastern Other (Romania) and the 
embodiment of Europe (the EU), which was raised in the Introduction chapter.  
 
The implication of such a level is that the Romanian enlargement is no longer a matter of 
only EU enlargement and integration, but also a matter of integration of the Eastern European 
Other (Romania) into the European Self (the EU). To a certain extent this also implies that a 
former satellite state (Romania) transitions from post-communism into democracy, a 
functioning market economy and the implementation of the acquis, which are central features 
of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria.  
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What we can identify at the societal level is that power relations and power struggles have 
taken a different shape in comparison to the institutional level. Instead of enlargement politics, 
which is largely dealt with at the institutional level, the societal level is shaped by power 
relations and power struggles, which are determined by the “idea of Europe” discourse (see 
Pagden, 2004). Thus, the MR that will be activated in the process of production and the 
process of interpretation are related to the common-sense assumptions that the EU has about 
Romania as part of Europe. As mentioned in chapters 5-7, we could identify how the EU 
controlled and constrained contents, relations and positions based on such MR. For instance, 
it was identified that the EU applied a certain vocabulary, such as the words Eastern and 
European, as means to describe the Romanian enlargement (or some aspects of it). Such 
findings suggest that the MR, which determined what discourse was to be produced, were 
shaped by the power relations between Europe and the Other. These themes have 
implications for the investigation of power relations, as it provides support of how power 
relations that exist, activate certain MR, which will produce a certain discourse.  
 
One noticeable aspect is the implications that the discourses produced in the Reports will 
have upon activating certain MR in the interpreters and so maintain or change power relations. 
As mentioned previously, in 2006, the study Footprint Romania identified that Romania was 
still regarded as an exotic presence in Europe (Euractiv, 2008) and that 68% regarded 
Romania as old-fashioned, as well as linked images of poverty, backwardness and corruption 
to it (Euractiv, 2006). At the same time, the discourses in the Reports accentuated that 
Romania would at one point become a member state and thus the discourses witnessed of 
indications of an imminent accession. It can be argued that the EU simulated solidarity with 
the non-European Eastern Other and the post-communist Romania through the latter 
discourse (see Fairclough, 2001:160). The interpreters were therefore interpreting such 
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discourses as Romania making progress towards accession, while the Romanian society was 
very much becoming a European society (see Euractiv, 2006). Nonetheless, by producing 
such a discourse, the EU brought in the idea of the non-European Eastern Other becoming 
European through enlargement. What we then identify here is how discourses at the societal 
level maintained a particular kind of discourse, in which a distinction was made between 
Europe and the Other.  
 
Thus, at the societal level we identify a different power struggle between Romania as the 
non-European Eastern Other and the EU as the embodiment of Europe. The Reports’ 
discourses can be regarded as an important element in this power struggle, as the discourses 
sustained the same power relations. What this means is that the power struggle was enabled 
by the position as the dominant bloc of the EU in the production process and which used the 
Reports to include ideologies of how Romania belonged to a certain category of applicants 
and thus created knowledge about Romania (see Fairclough, 2001:73). As mentioned earlier, 
the power struggle was won by the EU at societal level by constraining contents, positions 
and relations in discourses. For instance, the use of distinctive words to describe the positions 
of the EU and Romania clearly identified how the EU controlled what positions each agency 
was to intake. In Chapter 6, it was revealed how the wording of member states and candidate 
countries had an impact on the contents, positions and relations that were being produced, but 
also how such a vocabulary may have impacted upon interpretation.  
 
One notable question that emerges from this analysis at the societal level is whether there 
have been any changes of unequal power relations. The above indicates that this is not the 
case. For instance, the introduction of unprecedented criteria, such as benchmarking and 
safeguard clauses, indicates that the unequal power relations were sustained at the societal 
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level. In particular, this was noticed in the September 2006 Report, which introduced the idea 
of a continued monitoring activity of Romania post accession. In other words, the discourse 
sustained the same unequal power relations in that the EU was to continue its monitoring 
role, while Romania had to comply to a subaltern position.  
 
The findings reported above suggest that the Reports’ discourses were ideologically 
determined and ideologically determinative of power relations and power struggles. It was 
established that at the societal level, the discourses of the Reports were produced based on for 
instance the idea of the non-European Eastern Other and the European Self. As the EU was 
the dominant bloc in the enlargement process, it also had control over what contents, relations 
and positions were produced. The important part however is that depending on the societal 
situation, the MR that the EU relied on were to influence and thus shape in which way they 
controlled the discourses. As previous chapters have shown, the Reports’ discourses 
witnessed of a variety of practices in which a distinction between the EU and Romania was 
based upon the idea of Europe versus the Other. This in turn would impact upon how 
interpreters were to understand the Romanian enlargement and thus activate specific MR.  
 
8.5. Power relations at situational level 
The analysis of the determinations and effects at the situational level will underline how the 
power relations and power struggles shaped and were shaped by the Reports’ discourse. This 
level is also related to the situational context discussed in Chapter 7 and thus is related to how 
producers and interpreters were influenced by a background of MR, intertextuality and what 
it is in the text, in particular the discourse type, as well as the contents, positions and relations 
of the discourse type (Fairclough, 2001:39). 
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The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of 
situational level that the discourses belong to. The situational level is largely related to time 
and space in the Romanian enlargement. As it was previously discussed in Chapter 7, during 
the production process, a certain discourse type was produced, according to which a 
discourse took a certain shape. This discourse type was related to the process of enlargement, 
in this case Romania and so the discourses produced were related to what the situation 
required of the Reports to include. As it was mentioned in Chapter 3, language was used to 
constrain relations, contents and positions in the Reports. When it comes to the process of 
production, the findings suggested that the EU was the dominant bloc and thus had power to 
control and constrain relations, contents and position to a higher degree than the non-
influential participants such as Romania.  
 
The situational level has a striking importance to the interpretation dimension, questioning 
how MR and ideologies will be interpreted. Although the Reports were produced as the EU’s 
assessment of the Romanian enlargement, such discourses were meant not only for the EU, 
but also for instance the general public. As it was mentioned earlier, the Reports can be found 
for instance in electronic format on the Internet or as hard copies in Brussels and thus can be 
accessed by largely anyone. This distribution of the Reports can be identified as an attempt to 
introduce the wider public to the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement, but it does 
not mean that by doing so, the EU is not ideologically influencing how interpreters will 
interpret such assessments. In particular, by opening up towards larger audiences, the 
assessments were exposed to large masses and thus the EU’s examinations would impact 
upon how the wider public viewed Romania. What is of concern is the fact that we do not 
known whether the EU did this as a manipulative or a sincere act. As it was discussed in 
Chapter 7, a sincere act takes place when a producer believes that the interpreters of a 
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discourse sincerely share the same information, knowledge, understanding, etc. as the 
producer, while a manipulative act has the contrast effect, in that the producer deliberately 
hides information (see Faiclough, 2001:128). 
 
8.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship 
This section argues that examining the sociocultural practices can reveal the extent to which 
such practices may be identified as places in which unequal power relations were produced, 
exercised and enacted. The focus here will therefore be on how sociocultural practices have 
given rise to aspects of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry at the institutional, situational 
and societal levels (see Locke, 2004:42). The below presents a discussion of how the findings 
help us understand the production of unequal power relations and sets out how subalternity, 
orientalism and mimicry were operating in the Reports.  
 
The analysis of the sociocultural practices argues that due to the unequal encounter between 
the EU and Romania, the EU held power in and behind discourse. It was therefore the MR 
and ideologies of the EU that were reproduced in the Reports. We can then argue that the 
power relations at institutional, situational and societal levels can be identified as 
representational systems, which rendered Romania mute. Especially as Romania was 
dependent on the EU’s approval regarding the membership criteria, its position as a subaltern 
did not change. This questions whether the muteness of the subaltern (Romania) can in fact 
be challenged, by finding ways of allowing the subaltern to speak, to be heard and to be 
listened to. One way of finding out whether Romania was able to speak may be identified by 
examining the sociocultural practices after Romania has become a member state. Although 
such an aspect is not part of the aim of this research, it is nonetheless interesting to compare 
whether Romania’s subalternity changed post-accession.   
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Due to the powerful position of the EU in the Romanian enlargement, the EU was also able to 
produce knowledge about the Romanian enlargement and about Romania as a candidate 
(orientalism). As the above argued, the EU’s assessments of the enlargement reproduced their 
MR and ideologies about Romania. Romania on the other hand did not have the power to 
create knowledge, although we have identified instances when Romanian officials reacted to 
unsatisfactory assessments of the EU. Such reactions imply two postcolonial elements. First, 
we identify that the EU was producing knowledge (oriental discourse), which created a 
certain image about Romania. Second, Romania disagreed with such a discourse by raising 
concerns and disapproval of the EU. This can be seen as a way through which Romania was 
making its voice heard. We can then assume that the power of the EU was challenged (social 
struggle). However, judging from the path of the Romanian enlargement, a change of 
discourse did not occur, most likely due to the powerful position of the EU in the actual 
enlargement process and the dependency of Romania for the approval of the EU. In this case 
we identify not only an unequal encounter, but also that social struggles did not enable 
change or emancipation.  
 
Aspects of mimicry were not discernable in the findings of the explanation dimension. This 
may be due to the fact that as the EU maintained power in and behind discourse throughout 
the Romanian enlargement and thus power relations were not changed, the analysis could not 
identify instances in which Romania became knowable and visible. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that mimicry did not occur. For instance, once Romania became an EU member 
state, the former became the same as the EU (mimicry). What is however interesting to 
examine is the extent to which the EU still maintained power in discourse after Romania’s 
accession or whether social struggles occurred, which led to change and emancipation. This 
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relates in particular to the EU decision that Romania was to be monitored post-accession and 
would therefore introduce useful insights about power relations in a post-accession phase. 
Although such questions are not related to the current thesis, it is nonetheless pivotal in 
understanding the production of unequal power relations post-accession from the perspective 
of mimicry. Such examinations can for instance engage with the extent to which Romania 
was “a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” or whether the EU 
regarded Romania as “both resemble and menace at once” (Bhabha op.ci., p.86).  
 
However, one particular element in the findings above suggests an aspect of mimicry. When 
discussing the societal level, it was argued that discourses supported a particular discourse, in 
which a distinction was made between Europe (the EU) and the Other (Romania), although 
Romania was regarded as a future EU member state. This can be related to the fact that 
Romania was becoming knowable and visible during enlargement and thus was challenging 
the power of the EU. However, by creating a certain representation of Romania (which in this 
case relates to oriental binary representations), the EU inscribed the image that Romania was 
“almost the same, but not quite”, which is an aspect of mimicry. 
 
8.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the production of unequal power relations can be identified in 
instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operated in the sociocultural 
practices of the Reports. In a wider perspective, the above findings are significant because 
they question the extent to which unequal power relations are affected at three different 
levels, institutional, societal and situational, as power relations at these levels supported an 
unequal encounter between the EU and Romania, which in turn impacted upon how the 
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discourses of the Reports were produced and interpreted, which in turn effect the formal 
properties of the Reports. 
 
The analysis of the sociocultural practices demonstrated that due to the unequal encounter 
between the EU and Romania, the EU held power in and behind discourse. It was therefore 
the MR and ideologies of the EU that were reproduced in the Reports. The power relations at 
the institutional, situational and societal levels can be identified as representational systems, 
which rendered Romania mute. Due to the powerful position of the EU, the latter was also 
able to produce knowledge about the Romanian enlargement and about Romania as a 
candidate (orientalism). Aspects of mimicry were not apparent in the findings of the 
explanation dimension, although parts of the Reports’ discourses in which Romania was 
promised a future as EU member state can be identified as mimicry. On several occasions, 
the chapter also discussed how Romania challenged the EU (social struggles), but that such 
social struggles were won by the EU and thus did not result in a change of power relations, 
but the continued reproduction of the EU’s ideologies in and behind discourse at the 
situational, institutional and societal levels.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This thesis argues that the limited application of postcolonial perspectives in EU enlargement 
studies, and especially in studying power relations, has led to a failure to properly identify 
and examine the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Current studies of 
the EU are largely based on mainstream positivist theories, which overlook the importance of 
a post-positivist, critical and interpretivist research framework in understanding enlargement 
and power relations. In contrast, by adopting postcolonialist perspectives, and applying them 
to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of 
the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with officials of the EU and Romanian 
negotiating teams in order to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power 
relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry that have so far been 
identified and discussed by postcolonial scholars. This thesis aims therefore to address this 
gap and advance the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations.  
 
In order to proceed with the above argument, the thesis first reviewed the EU enlargement 
literature. The discussion argued that besides its strengths in engaging with different aspects 
of the EU, there is a dearth of postcolonial applications in the literature and in particular in 
examining how the EU produces unequal power relations, which are similar to the legacies of 
colonial and imperial unequal power relations. In contrast, the thesis argued that postcolonial 
scholars have established a solid body of literature based on different postcolonial 
perspectives. One of the most distinctive postcolonial scholarships is the EU focused 
postcolonial literature, which has proven to be a fruitful research avenue, by taking 
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postcolonialism to new levels in the study of the EU. Nevertheless, there still remains a 
dearth of postcolonial applications in this particular literature, due to limited application of 
postcolonial perspectives, overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement 
and using a limited research method. The thesis argues that tackling these gaps is of particular 
value for trying to come to terms with how the EU produces unequal power relations and 
introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a 
postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced. Overall, the thesis argued 
that by building upon postcolonial literature, this current thesis will advance the application 
of postcolonialism to the study of how the EU produces unequal power relations.  
The thesis argued that the literature has been silent about the following research questions:  
 
 To what extent can a postcolonial examination demonstrate how the EU produces 
unequal power relations in the enlargement context?  
 How can we reveal such unequal power relations?  
 In which way does a postcolonial examination contribute to our understanding of EU 
enlargement and the production of unequal power relations?  
 
The thesis maintained that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the 
gaps identified, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in adequately 
demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The thesis also 
argued that the application of three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and 
mimicry, will introduce a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the 
EU and in particular in adequately understanding how unequal power relations are produced. 
Moreover, apart from orientalism, which has been steadily applied, subalternity and mimicry 
have so far been obscured to a great extent from EU enlargement studies. Thus, the thesis 
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argued that examining the EU from the standpoints of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry 
will set out a preliminary discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to analyse 
the EU and unequal power relations.  
The thesis also maintained that employing critical discourse analysis and the interviewing 
technique will aim to shed the maximum light on examining the extent to which the EU 
produces unequal power relations. Content analysis was also employed to provide an 
additional element of data-collection and thus support the research findings. Furthermore, the 
thesis argued that the most relevant CDA model for the purpose of the research questions is 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA. The centrality of this model is sustained by bringing 
into perspective a research method, which engages with the production of unequal power 
relations “through focusing upon language". More importantly, the three-dimensional CDA 
model contributes to the research questions through its engagement with the production of 
unequal production in and behind discourse at a micro, meso and micro level of analysis. The 
thesis indicated the extent to which each dimension (description, interpretation, explanation) 
of the three-dimensional CDA model has the potential to make a significant contribution to 
the understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced, by revealing what 
ideologies are hidden in the language produced by the EU and how do they impact upon 
unequal power relations. The three-dimensional model was applied to two sets of EU 
documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report. Furthermore, by 
making participants aware of how ideologies may work as instruments of inequality, change 
of unequal power relations and emancipation of subordinated participants may occur.  
 
The thesis argued that examining the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement 
will not only provide a history of the enlargement progress and accession negotiations, but 
will also set out the extent to which different elements of the Romanian enlargement reveal 
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some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. The chapter 
identified an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania and which facilitated the 
production of unequal power relations in the Romanian enlargement. 
 
Establishing a postcolonial relationship 
 
The thesis argued that although formal properties (vocabulary and grammar), discourse 
practices and sociocultural practices may be automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot 
neglect the fact that these may also be ideological. Thus these elements can be identified as 
places in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted. The thesis 
therefore presented discussions of how the findings help us understand the extent of the 
production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and setting 
out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.  
 
The thesis argued that each of the above mentioned elements produced aspects of 
subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which impacted upon unequal power relations. Such 
findings are significant because they demonstrate that examining the EU and unequal power 
relations through the perspective of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry enables scholars to 
conceptualize new postcolonial experiences in the EU. In particular since the existing 
literature has developed largely without references to subalternity and mimicry, these notions 
become a paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in 
the present and in expanding the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power 
relations. What is intriguing about the findings is that participants in discourse are (often) not 
aware of how the different elements of discourse can contribute to unequal power relations. 
However, by identifying the extent to which subalternity, orientalism and mimicry impact 
upon unequal power relations through formal properties, discourse practices and sociocultural 
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practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in 
and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such unequal 
relations.  
 
First, the thesis argued that subalternity is of enormous value in examining the EU and 
unequal power relations as it enabled us to engage with questions regarding the extent to 
which representational systems rendered marginalized groups mute and the ways in which 
instruments of subjugation impacted upon power relations within the enlargement context. 
Moreover, the application of subalternity also engaged with the extent to which the muteness 
of the subaltern can in fact be challenged, by finding ways of allowing the subaltern to speak, 
to be heard and to be listened to. Similarly, the application of subalternity enabled an 
understanding of the EU and in particular unequal power relations to be represented from the 
perspectives of marginalized groups. In particular, this bottom-up approach aims to enable 
the voices of these groups to be heard, which are missing in mainstream positivist analyses 
and which so far has been “represented” by “the colonial voice of the EU” (Polat op.cit., 
p.1269). Second, the application of subalternity not only introduced alternative 
representations and knowledge from the perspectives of marginalized groups, but also 
questioned the durability of truths created by the EU and challenges power relations inherent 
from EU practices and forms of representations and knowledge.  
 
Second, orientalism was of paramount importance to EU studies from two different 
perspectives. First, it expanded the discursive and linguistic turn in enlargement studies and 
drew attention to an alternative way of understanding the EU. Second, orientalism established 
a platform in which discursive domination can be examined in the postcolonial present. By 
applying this to for instance enlargement documents, such an analysis expands the 
 Page | 264  
 
examination of how language was used as a medium through which unequal power relations 
were produced. Moreover, the application of orientalism enabled alternative forms of 
knowledge and resistance to be seen and heard.   
 
Third, engaging with mimicry was also instrumental when examining the EU and unequal 
power relations, as mimicry engaged with the EU on a different level than subalternity and 
orientalism. Mimicry advocated resistance to unequal power relations by acknowledging the 
mimicking of marginalized groups and how mimicry evoked both resemblance and threat to 
the EU, which indicated a flaw in the certainty of EU dominance in controlling the mimic 
man (Romania). The centrality of mimicry laid in the fact that its application revealed a state 
of ambivalence of Romania and which can be regarded as a form of power strategy against 
the EU. Moreover, the application of mimicry recognized a bottom-up approach and 
encouraged emancipation, by acknowledging how subordinated groups can be “knowable and 
visible”.  
 
Overall the three postcolonial perspectives enabled new ways of theorizing and displaying a 
new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand enlargement and set out a 
preliminary discussion of the extent to which postcolonialism might be applied to the case of 
the EU and unequal power relations. In particular these perspectives have helped in 
answering the three research questions. 
 
Contributions 
The thesis argued that the current research makes three important contributions.  
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First, the thesis contributes to the advancement of post-positivist application and postcolonial 
research on EU enlargement and power relations, by introducing a critical exploration and 
rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power 
relations are produced. The thesis argued that although the bulk of enlargement studies is 
vast, enlargement has largely been discussed from the perspectives of positivist mainstream 
theories. However, by providing a postcolonial springboard for the investigation of the EU 
and power relations, this research aimed to make an important theoretical contribution, which 
will consolidate the application of post-positivist perspectives and reduce the postcolonial 
void that exists in EU studies (Tlostanova op.cit., p.130).  
 
Second, another contribution is related to EU focused postcolonial scholarship. Although this 
scholarship provides substantial research, the fifth enlargement and power relations have 
been largely discussed from the viewpoint of one specific postcolonial perspective, 
orientalism. Even though orientalism offers a solid rationale within which the EU and power 
relations can be understood, by including two additional postcolonial perspectives, 
subalternity and mimicry (and alongside orientalism) this thesis aimed to capture a broader 
postcolonial analysis, by expanding our understanding of the extent to which postcolonial 
perspectives can provide a framework within which the EU’s production of unequal power 
relations can be examined.   
 
The third contribution is methodological. Building upon discourse analysis studies, this thesis 
argued that we can further expand EU research by applying the method of critical discourse 
analysis, which aims to “’critique, expose, deconstruct, counter and … transcend’” unequal 
power relations (Sidaway op.cit., p.594). In particular, CDA not only examines the extent to 
which unequal power relations are produced in and behind discourse through the application 
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of a micro, meso and macro level of analysis, but it also aims to attain change and 
emancipation.  
 
Limitations 
The thesis argued that four limitations can be identified in the current research.  
 
First, the three-dimensional CDA is a research method that largely depends on the 
involvement of the researcher in engaging with the examination of inequality in power 
relations. As mentioned previously, CDA is influenced by a range of aspects such as what the 
researcher “’sees’ in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to 
emphasize” (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). For instance, when it comes to the interpretation 
dimension, the researcher also uses her own MR, ideologies, etc., which may influence the 
results through the research’s “capacity to herself engage in the discourse processes she is 
investigating” (Fairclough op.cit., p.138). Thus, the researcher is “inevitably influenced in the 
way they perceive” matters they research, the choice of research topics and the way 
researchers approach such topics. Therefore, it is important for a researcher to acknowledge 
her standpoint and identify how this could have been influenced by the researcher’s own MR 
and ideologies (Fairclough, 2001:4). However, as long as the researcher is aware of the 
implications of one’s MR, ideologies, etc. upon results, a certain level of objectivity is 
maintained, as the researcher is conscious of the conventions applied to research and is self-
conscious of her involvement and the need “to explicate what she is doing” (2001:139).  
 
Second, due to limited accessibility to some of the interviewees, I resorted to other forms of 
interview techniques, such as phone and email interviews. These forms of interviews have 
their strengths, but their shortcomings lay in the fact that such techniques offer an impersonal 
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method and provide short and not expansive replies. In contrast, the material recorded in face 
to face interviews was lengthier and more elaborated.  
 
Third, in contrast to non-elite respondents, elite interviewees had a tendency to control the 
interview situation in a variety of ways, such as in deciding the flow of the interview through 
interruptions and controlling their responses. Furthermore, elite interviewees opted for 
anonymity, an aspect which was not requested by non-elite interviewees. Such circumstances 
questioned the extent to which the interview material include the accurate version of what 
happened or the experiences of the interviewees in the Romanian enlargement.  
 
Fourth, although all interviewees were advised that their participation would enable insightful 
contributions to the academic literature through this current research, a significant low 
number of Romanian officials indicated that they wanted to be part of the research, in 
contrast to the EU officials. This raised questions regarding their motives for not responding 
to or declining the interview request.  
 
Future research 
The below includes a range of suggestions regarding future research.  
 
First, the main suggestion is to further the applicability of postcolonial perspectives on 
enlargement and power relations, for instance by engaging with other postcolonial key 
themes such as ambivalence and hybridity (both Bhabha’s themes). This will not only expand 
the use of post-positivist perspectives in EU studies, but will also further our understanding 
of the EU as a postcolonial space in the present.  
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Second, another interesting prospective research project may be a postcolonial critique of 
perhaps a different round of enlargement, as this will engage with the question of whether the 
postcolonial discourse was the same in the Romanian enlargement as it was in for instance 
the Polish one. In particular, as Chiva and Phinnemore argue that the impact of the 2007 
enlargement has brought evident changes to the reports of the next round of enlargement 
(2011b:14), it would therefore be of importance to reveal what aspects have changed in the 
recent rounds of negotiations. Such an application can be applied to the latest round of 
enlargement (Croatia) or future ones as in the case of the Western Balkans and Turkey.  
 
Third, one of the themes that was discussed in the above thesis was the aspect of reproduction 
of ideologies. For a possible future research, especially one which I would be interested in, an 
examination of the extent to which unequal power relations are produced by the EU after 
post-accession would be of significant importance in order to engage further with the aspect 
of reproduction of ideologies and the impact upon power relations. Such an avenue of 
research was slightly suggested in Chapter 8, when it was questioned whether Romania was 
able to speak by analyzing the sociocultural practices after 2007 and whether changed and 
emancipation did take place and how.  
 
Fourth and as a suggestion, the theoretical (and analytical) framework of the thesis can offer a 
useful avenue for research of the EU’s relationship with Greece and Ireland during the 
Eurozone crisis. Postcolonialism can be instrumental in identifying how EU discourses have 
created for instance a certain knowledge of the “other” (orientalism), dismissed the other’s 
voice (subalternity) or how the other has resisted the framing of orientalism and subalternity 
(mimicry). A number of scholars have engaged with postcolonialism when discussing the 
Eurozone crisis in relation to Greece and Ireland, although there is still room for further 
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research (Pitelis, 2012; Gibbons, 2013; Bhambra, 2016; Vossole, 2016). One insightful study, 
which addresses the rise of racism towards Greece and Ireland (as well as three more EU 
countries), is Jonas van Vossole’s examination of political and media discourses and how 
such discourses have produced a racist framing of Greece and Ireland. Vossole employs a 
postcolonialist framework in order to reveal how these discourses have re-employed (or what 
Vossole calls “a return of colonial dynamics in the Eurozone”) “colonial power relations 
through processes of economic dependence, conditional aid and cultural hegemony” 
(2016:1). Further postcolonial examination will therefore challenge mainstream 
understandings of Greece/Ireland-EU relations and raise awareness of “the situatedness of the 
EU and its current crises” from a post-positivist perspective (Manners and Whitman, 2016:3 
and 14).  
 
As a concluding remark, this thesis argues that by adopting postcolonialist perspectives, and 
applying them to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents a critical 
discourse analysis of the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with officials of 
the EU and Romanian negotiating teams, demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces 
unequal power relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. As such, 
the thesis has enabled an alternative (post-positivt) way of explaining and understanding how 
power relations are produced in enlargement.  
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Appendix 1.  
 
List of the ten questions89, which we can ask about the formal properties of a text, as outlined 
in Norman Fairclough’s Language and Power (2001), pp. 92-93.  
 
A. Vocabulary 
1. What experiential values do words have? *  
What classification schemes are drawn upon? * 
 Are there words which are ideologically contested? *  
 Is there rewording or overwording? * 
 What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) 
are there between words? *  
2. What relational values do words have?  
Are there euphemistic expressions?* 
Are there markedly formal or informal words?  
3. What expressive values do words have? 
4. What metaphors are used?*  
 
B. Grammar 
5. What experiential values do grammatical features have?  
What types of process and participant predominate?  
Is agency unclear? 
Are processes what they seem? 
Are nominalizations used? *  
Are sentences active or passive? *  
Are sentences positive or negative?  
6. What relational values do grammatical features have?  
What modes (declarative, grammatical question, imperative) are used? 
Are there important features of relational modality?  
Are the pronouns of we and you used, and if so, how?  
                                                          
89 The questions identified by star (*) indicate that these were not applied to the Reports, as the questions were 
not relevant, were absent or could not be asked. 
 Page | 271  
 
7. What expressive values do grammatical features have? 
Are there important features of expressive modality?  
8. How are (simple) sentences linked together? *  
What logical connectors are used? * 
Are complex sentences characterized by coordination or subordination? * 
What means are used for referring inside and outside the text? * 
 
C. Textual structures 
9. What interactional conventions are used? * 
Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of others? * 
10. What large-scale structures does the text have? * 
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Appendix 4. 
 
 
The time frame of the production of a Regular Report and the entities involved, based on the 
description by Katja Lass-Lennecke and Annika Werner (2009:279-280). 
 
 
 
Time Task Entity responsible Received by 
 Guidelines for the production of the Regular 
Report sent to all relevant parties. 
Co-ordination Unit of 
DG ELARG 
All relevant parties  
Spring of 
each year 
Commissioner for Enlargement set the final 
deadline when the Reports had to be forwarded to 
the Council of Ministers. 
DG ELARG Co-ordination Unit 
 Set exact deadlines for the Reports. Co-ordination Unit All relevant parties 
June Report detailing achievements in previous year 
sent. 
Candidate country90 DG ENLARG 
 Report detailing achievements in previous year 
sent. 
EU delegation of each 
candidate country  
DG ENLARG 
 First draft based on both reports was prepared. 
 
Country desk Chapter desks 
 Draft compared with every chapter desk within 
DG ENLARG, to ensure correctness and 
consistency in their policy area. 
Chapter desks Co-ordination Unit 
 Draft revised to ensure coherence in content and 
language. 
Co-ordination Unit  
July Consultation of other sources to ensure a broad 
understanding of the candidate’s progress. On the 
political criteria: Council of Europe; non-
governmental organizations (i.e. Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), etc. On 
the economic criteria: International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, etc.. 
Commission officials Co-ordination Unit 
July-
September  
Additional information could be sent. Candidate country  DG ENLARG 
Early 
September  
Harmonized information and draft to ensure 
consistency.  
DG ENLARG All DGs of the 
Commission 
September Inter-service consultations took place during 
which DGs made comments, which they returned 
within ten days. The DGs only received the 
individual chapters concerning their field. 
All DGs of the 
Commission 
Co-ordination Unit 
 Final reading and adjustment of draft. Co-ordination Unit  
End of 
September 
Final internal deadline of the Report. Co-ordination Unit  
First half 
of October  
Short bilateral meeting with each candidate in 
order to present the central points of the Report. 
Afterwards, the Reports left the administrative 
level within the Commission and approached the 
political one. 
DG ENLARG 
 
 
Commission’s 
College 
Second 
half of 
October- 
first half 
of 
Inter-cabinet consultations and adoption of a final 
version of the Report. 
 
Commission’s College   
                                                          
90 This is the report of the country’s Chief Negotiator and his office (Grabbe, 2001:1018).  
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November 
 
Second 
half of 
November  
Delivery of full Report. Commission’s College Council of 
Ministers 
December  Report adopted. European Council  
Following 
year 
Decisions based on the Report to enter into 
practice. 
All relevant parties  
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